Russia, Cina, energia, alleanze regionali Wsws 06-04-04
Una “partnership strategica” più stretta tra Russia e
Cina, cementata con gas e petrolio
John Chan
Tesi WSWS:
–
Russia e Cina stanno forgiando più strette relazioni
economiche e strategiche.
–
Russia e Cina hanno emesso una dichiarazione congiunta su
“interessi condivisi”, contro l’aggressività USA:
o
Irak, Afghanistan, basi militari in Centro Asia,
appoggio a rivoluzioni ex repubbliche sovietiche;
o
contenimento strategico di Pechino con una rete
di alleati: Jap, Corea, Australia, India,
–
La Risoluzione è rivolta contro l’intervento USA in
regioni di interesse vitale per i due paesi, e
–
significativamente propone “un meccanismo di
cooperazione triangolare” con l’India,
che gli USA intendono utilizzare per completare l’accerchiamento della Cina.
–
Nel 2005 Cina e Russia hanno riconosciuto all’India lo
status di osservatore nella Shanghai Cooperation Organisation dei paesi del
Centro Asia.
–
Il comunicato appoggia la Cina, e la legge anti-secessione
contro Taiwan, emanata dalla Cina del 2005, che autorizza l’uso della forza contro
Taiwan in caso di dichiarazione di indipendenza.
–
Nel 2005 le prime esercitazioni militari congiunte
russo-cinesi sulla costa cinese (obiettivo immaginario Taiwan); per il 2007
previste le seconde nel Nord Caucaso, che comprende la Cernia e confina con Georgia,
Azerbaidjan e Ucraina.
Le riserve mondiali di gas sono concentrate in Russia, Iran
e Qatar; il predomino USA in MO spinge Europa, Cina, Giappone e India verso l’opzione
russa.
–
Ne deriva un rafforzamento della posizione negoziale di
Mosca, già utilizzata contro Ucraina, Georgia e Armenia, e come ammonimento a
Germania e Francia contro eccessiva pressione politica.
–
L’invito a Russia per il primo Summit Est Asia del novembre
2005 è riconoscimento della sua importanza energetica per l’Asia. Putin si è
impegnato a vendere al Jap il 30% del gas siberiano, ha offerto a Sud Corea fornitura
di gas di 6mn. m3.
21-22 marzo 2006, 5° incontro tra presidente russo Putin e cinese
Hu Jintao in meno di un anno; a Pechino cerimonia d’apertura dello “anno della
Russia” in Cina. Il prossimo anno previsto in Russia “l’anno della Cina”
Putin accompagnato da oltre 1000 funzionari e uomini d’affari
tra cui : dirigenti del gigante russo del petrolio Rosneft, di quello del gas
Gazprom e del monopolista di oleodotti Transneft.
Siglati 29 accordi, il maggiore riguarda la costruzione di
due gasdotti dall’Est ed ovest Siberia alla Cina per il 2011, costo complessivo
$10MD. È questa una vittoria per la Cina dopo la revoca russa nel 2003 dell’accordo
di costruzione di un oleodotto fino a Daging, al Nord-Est Cina, e accordo con
Jap per oleodotto Est Siberia-Oceano Pacifico, al porto di Nakhodka).
Impegno russo a fornitura di 60-80 m3 l’anno, il
doppio del consumo cinese nel 2004. Il petrolio russo giunge fino ad ora via
ferrovia; previsti 25 mn. di tonnellate per il 2006, quasi x 2 su 2005.
Nel 2005 gli scambi commerciali bilaterali + 37,1%, per la
maggior parte derivanti dall’accresciuta importazione cinese di petrolio,
materie prime e armamenti (grazie anche la persistente embargo europeo ed
americano sulle armi, dal 1989).
Fino ad ora la Russia non ha fornito gas alla Cina, e solo
il 5% del suo import petrolifero. La Cina intende raddoppiare la quota di gas
nel suo consumo energetico per il 2010.
