– Tesi: La Siria si trova al centro di grandi, complessi interessi internazionali configgenti, e questo la rende un campo di battaglia per procura dove potrebbero dispiegarsi molti dei futuri intrighi geo-politici del Medio Oriente, come una guerra tra sciiti e sunniti.
– Non è probabile che il rimescolamento della direzione dei ribelli siriani, ispirato dall’estero e deciso nell’ultimo incontri di Doha, produca un cambiamento significativo della situazione sul terreno;
– “È una Guerra civile sempre più internazionalizzata e, come storicamente sperimentato, più si internazionalizza, più il conflitto si prolunga”, rischio di un altro Afghanistan (Peter Wallensteen, ricercatore per la pace presso l’Università di Uppsala, direttore dell’Uppsala Conflict Data Program).
o C’è forte rivalità ai vertici tra il Consiglio Nazionale Siriano (CNS), un’organizzazione ombrello, e la nuova “Coalizione Nazionale per le forze Rivoluzionarie e l’Opposizione Siriana”, in cui il CNS ha solo 1/3 dei seggi.
o Il CNS ha scelto come suo dirigente George Sabra, cristiano di sinistra con un passa
to comunista, contro i timori delle potenza di un’influenza jihadista, e con un occhio alla Russia (finora alleata di Assad).
– C’è il rischio che si ripeta la situazione della guerra civile libanese degli anni Settanta e Ottanta,
o se le potenze internazionali, tra loro in competizione e molto divise al loro interno sulla questione siriana, non riescono a concordare un intervento a breve.
o Strumenti e istituzioni internazionali non sono stati in grado di affrontare il conflitoo siriano; Usa e CdS Onu non sono ricorsi alla risoluzione 377 (“Uniti per la pace”) contro Russia e Cina, forse non certi di poter ottenere il consenso da parte dell’Assemblea generale Onu.
– Secondo Strafor i dirigenti iraniani (ayatollah e Guardie Rivoluzionarie) avrebbero interessi divergenti sulla sorte del regime siriano.
– Sembra vacillare anche la posizione della Russia, secondo recenti dichiarazioni di ufficiali russi:
o il negoziato per una massiccia vendita di armi all’Irak del mese scorso ($4,2MD, comprendente elicotteri da attacco e sistemi mobili di difesa aerea) fa pensare a negoziati segreti con gli Usa sul MO, ma ha forti legami con Iran e Siria riflesso dei suoi fondamentali interessi geo-politici. Il primo ministro iracheno, Maliki ha in seguito annullato l’acquisto, per “sospetti di corruzione”.
– Usa: si è affermata la strategia di dirigere da dietro le quinte nelle guerre in Irak e Afghanistan, ma ora c’è divisione all’interno:
o 1. intervenire con decisione, per evitare i rischi del non intervento, che favorirebbe l’influenza jihadista tra i ribelli, se gli Usa non curano i legami con questi;
o 2. cautela, per non rimanere bloccati nel pantano siriano.
– Turchia: dopo aver appoggiato i ribelli siriani, fa da mdiatrice tra i maggiori campi mediorientali, Siria e poi Iran.
– Egitto: avrebbe un ruolo attivo in questi tentativi diplomatici, se si realizzasse il piano di pace delle potenze,
o Turchia e Egitto, i maggiori paesi musulmani della regione, e con storici legami con i vari segmenti di popolazione, sarebbero in posizione preferenziale per l’invio di “forze di pace”.
– Le questioni aperte per la Turchia: l’eventuale creazione di un’entità curda al suo confine meridionale (dopo il ritiro dal Nord Siria delle forze pro-Assad) modifica il suo piano originale di creazione di zone cuscinetto.
o Un intervento militare (pur con forze armate numericamente superiori a quelle siriane) presenterebbe dei problemi, in particolare per l’imposizione di una no-fly zone, dato che la Siria dispone di circa 4700 missili di difesa aerea, contro i 178 turchi …
– Arabia Saudita: rischi se continua la guerra civile in Siria,
o ma anche rischio di un accordo Usa-Tehran, derivante dalla crisi siriana. I sauditi potrebbero cercare di far fallire eventuali negoziati (Stratfor)
– Mentre continuano i negoziati, con la mediazione della Turchia e di altri, cresce il caos, 36 000 le vittime, e centinaia di migliaia i profughi nei paesi vicini; 11 000 in un sol giorno la scorsa settimana.
