Un Kosovo nelle steppe del Centro Asia

M K Bhadrakumar

●    In Centro Asia è in corso un cambiamento paradigmatico, frutto della diplomazia Usa,

o   che nella crisi kirghiza ha legato le relazioni USA con il Kirghizistan alla  guerra in Afghanistan; la base di Manas rimane una priorità per la sicurezza nazionale Usa solo se il Kirghizistan rimane allato affidabile;

o   gli Usa hanno stanziato prontamente un grosso programma di aiuti per la ricostruzione economica del Kirghizistan ($1,5MD, per i prossimi 30 mesi, più di quanto richiesto da Bishkek).

o   Il vice-segretario di Stato americano, Blake: gli Usa non intendono «consegnare il Centro Asia, regione di grande importanza per gli interessi nazionali americani, alla Russia, come suo giardino di casa. Riconosciamo che anche altri paesi  hanno interessi in Centro Asia, ma non accettiamo che nessun paese abbia interessi esclusivi».

●    L’iniziativa Usa di far intervenire la OCSE (Organizzazione per la sicurezza e la Cooperazione in Europa, 56 paesi rappresentanti) nei conflitti in Kirghizistan ed Afghanistan fa prevedere un rimescolamento delle carte in Centro Asia, come premessa alla risoluzione della questione afghana;

o   una sfida per Russia (membro Ocse) e Cina (che non ne fa parte)

o   le cui rispettive organizzazioni per la sicurezza, CSTO[1] (Russia) e SCO (Cina) vengono messe fuori gioco dall’iniziativa Usa.

– Gli Usa – introducendo l’Ocse in Afghanistan – come “Squadra B”, che dovrebbe consentire alla Nato di concentrarsi sui compiti più importanti della sicurezza – si stanno preparando ad un impegno di lungo termine per la sicurezza in Afghanistan e Centro Asia.

– Dato l’acuirsi della crisi in Kirghizistan e la partita finale giocata in Afghanistan, l’iniziativa Usa sembra dare una risposta immediata, mentre Russia e Cina non propongono una contro-strategia.

– Paradossalmente, in caso di fallimento del piano Ocse e di conseguenti tensioni etniche, Russia e Cina potrebbero assumere l’iniziativa,

o   un vantaggio discutibile dato che entrambe hanno interesse alla stabilità regionale.

– Per Russia e Cina l’aspetto più spiacevole dell’iniziativa americana è che il Kazakistan, che esse consideravano l’alleato più sobrio e razionale nella regione, sostiene l’intervento Ocse,

o   e gli Usa hanno accolto la richiesta del Kazakistan di presiedere il vertice Ocse nel 2011;

o   il prossimo 20-21 ottobre, il Kazakistan ospiterà una conferenza straordinaria Ocse, che avrà come tema centrale il suo ruolo nella questione afghana.

o   Secondo Astana (capitale del Kazakistan) l’Ocse può dare un apporto nelle questioni minori di sicurezza e civili: addestramento di personale afghano dell’anti-narcotici, controllo di confini e dogane, assistenza e monitoraggio delle elezioni, sviluppo istituzioni democratiche.

– Il Kazakistan ha chiesto, appoggiato dagli Usa, la nomina di un rappresentante speciale Ocse per l’Afghanistan, e una presenza Ocse sul terreno;

o   a queste richieste si è opposta Mosca: l’Ocse non deve operare in territorio afghano, non devono essere estesi a questo paesi obblighi su diritti umani e democrazia; non c’è alcun motivo di istituire un rappresentante speciale Ocse per l’Afghanistan.

– Negli ultimi 5-6 anni Mosca ha continuato a proporre la CSTO come partner Nato nella stabilizzazione dell’Afghanistan, proposta sempre ignorata da Washington.

– La Russia può reagire solo debolmente, dato che gli Usa presentano il proprio intervento in Kirghizistan come esempio della cooperazione Usa-Russia, voluta a Obama con il riassetto delle relazioni con Medvedev.