Il portavoce di Gazprom: Futuri aumenti di fornitura di gas russo all’Europa
dovranno essere sottoposti a negoziato tra Cina e paesi europei.
Wsws 06-04-04
A closer
Russia-China “strategic partnership” cemented with oil and gas
By John Chan
– The visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin to China on March 21-22 was a further sign that Moscow and Beijing are
moving closer to one another in response to Washington’s increasingly hostile stance
toward the two countries.
It was Putin’s fifth meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao in less than a
year. He was accompanied by an unprecedented delegation of 1,000 officials and businessmen. Putin told Russian
journalists: “A thousand people. And they all—I would like to emphasise
this—are engaged in something concrete. First of all, this bears witness to the
fact that Russia and China
have achieved a very high level of interaction which leads to further expanding
our cooperation.”
In Beijing,
Putin attended the opening ceremony of China’s “Year of Russia”—a series of cultural
and business events to promote bilateral relations. Next year, the Russian
government is planning its own “Year of China”.
– A Sino-Russia economic forum was held in Beijing
to strengthen bilateral trade, which grew 37.1 percent last year, largely due to China’s expanding demand for
Russian oil, raw materials and weapons.
– A key focus of Putin’s trip
was oil and gas. Top executives from oil giant Rosneft, natural gas supplier Gazprom and
pipeline monopoly Transneft were part of the Russian delegation. Of the 29 agreements signed, the most significant was a deal to build
two gas pipelines from eastern and western Siberia to China by 2011
at a total cost of up to $10 billion.
– Russia
has agreed to supply China with 60-80 billion cubic metres of gas
annually, twice China’s total
consumption in 2004. The huge scale of the Chinese agreement has already
provoked concerns in Europe, which depends on Russia for 70 percent of its gas,
about the impact on supplies to European markets.
In response to comments in Europe, Gazprom spokesman Sergei Kupriyanov promised to
fulfill existing contracts. “However,
– the future increases in gas
supplies to Europe—in response to its growing demand—will be subject to arbitrage between China and European countries,”
he warned.
– Russia has the world’s largest
reserves of natural gas and is the second largest producer of oil. Currently, however, Russia supplies
no gas and accounts for only 5 percent of Chinese imports of oil. The
pipeline deal will assist China to achieve its target of doubling the
proportion of gas in its total energy consumption by 2010.
The gas deal is clearly a boost for Beijing
after Moscow abrogated a 2003 agreement to build
an oil pipeline to the northeastern Chinese city of Daqing. Russia
decided instead to accept a Japanese proposal to build an East
Siberia-Pacific Ocean
(ESPO) pipeline to the Pacific port of
Nakhodka to facilitate oil exports to Japan in
particular.
China,
which is the world’s second largest consumer of oil, is keen to have Russian
supplies. In Beijing,
Putin declared that there was “no doubt” that a spur from ESPO line to Daqing
would be built, but no timetable was given.
– At present, Russian oil is
transported to China
via an already overloaded rail system. Russia is expected to ship about 15 million
tonnes of oil to China
this year, nearly double last year’s level.
Although Moscow
and Beijing are
yet to finalise details of the gas pipeline, including the sensitive issue
of price, Russia is
obviously preparing to play a central role in China’s energy supply.
Energy diplomacy
– According to the
International Energy Agency, gas is currently providing 21 percent of global
energy and is expected
to overtake coal as the world’s second largest energy source by 2030. The world’s gas reserves are
largely concentrated in three countries: Russia,
Iran and Qatar.
– With the US
occupying Iraq and
threatening Iran, it is
clear to America’s rivals in
Europe and Asia that Washington
is seeking control Middle Eastern oil and gas. Thus
securing alternative
supplies has become a critical issue for European countries as well as China, Japan
and India.
Russia
is an obvious option.
Dmitry Trenin, deputy director of the
Moscow Carnegie Centre, recently summed up the sentiment in Russian ruling circles that Moscow should make the most of its strong
bargaining position. In the 19th century, Tsar Alexander III famously declared
that Russia
had two allies: the army and the navy. Rephrasing the remark, Trenin commented:
“Russia
now has only two allies: oil and gas.”