– la comunità internazionale sta cambiando approccio: contenere la violenza all’interno della Siria, anziché arrestarla.
–
– Sempre più isolato il regime di Assad, sostenuto solo per paura anche dalla propria base alawita, che si sente usata.
o Le forze armate siriane stanno divenendo una milizia settaria, e Assad coltiva gruppi di forze alawite e paramilitari (con il sostegno dell’Iran), una contro-insorgenza che ricorre ad atrocità e distrugge qualsiasi possibilità di una transizione pacifica.
– I ribelli sono divisi, infiltrati da jihadisti, e ancor meno rappresentativi di ampie parti della popolazione siriana. Aleppo ad es. non si è unita alla rivolta.
o La moltiplicazione di organizzazioni politiche e gruppi di ribelli – ognuno dei quali controlla parti diverse della campagna, dove signori della guerra imperano, e traggono profitti da estorsioni, rapimenti, contrabbando – corrisponde ad una varietà di influenze estere.
o Assad sopravvive aiutato da Iran, Russia e Cina; si calcola che la macchina militare di Assad costi circa $1MD al mese (rivelazioni a CBS del re di Giordania Abdullah II. L’Iran finanzia e ha inviato militari e droni.
i ribelli vengono finanziati dalle monarchie del Golfo
– After the utter collapse of the Eid al-Adha ceasefire attempted by the United Nations envoy Lakhdar Brahimi a couple of weeks ago, it is even more obvious that there isn’t much time to stop the Syrian civil war.
– Nor is it likely that the latest reshuffles of the rebel leadership, inspired from abroad and decided on during a meeting in the Qatari capital Doha last week, will produce a meaningful change in the dynamics on the ground.
– Unless the deeply divided international community acts quickly and in concert, a repeat of the Lebanese civil war in the 1970s and 1980s is likely to follow.
o The chaos is growing. Already around 36,000 have died and hundreds of thousands have sought refuge in neighboring countries. Last week, the flood of refugees reached 11,000 in a single day.
– While negotiations over the fate of Syria continue – away from the limelight and, according to credible reports, through the mediation of Turkey and others – the civil war is quickly becoming entrenched. Moreover, there is some evidence of a gradual shift in the approach of the international community towards containing the violence inside the country rather than stopping it outright.
– Syria, which was plagued by domestic instability for decades before the Assad family came to power, now finds itself at the intersection of powerful and complex international interests. This turns it into a lucrative proxy battlefield where many of the future geopolitical intrigues of the Middle East – such as a wider war between Shi’ite and Sunni Muslims – may unfold.
– Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s minority regime finds itself ever more isolated, appointing new governments every month or two. Increasingly it appears that even its power base, the Alawites, support it out of fear rather than out of loyalty. As one Alawite activist told the Washington Post, "Assad is not representing the Alawites; he is using them." A recent shoot-out in the home town of the president’s clan, involving his cousin, backs this observation.
– The Syrian army is in the process of quickly degenerating into a sectarian militia, and in parallel to it Assad is cultivating (with help from Iran) a number of Alawite and other paramilitary forces. His strategy, described by Foreign Policy Magazine as "counterinsurgency by atrocity", has had the effect of ripping apart the country’s social fabric and destroying the possibility of a peaceful transition.
– For their part, the rebels are divided, infiltrated by foreign jihadists, and ever less representative of (or welcome by) large segments of Syria’s population. "The city of Aleppo has not really joined the revolution," a fighter recently told the Associated Press, while reporters witnessed civilians in the key northern commercial hub pelting the rebels with broken glass.
– Different rebel militias control different parts of the Syrian countryside, where warlords have set up effective fiefdoms and are profiting from smuggling, extortion and kidnappings.
– The divisions that have plagued them for over a year-and-a-half are not likely to disappear after last week’s restructuring of their main political organizations.
– It is hard to hide the bitter rivalry at the top between the Syrian National Council (SNC), itself an umbrella organization, and the newly created "National Coalition for Revolutionary Forces and the Syrian Opposition" (in which the SNC holds only about a third of seats).