– Inoltre Mosca cerca da tempo di trasformare l’Ocse in una efficiente organizzazione per la sicurezza, e l’iniziativa americana in Kirghizistan va in questo senso.

– La Russia ha evitato di assumere un ruolo unilaterale nella stabilizzazione del Kirghizistan, temendo che si trasformi per lei in un eccessivo impegno finanziario.

– Con la Cina che sta a guardare lo scontro Mosca-Washington, la Russia non può permettersi di opporsi all’iniziativa americana in Kirghizistan.

– Anche Kazakistan e Uzbekistan stanno avvicinandosi agli Usa.

– Ci sono anche rischi per la strategia Usa, preoccupanti le prospettive di medio termine per il Kirghizistan, il cui panorama politico presenta molte spaccature … e le divisioni regionali si stanno aggravando; si alzano i toni del nazionalismo kirghizo, rimane profonda la frattura etnica kirghizi-uzbeki; le rivendicazioni Uzbeke rimangono per lo più insoddisfatte.

o   Piccoli gruppi di giovani uzbeki si stanno rivolgendo ai campi e alle reti dei jihadisti in Afghanistan e Pakistan (secondo Martha Olcott, esperta Usa per il Centro Asia).

o   Il pogrom di giugno contro l’etnia uzbeka potrebbe per anni avere gravi conseguenze sia in Kirghizistan che in Uzbekistan.

– Quattro gli scenari paventati per il Kirghizistan, che diventerà:

o   una specie di Sri-Lanka, dove si è formata una forte organizzazione di guerriglieri dopo gli scontro etnici;

o   oppure, una Cecenia, dove il movimento nazionalista è finito nella rete islamista;

o   o un Uzbekistan, dove si è imposta una sanguinosa repressione dopo la sollevazione del 2005;

o   l’introduzione di 52 poliziotti Ocse, disarmati, sono solo il primo passo; i 52 potranno fare poco per stabilizzare il sud Kirghizistan,

●    ma se capiterà loro qualcosa sarà la giustificazione per un intervento armato, della Nato.

●    C’è una base militare Usa a Manas, una base aerea francese a Dushambe, un contingente di 154 000 soldati Nato in Afghanistan; si creerebbe una situazione simile a quella in Kosovo.

●    L’intervento Ocse, inteso per calmare le tensioni, potrebbe viceversa incoraggiare gli uzbeki etnici nel Sud Kirghizistan a perseguire l’autonomia,

o   e questo innescherebbe una reazione del nazionalismo kirghizo, e la comparsa di un uomo forte kirghizo che spazzerebbe via i democraticità filo-Usa.

A questo punto verrebbero coinvolti Uzbekistan e Tajikistan, data l’enclave etnica Vorukh nella provincia di Batken nel Sud Kirghizistan; sarebbero cioè coinvolti tre dei 5 paesi centro Asiatici, una nuova Iugoslavia.

A Kosovo on the Central Asian steppes

–   A robust geopolitical thrustby the United States aimed at creating a role for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in resolving conflicts in Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan promises to rewrite the great game rivalries in Central Asia in anticipation of an Afghan settlement.

–   The US initiative poses political challenges to Russia, which is a member of the 56-member OSCE, and China, which is not.

o    The security vehicles piloted by each the respective two regional powers – the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) – are being outmanoeuvred by the US.

–   Yet, coming in the wake of the deepening crisis in Kyrgyzstan and the endgame in Afghanistan, the US initiative does convey an air of positive thinking and carries a sense of immediacy, while neither Russia nor China has any counter-strategy available.

–   Paradoxically, Russia and China could seize the initiative if the OSCE plan to stabilize the situation in Kyrgyzstan somehow crash-lands and ethnic tensions, violence and anarchy ensue. But that would be a dubious blessing as Russia and China too are stakeholders in regional stability in their own ways.

–   The unkindest cut of all is that it is Kazakhstan, which both Moscow and Beijing counted to be their most sober and thoughtful regional partner, which is heading the OSCE chariot. As Kazakh President Nurusultan Nazarbayev firmly asserted, "There is no doubt a new OSCE strategy on Afghanistan is necessary."