By strengthening China as a market, Russia will be able to wield energy
supplies even more effectively as a strategic weapon. Moscow has already used its position
as gas supplier to threaten pro-Western regimes in Ukraine,
Georgia and Armenia and indirectly warn France and Germany
against putting too much political pressure on Russia.
– Putin was invited to
the first East Asian Summit last November, largely because of Russia’s growing importance as an oil supplier
for Asia. He also visited
Seoul, where he proposed to provide 6 million
cubic metres of gas to South Korea in 2008, and Tokyo,
where he pledged to sell Japan 30 percent of the gas extracted from
the Sakhalin-1 project in eastern Siberia.
In December, as Russia began construction on the $5 billion
North European Pipeline to deliver gas to Germany
and other European countries via the Baltic Sea, Gazprom began demanding higher
gas prices from the Ukraine.
The standoff not only threatened the Ukraine,
but raised the spectre of a cut-off of gas supplies to Europe.
Russian newspapers have hailed Putin’s gas deal with China as a major coup. Nezavisimaya Gazeta
commented: “The new project
paves Russia’s way not only
into China but also into
other countries in South and South East Asia and makes it less dependent on
supplying gas to Europe”. Vedomosti declared that “even the
sceptics have called the agreement with China ‘a breakthrough’ and ‘a
revolution’. The point is that as of 2011, not just Europe but also Asia will
be dependent on Russia
gas.”
–
At present, Russian and Chinese foreign policies broadly coincide. Both countries share concerns
about Washington’s aggressive policies—in
particular the US-led
occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan and the US
military presence in Central Asia. Moscow confronts hostile
US-backed “colour revolutions” in former Soviet republics. Beijing is facing a barely disguised
policy of US strategic containment through a network of
allies, including Japan,
South Korea, Australia and India.
As a result, the two countries are not only forging a closer economic
relationship but a strategic one as well. With a continuing arms embargo imposed by the US and EU after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, China already relies on Russia as its single largest source of weapons
and military technology, in turn propping up Russia’s decaying arms industry.
– Putin and Chinese
President Hu spelled out their “shared interests” in a joint communiqué, which reaffirmed the sovereignty of independent nations—that is,
opposition to US
intervention in regions vital to Chinese and Russian interests. It called for a “political and diplomatic”
solution of the Iranian nuclear standoff, in opposition to the US push for economic sanctions and military action
against Tehran.
– Significantly, the communiqué
called for “a triangular cooperative mechanism” with India. The Bush administration has been seeking to establish India as a major strategic ally as part of its
geo-political plans, including to encircle China.
– In response, China and Russia
are trying to woo India away
from the US.
Last year they granted observer status to New
Delhi for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)
of Central Asian states. The meeting in Kazakhstan issued a statement calling for the US to set a deadline to shut down its military
bases in Central Asia.
– The Beijing joint communiqué also backed China
against Taiwan, supporting Beijing’s Anti-Secession Law passed last year that
authorises the use of military force against Taiwan if it declares formal
independence. The communiqué declared that Taiwan
was part of China’s
“internal affairs” and other countries should not interfere.
In an interview with the official Xinhua
news agency before his trip, Putin
pointedly criticised Washington’s support for
pro-US regimes in former Soviet republics such as Belarus,
Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. He said the US was
trying to “forcibly export democracy and impose cultural standards and values”.
– Russia and China are also
holding joint military exercises. Last year, the two
countries held their first-ever combined war games—”Peace Mission 2005”—on the Chinese coast. Although
not stated, the obvious target of their imaginary “mission” was Taiwan.
– Last month, Russia
announced plans for the second joint
exercises in the spring of 2007 in Russia’s
sensitive Southern Federal District or northern Caucasus, which includes Chechnya
and is adjacent to Georgia, Azerbaijan
and Ukraine.
Far from backing off, Washington
is likely to react to the developing relationship between Russia and China in an even more aggressive
manner.