– In an attempt to rebrand and reinvigorate itself, the SNC chose a leftist Christian opposition figure, George Sabra, to lead it. Sabra’s appointment was intended to allay international fears of jihadist influence, and his communist past also sparked some speculation that the SNC may be hoping to court Russia (until now an ally of Assad).
– The mushrooming of militias and political organizations is paralleled by diverse foreign influences.
o Assad survives mostly with the help of Iran, Russia and China, while the rebels receive large donations from the Gulf.
o The Syrian president’s military machine is still strong, but the war costs him approximately US$1 billion a month, as Jordan’s King Abdullah II revealed in an interview with CBS. These operations are bankrolled by Iran, which has also reportedly sent its operatives and technology such as drones. [1]
– Not only are the different countries at odds with each other, but most seem internally split on how to proceed with Syria.
– According to the influential intelligence analysis firm Stratfor, for example, the Iranian leaders – the ayatollahs and the Revolutionary Guard Corps – may have divergent interests concerning the fate of the Syrian regime.
– Russia, too, is vacillating, as recent statements by Russian officials indicate. Its massive weapons deal with Iraq last month suggests that secret negotiations with the American administration may be underway over its role in the Middle East, but its ties with Syria and Iran are deeply-rooted and reflect its fundamental geopolitical interests.
– (Iraq’s Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has canceled the US$4.2 billion arms deal with Russia, involving attack helicopters and mobile air-defense systems, after "suspicions over corruption" surfaced, CNN and other media reported at the weekend.)
– In United States policy circles, the strategy of "leading from behind" is grounded in the experience in Iraq and Afghanistan (and the financial crisis), but within that paradigm, two arguments have emerged: some argue in favor of a more forceful intervention, pointing out the dangers of doing nothing (including a Bosnia-style argument that jihadist influence among the rebels will grow if the US forfeits its ties with them). Others caution against getting mired in a Syrian quagmire.
– Turkey has supported the Syrian rebels but has more recently tried to facilitate talks between the broader camps in the Middle East, first over Syria and subsequently over the Iranian nuclear program.
– According to some accounts, Egypt is also playing an active role in this diplomacy. In many ways, if an international peace plan for Syria materializes in the future, Turkey and Egypt would be best placed to send peacekeepers – they are the largest Muslim countries in the region, and both have long-standing ties with the different segments of Syria’s population.
– Ankara faces its own set of issues. The effective creation of a Kurdish entity on its southern border (some argue, a precursor to a wider Kurdish state) after pro-Assad forces pulled out of much of northern Syria has turned its original "buffer zones" plan on its head.
o It faces a steep challenge should it choose to intervene militarily, and although its army is larger than Syria’s, it has little experience enforcing a no-fly zone while the Syrian air defenses are much more extensive than its own. According to Turkish journalist Eyup Can, for example, Syria has an estimated 4,707 air defense missiles, while Turkey has 178.
– "Though Saudi Arabia can see the risk to the region of having Syria remain in a prolonged state of civil war," Stratfor writes in another recent report, "it also does not want to see a broader understanding between Washington and Tehran develop out of the Syrian crisis, an understanding that could strain the US-Saudi relationship. If negotiations gain traction in the coming months, Saudi Arabia may end up being more of a spoiler than a facilitator."
– Compounding this confusion, the instruments and institutions of international law have failed time and again in addressing the conflict. Despite credible evidence of war crimes on both sides, the argument has prevailed that indictments would make it even harder to stop the violence.
– Despite various threats, the United States and its allies in the UN Security Council have refrained from using Resolution 377 ("Uniting for Peace") against Russia and China, perhaps unwilling to put into question their own veto power and perhaps uncertain of the backing they can receive at the General Assembly.
– At the same time, experts caution that urgent international action is needed if the bloodshed is to stop. Peter Wallensteen, a leading peace researcher at the University of Uppsala and the director of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, said in a telephone conversation that an arms embargo enforced by regional countries, broadly similar to the ones imposed on Liberia and the Ivory Coast in the past, might help, but emphasized that an immediate and coordinated response by the international community was crucial.
– "It’s increasingly an internationalized civil war," he said, "and as we know from previous history, the more internationalized, the longer the conflict will be. So there is an interest in finding a way out, and quickly. Otherwise this will turn into another Afghanistan."
1. Are Iran’s drones coordinating attacks in Syria? , Global Post, September 18, 2012.
Victor Kotsev is a journalist and political analyst.