–   The US is delighted, and as a quid pro quo, Washington has accommodated the Kazakh leaderships’ desire to chair an OSCE summit meeting within the year in Astana and thereby claim a legacy on the world stage. The last time the OSCE held a summit meeting was in 1999. This is also the 35th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act. [1]

–   "Kazakhstan’s strategic approach to the Afghan issue became one of the foundations of a historical consensus reached there [the OSCE inter-ministerial meeting in Almaty on July 16-17] on holding an OSCE summit in Astana before the end of 2010," Kazakh State Minister and Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev openly admitted.

–   Kazakhstan will host a special OSCE conference in Astana on October 20-21, when the Afghan issue and the role the OSCE could play in the Hindu Kush will be at the top of the agenda. The conference factors in the current search for a political solution to the Afghan problem.

–   "I would like to emphasize the importance of changing the very paradigm of combating today’s challenges which come from Afghanistan, shifting emphasis from military means to eradication of sources of these challenges,” Saudabayev said. ”Helping the Afghans move from the military conflict to a constructive track is a main objective of the OSCE and the [US-led] international coalition."

–   Astana elaborated on its thinking in a paper titled "Efforts to intensify cooperation with Afghanistan", according to which the OSCE can offer help from its niche competencies in soft security and civilian affairs. These would include training personnel belonging to Afghan security bodies involved in narcotics control, guarding the border and customs, assisting in the conduct of elections and monitoring, and helping develop Afghanistan’s democratic and political institutions.

–   Kazakhstan proposed – evidently, with Washington’s backing – that the OSCE should appoint a special representative for Afghanistan and have an OSCE presence on the ground there.

–   Moscow promptly objected, informing the OSCE’s permanent council in Vienna last month, "Referring to border, customs and anti-drug projects to assist Afghanistan … we [Russia] cannot support the idea of the OSCE operating on Afghanistan’s territory, nor can we support attempts to extend human rights and democracy obligations to this country. Nor do we see any grounds for creating the post of OSCE special representative for Afghanistan."

–   Russia’s sense of indignation is understandable. The US has stolen a march over Moscow, which for the past five or six years has been pleading that the CSTO can act as a constructive partner for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in stabilizing the Afghan situation, but Washington studiously ignored the plea.

–   Now, the US is bringing in the OSCE (which includes Russia) as a "B Team" into Afghanistan so that NATO can concentrate on the major security tasks of the counter-insurgency.

–   Plainly put, the US is preparing for a prolonged involvement with the developing security paradigm of Afghanistan and Central Asia.

–   Yet, Russia is forced to react with one arm tied behind its back. The US misses no opportunity to characterize its initiative in Kyrgyzstan as a fine example of US-Russia cooperation in the best spirit of US President Barack Obama’s "reset" with his Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev.

–   Moscow cannot openly dispute the US interpretation at a time when the "reset" is delicately poised. Besides, Moscow has hoped that cooperation in Afghanistan would itself develop into a major template of the "reset". As for the OSCE role, Moscow has been all along seeking a transformation of the body as an effective security organization and the US initiative in Kyrgyzstan conforms to the Russian wish. Again, Russia has shied away from playing a role in stabilizing the Kyrgyz situation unilaterally and has taken a cautious stance, fearing a Kyrgyz quagmire that could be financially burdensome.

–   Evidently, Russia cannot also object to the US initiative in Kyrgyzstan under the circumstances when China chooses to sit on the fence simply watching the battle of wits between Washington and Moscow.

–   Also, the two key Central Asian countries – Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan – are themselves warming up their relationship with the US.

–   Generally speaking, Washington is having a sort of "reset" with Astana and Tashkent as well. Now, these two Central Asian capitals are essentially trying to emulate Russia’s example of prioritizing ties with the US. On its part, Washington is also being pragmatic about its democracy project in Central Asia that used to irritate authoritarian regimes in the region.

–   Clearly, there is a paradigm shift in Central Asia and the credit goes to US diplomacy; US influence is on an upward curve. The fact is that unlike Russia, which has acted in an ad-hoc manner, the US is coming up with a comprehensive approach to the Kyrgyz crisis and the CSTO’s credibility has suffered.

–   Testifying before the Helsinki Commission in Washington last week, US Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake was frank about the US’s intention to keep its military presence in Kyrgyzstan for the foreseeable future. He said:

–       We are not in competition with any country for influence in Central Asia … Maintaining the Manas Transit Center is an important national security priority for the United States, but that center can only be maintained if Kyrgyzstan itself is a stable and reliable partner and we ourselves are totally transparent in the functioning of the center. The center is an important part of our partnership, but our focus has been and remains developing our overall political, economic and security relationship.

–   The US has also lost no time pushing through a big aid program for Kyrgyzstan’s economic reconstruction. The international donor conference held in Bishkek, the Kyrgyzstan capital, on July 27 was sponsored by the World Bank but it bore Washington’s imprimatur.

–   The donors’ pledge of US$1.5 billion for Kyrgyzstan over the next 30 months exceeded Bishkek’s own request. In political terms, it unmistakably underscores that the "United States has a strong commitment to Kyrgyzstan", as Blake put it.

–   In a July 30 speech at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Blake made it clear that Washington was in no mood to concede Central Asia – "a region of significant importance to US national interests" – to Russia as the latter’s backyard. He said:

–      We recognize that other countries have interests in Central Asia. But we don’t accept any country having exclusive interests. We maintain it is in the interests of all countries in the region to undertake policies that can produce a more durable stability and more reliable partners for everyone, including the United States, in addressing critical regional and global challenges, from non-proliferation to counter-narcotics to energy security and combating terrorism.

–   Having said that, the audacious US strategy is also not without real risks and Kyrgyzstan’s medium-term prospects are worrying. The political landscape is highly fractured and there is no certainty as to how a new constitution will work in practice and whether elections expected in October will be free and fair. Clan politics are acute and the interim government in Bishkek remains weak.

–   Furthermore, regional divisions in Kyrgyzstan are deepening. Kyrgyz nationalist rhetoric is becoming strident, insecurity continues, the Kyrgyz-Uzbek ethnic divide remains enormous and minority Uzbek grievances are largely unaddressed. With the security bodies and law-enforcement agencies showing bias against Uzbeks, revenge attacks are possible.

–   Meanwhile, as Martha Olcott, a prominent US expert on Central Asia, put it, "Uzbeks are unlikely to simply fade away … small numbers of young men also seem to be drifting into the jihadist camps and networks in Afghanistan, and beyond in Pakistan.

o    All this means that even if the Kyrgyz government is able to keep the lid on ethnic tensions in the south in the near term, the events of June [the pogrom against ethnic Uzbeks] could have serious ramifications in both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan for years to come."

–   Conceivably, as a perceptive Kyrgyz expert wrote in the Guardian newspaper recently, "There are three possible templates for the future:

o    that of Sri Lanka, where a powerful guerrilla organization emerged after ethnic riots;

o    that of Chechnya, where a nascent nationalist movement fell prey to Islamist networks;

o    and that of Uzbekistan, which reacted to Andijan [the uprising there in 2005] with overwhelming repression. None of these is very inspiring."

–   Indeed, some Russian observers discern a fourth template as the most likely scenario – Kosovo. They feel that the US is proceeding according to a carefully choreographed plan where the induction of OSCE policemen is a necessary first step.

–   After all, the 52 unarmed OSCE policemen put in place under the group’s plan can’t do much to stabilize southern Kyrgyzstan. They are most likely to fail in a hostile environment where the Kyrgyz majority population appears to be opposed to the OSCE’s intervention. A Moscow politician who is a member of the Russian Duma’s international affairs committee said:

–       If anything happens to these OSCE policemen, orders will be given to bring in armed units to Kyrgyzstan. Who is going to send military units there? Of course, it’s NATO.

–   There’s a US military base in Manas, a French air base in Dushanbe, a 154,000 NATO military contingent in Afghanistan. What’s the problem? If that happens, we will witness a very interesting situation that will resemble the one in Kosovo … And the threat of active Western interference according to the Kosovo scenario is very realistic.

–   Above all, the OSCE deployment may be designed to soothe tensions, but its downstream impact could be quite to the contrary. It could well turn out that the presence of international observers might embolden ethnic Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan to pursue autonomy.

To an extent, the US is already pandering to latent Uzbek separatist sentiments in the Osh and Jalalabad regions in southern Kyrgyzstan. Whether this is a calibrated approach happening in concert with Tashkent is a key question with immense consequence to the future trajectory of the geopolitics of Central Asia, and indeed Kyrgyzstan’s own integrity and viability as a state.

–   A surge in Uzbek separatist sentiment in southern Kyrgyzstan would be bound to trigger a backlash of Kyrgyz nationalism and it would only be a matter of time before some Kyrgyz "strongman" took the stirrups and rode to the center stage, brushing aside the US-backed Kyrgyz democrats in Bishkek to take matters to a point of no return.

–   If that happens, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan – given the Vorukh ethnic enclave in Batken province in southern Kyrgyzstan – would almost inevitably be drawn in, locking in three of the five Central Asian states. In sum, it could be Yugoslavia all over again.

Note 1. The Helsinki Final Act was the final act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe held in Helsinki, Finland, during July and August of 1975. Thirty-five states, including the US, Canada and all European states except Albania and Andorra, signed the declaration in an attempt to improve relations between the communist bloc and the West.

Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.

 Jul 20, 2010

–   Central Asia arrived at a turning point last weekend far removed from the history of Genghis Khan riding out to conquer the world, as it sought peacekeepers from Europe. Russia, which has provided security to the region for the past century and more is stepping aside – unable or unwilling, and possibly incapable of performing that role anymore.

–   The historic decision to bring in European peacekeepers was taken on Saturday at a conclave of statesmen from 56 countries in Almaty, a short distance from the Chinese border. Beijing was not a participant and has yet to speak its mind, but will be watching with raised eyebrows the appearance of "foreign devils on the Silk Road" at a juncture when its own regional profile is deepening.

–   Moscow too is uncharacteristically reserved about the dramatic turn in regional politics in its "near abroad". Does Russia welcome the trespassers or let resent brew, given it cannot do much about their arrival for the present? The fact that the European peacekeepers are arriving in Central Asia against the backdrop of the approaching endgame in Afghanistan cannot go unnoticed, either.

–   From any of these perspectives, the support voiced by the foreign ministers of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for sending an international police force to Kyrgyzstan following last month’s bloody ethnic clashes is a signpost of immense political and diplomatic significance.

–   The OSCE is, technically speaking, responding to a request from the Kyrgyz government. But the idea was originally mooted by the United States and the major European countries. The Almaty conclave has nodded in principle for the dispatch of a small 52-strong contingent to Kyrgyzstan "quickly" and to follow up with another 50 officers soon thereafter, initially on a four-month, extendable assignment in the violence-torn southern Kyrgyz regions of Osh and Jalalabad. A formal decision on the deployment is expected to be taken by the OSCE’s permanent council in Vienna on Thursday.

–   Unsurprisingly, the Kyrgyz government, which made futile attempts to seek Russian military intervention to restore order in Osh and Jalalabad, is manifestly enthused by the OSCE decision. The head of the Kyrgyz government, President Roza Otunbayeva said, "We will take this step because stability has not yet been restored to the extent where normal functioning of the two communities [Kyrgyz and Uzbek] can happen."

Otunbayeva said the OSCE force would be performing three functions: monitoring, advising and training. She added that there was a serious threat of further destabilization with the melting of the glaciers in the Pamirs, especially in the Batkent region, which is a route for Islamist militants and the drug traffickers from Afghanistan.

–   The president of Kazakhstan, Nurusultan Nazarbayev, who currently chairs the OSCE, also warned the gathering in Almaty, "The fragile stability in Kyrgyzstan could erupt at anytime." Nonetheless, it is unclear how far and how diligently Kazakhstan played a lead role in this OSCE decision. In all probability it buckled under Western pressure.

–   There has been virulent criticism by Western spokesmen in recent weeks that Kazakhstan was lackadaisical in mobilizing an effective OSCE response to the Kyrgyz crisis and was in fact arguing against any international intervention.

–   Western critics targeted Nazarbayev personally for failure to lead the OSCE. They alleged that "Kazakhstan has acted more like Russia’s ally in regard to Kyrgyzstan than as the chairman of the OSCE". The pressure tactic finally worked.

–   United States diplomacy also seems to have pitted Uzbekistan against Kazakhstan – two regional rivals vying for leadership – by cozying up to Tashkent and portraying the Uzbek leadership as very cooperative and mature in its response to the Kyrgyz crisis in comparison with Nazarbayev and, therefore, more worthy of its self-styled credentials as the region’s key country.

Conceivably, Washington may now reciprocate by acceding to Nazarbayev’s proposal to host an OSCE summit during his chairmanship in Kazakhstan. The last OSCE summit was held in 1999.

The OSCE move brings to the fore the fault lines that have been developing in the Central Asian great game. Neither of the two regional security organizations – the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Beijing-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) – has acquitted itself well in responding to the Kyrgyz crisis. Plainly put, they seem pretenders.

The fallout for regional integration has been quite negative. Kyrgyzstan has edged very close to the US; a new proximity has developed between the US and Uzbekistan that may blossom into strategic cooperation; and Kazakhstan has drifted from a lukewarm stance toward overt support vis-a-vis the Western intervention in Kyrgyzstan.

That leaves Russia in a bit of a grey zone. Having expressed its inability to intervene in the Kyrgyz crisis and having failed to mobilize an intervention by the CSTO – but all the while crying "wolf" about violent Islamists and the drug mafia threatening regional security – Moscow cannot now frontally oppose the OSCE move. Any such negativism may look churlish. Nor, perhaps, does it want to adopt an obstructionist stance.

It is in the best spirit of the ongoing "reset" with the US that Russia desists from stonewalling (even if it harbors reservations) the US’s OSCE initiative which Washington is flaunting as a fine example of the US-Russia working relationship aimed at stabilizing Central Asia.

What is intriguing is that the US and the European countries are also on a parallel track, robustly leading the call for an international investigation into the ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan. Russia hasn’t spoken its mind on the need of an investigation, whereas the US is insisting on it.

French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner said after a joint "fact-finding" mission to Osh last week with his German counterpart, "We would like to know who these groups are that provoked these incidents. These incidents and animosities go back a long way, but there were clearly provocations in this case and we want to know about them. So we support this proposal for an international investigative commission."

Indeed, there seems to be some "hidden agenda" behind the call for the international investigation. Interestingly, Uzbekistan originally mooted the idea – and Tashkent makes its regional moves only with great deliberation. OSCE foreign ministers endorsed the idea in Almaty.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that the OSCE’s reaction to the Kyrgyz situation showed the organization’s ability "to respond quickly to crises. We acknowledge both the prompt action shown by Kazakhstan as OSCE chair, and the fact that the OSCE permanent council has proved its ability to reach a consensus".

Kazakhstan, Russia’s number one ally in the region, didn’t lack enthusiasm. Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev made a spirited defense of the OSCE decision to intervene. "The current difficult situation in Kyrgyzstan could have a highly destabilizing effect not only on Central Asia but also far beyond its borders, he said. ”That is why we need a prompt consolidation of international efforts to provide the widest possible cooperation with the Kyrgyz Republic using the full potential and experience of the OSCE."

Unlike his counterparts from Germany and France, who were present at Almaty, Lavrov didn’t dwell on the substantive issue of how the prospect of an international force other than CSTO assuming a security role in Central Asia is viewed in Moscow.

Now, where does the CSTO fit into all this? Arguably, the OSCE will be called on to balance its interests with the CSTO, which is already sending equipment and funds to Kyrgyz security forces. So far, the US has balked at forming any cooperative grid with the CSTO, as Moscow has persistently demanded. The spirit of "reset" requires there to be a rethink on this score. The CSTO comprises Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan

More important, what about the SCO? China is neither a member of the OSCE nor the CSTO. Geopolitical reality is that on the one hand, Kyrgyzstan impacts on Xinjiang’s security, while and on the other, the OSCE arriving at China’s border region is a leviathan – albeit lethargic as of now – comprising 56 participating states drawn from three continents whose total population is more than a billion people. Clearly, the OSCE needs to reach out to the CSTO and the SCO. If that happens, regional stability will be strengthened. The SCO comprises China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

But we live in a real world. It is unclear which way US thinking is evolving. As Stephen Minikes, a former US ambassador to the OSCE, wrote recently, there is a perfect case of a US-Russia "reset" over the OSCE. Minikes argues:

    At the time of the OSCE’s inception in 1975, the world was bipolar. Today it is multipolar. Russia has become a balance-shifter, not an opponent. The US must nurture this change. When Russia and the US are on the same side, all kinds of breakthroughs are possible. In a bipolar world, it was "us" against "them". Now it is "Western" against "other" values. The US and Russia should be in agreement on as many of those values as possible.

However, the US will also be inclined to use the OSCE to reposition itself in Central Asia. The US already finds itself in a far more confident position with regard to the continuance of its air base at Manas in Kyrgyzstan, which was perennially under Russian and Chinese "threat".

Again, the strengthening of the Eurasian dimension of the OSCE goes beyond a matter of Western "values". A new narrative is beginning in the nature of an institutional link between the trans-Atlantic community and Central Asia.

But then, Chinese, Indian and Persian people also live in the neighborhood of Central Asia. By a curious coincidence, the OSCE conclave took place in Almaty on a day when the company newspaper of China National Petroleum Corporation revealed that a total of 2,009 billion cubic meters (bcm) of Central Asian natural gas has already been pumped to China as of July 15 via the new 2,000-kilometer pipeline from Turkmenistan via Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan to Xinjiang.

The OSCE may not take long to realize that the vast Central Asian steppes are not as vacant as they seem to the naked eye and furthermore, for undertaking any serious enterprise in the steppes you need surplus money – and lots of it – which the recession-ridden European and US economies or Russia cannot easily come up with.

That said, the OSCE move on Kyrgyzstan is indeed a smart US diplomatic initiative. Its potential is spread over a range of fronts: to revamp the OSCE so that it acquires comparative advantage in conflict prevention and management in Central Asia; to co-opt Russia and to counter the ascendancy of Chinese influence in Central Asia; to develop a comprehensive US policy toward Central Asia which hitherto remained largely transactional; to galvanize greater attention and international support for Afghanistan, an OSCE partner, so as to get that country embedded in the region as a vital hub in a Greater Central Asia, which in turn would incrementally help open the so-called "southern corridor" leading to the Pakistani ports of Karachi and Gwadar that provide Central Asia strategic alternatives to Russia, China and Iran.

In sum, the weekend’s OSCE decision becomes a key building block of the US’s regional policy as it prepares for the post-Afghan war regional security scenario. The attendance of two key US diplomats in the Central Asian region last week for meticulous parallel diplomacy in Almaty and Bishkek – Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg and the director for Russian and Eurasian Affairs at the US National Security Council, Michael McFaul – underscored the importance Washington attaches to the OSCE decision to underpin Kyrgyzstan’s security.

Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.

05.08.10 | 14h27 • Mis à jour le 05.08.10 | 14h27

–    Quelque deux mille manifestants se sont rassemblés jeudi 5 août à Bichkek, la capitale du Kirghizistan, afin d’obtenir la libération de leur chef et une rencontre avec Rosa Otounbaïeva, la présidente de ce pays d’Asie centrale en proie à des vagues de violences à répétition. Les protestataires étaient réunis devant le Parlement, à l’appel de l’opposant et homme d’affaires Ourmat Baryktabassov, interpellé jeudi matin dans le cadre d’une enquête pour tentative de coup d’Etat ouverte en juin 2005.

MENACES SUR LE GOUVERNEMENT

–   Devant le Parlement, la police a procédé à des tirs de sommation pour disperser la foule."Nous voulons la démission de [la présidente] Otounbaïeva et de son gouvernement corrompu, dans lequel il n’y a pas de patriotes", avait lancé plus tôt un manifestant à la tribune. "Donnez le pouvoir à Baryktabassov, ce serait le meilleur président", a-t-il ajouté.

–   Auteur d’une tentative de coup d’Etat manqué avant l’élection présidentielle de 2005, M. Bariktabassov avait fui le Kirghizistan avant de rentrer dans son pays en avril, après la révolution sanglante qui renversa le président Kourmanbek Bakiev.

Ourmat Baryktabassov est resté quelques heures aux mains des autorités à Kant, à 40 km à l’est de Bichkek. Il a été relâché, selon le gouvernement. Des centaines de ses partisans s’étaient mis en route dans la matinée vers cette ville pour obtenir sa remise en liberté. Un photographe de Reuters a indiqué en début d’après-midi que le leader politique se trouvait au milieu de ses partisans, bloqués par un barrage militaire à l’extérieur de Bichkek.

–   L’armée kirghize s’était positionnée en début de matinée, bloquant les routes pour empêcher que des manifestants extérieurs grossissent les rangs dans le centre-ville. Les soldats ont agi, selon le service de sûreté nationale, sur la base d’informations selon lesquelles certains manifestants seraient armés et menaceraient de renverser le gouvernement intérimaire de la présidente Rosa Otounbaïeva.

LA PRÉSIDENTE RECONNAÎT DES VIOLENCES POLICIÈRES ETHNIQUES

–   Cette dernière a par ailleurs reconnu, jeudi, que les forces de l’ordre s’étaient rendues coupables d’exactions contre la minorité ouzbèke, moins de deux mois après de sanglantes violences interethniques qui ont contribué à renforcer l’instabilité du pays. "Je dois dire ‘oui’, nous avons des violations des droits de l’homme et nous devons revoir un cas après l’autre, mais n’oubliez pas que moins de deux mois se sont écoulés depuis ces jours sanglants", a-t-elle dit au cours d’une interview.

–   Cet aveu intervient après que des organisations de défense des droits de l’homme et l’ONU ont tiré la sonnette d’alarme, estimant que la police et les forces armées, dominées par la communauté kirghize, torturaient et procédaient à des arrestations arbitraires dans les régions d’Och et Djalal-Abad, dans le sud du Kirghizistan.

–   La présidente a reconnu que les Ouzbeks étaient particulièrement visés par ces exactions, citant même un exemple d’exécutions sommaires, où deux Ouzbeks, abattus le 21 juin lors d’une descente des forces de l’ordre, n’étaient pas des résistants armés, comme annoncé alors par la police. "C’était un acte de vengeance [après les violences interethniques]. Et nous venons d’arrêter ce type d’opérations, ces descentes", a insisté cette ancienne ministre des affaires étrangères, qui a aussi été ambassadrice à Londres et Washington.

–   Malgré des promesses d’aide de 1,1 milliard de dollars de la communauté internationale, la présidente de la petite et pauvre république d’Asie centrale juge très difficile la situation dans son pays. "La situation est critique, la situation est grave (…), nous avons des milliers de personnes blessées, malades ou mortes à cause des événements de juin", souligne-t-elle. Les violences interethniques du mois de juin ont fait officiellement plus de 350 morts et des dizaines de milliers de sans-abri, mais la présidente avait laissé entendre que le bilan pouvait être de près de deux mille morts dans le Sud.

Rosa Otounbaïeva espère dès lors que les élections législatives prévues en octobre permettront la stabilisation de ce pays stratégique pour les Etats-Unis, qui y disposent d’une base aérienne essentielle au déploiement des troupes en Afghanistan. Mais elle reconnaît aussi que le scrutin pourrait, au contraire, provoquer de nouveaux affrontements : "Il y a tout le temps un risque de violences. Tout le temps."