Relazioni tra Usa e Nord Corea a partire dall’amministrazione Clinton…
- I diplomatici statunitensi chiedono un’ispezione internazionale dei carichi che entrano o escono dal Nord Corea per prevenire trasferimenti di materiali per le armi.
- Nel 1993, il Nord Corea ha minacciato di ritirarsi dal Trattato di Non Proliferazione Nucleare.
- Sostenitori dell’amministrazione Clinton affermano che l’accordo fra i due paesi del ’94 ha fermato il programma nucleare più avanzato di Pyongyang, che prevedeva l’uso di plutonio come combustibile, e ha assicurato la promessa del leader coreano Kim Jong Il nel 2000 di diminuire i test missilistici.
La Cina si oppone a questi controlli e chiede, invece che la risoluzione presa dagli Usa sulla base del capitolo 7 dell’Onu che riserva azioni militari nei confronti del Nord Corea, la risoluzione sulla base dell’Articolo 41, che permette solo sanzioni non militari.
L’amministrazione Clinton lo ha considerato un attacco militare preventivo: Clinton ha ordinato al Pentagono di mandare decine di migliaia di forze addizionali statunitensi in Nord Corea, insieme con aerei da guerra e altri veicoli da combattimento.
Allo stesso tempo, l’amministrazione Clinton ha cominciato negoziati con Pyongyang, che sono culminati poi in un accordo nel ’94: mentre la Corea del Nord doveva arrestare la costruzione di armi nucleari, gli Usa l’avrebbero aiutata a costruire due reattori ad acqua leggera per produzione di energia e avrebbero fornito al paese centinaia di migliaia di tonnellate di olio combustibile pesante. Negli otto anni seguenti il Nord Corea ha arrestato il suo lavoro di ritrattamento del plutonio e ha permesso a ispettori internazionali di tornare. Altri aspetti dell’accordo, però, non sono stati rispettati: la conquista repubblicana della maggioranza in Congresso qualche settimana dopo la firma dell’accordo ha minato la possibilità di attuazione dell’accordo da parte dell’amministrazione Clinton, ritardando di diversi anni la costruzione dei reattori. Gli Usa hanno infatti posto fine al programma all’inizio di quest’anno senza comunque completare nessuno dei due impianti, inoltre la fornitura di olio combustibile è stata sospesa nel Novembre 2002 ed è stato fatto poco per normalizzare i rapporti tra i due paesi.
Bush, invece, ha cercato di rivolgersi a tutte le questioni in una volta e, i critici dicono, senza risolvere niente. Alcuni diplomatici statunitensi dicono che la linea dura dell’attuale amministrazione ha prodotto come risultato la ripresa del programma nucleare di Pyongyang e i suoi test missilistici.
L’approccio di Clinton non è stato del tutto efficiente, affermano comunque alcuni analisti.
Gli ufficiali dell’intelligence statunitense credono ora che il Nord Corea avesse varato un programma nucleare segreto già pochi anni dopo l’accordo con gli Usa.
Formalmente l’accordo è saltato quando l’amministrazione Bush nell’ottobre 2002 ha messo Pyongyang di fronte alle prove del suo programma nucleare militare segreto e la Corea del Nord ne riconobbe l’esistenza.
Weighing Carrots or Sticks for North Korea /
As U.S. Considers Response
To Pyongyang, Both Parties
Trade Blame for Failed Diplomacy
By YOCHI J. DREAZEN and JAY SOLOMON
October 13, 2006; Page A4
WASHINGTON — The Bush administration has a simple explanation for why it won’t restart one-on-one talks with North Korea to persuade Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear weapons program:
"Bilateral negotiations didn’t work. I appreciate the efforts of previous administrations. It just didn’t work," President Bush said Wednesday, referring to the Clinton administration’s years of talks with North Korea. "And therefore I thought it was important to change how we approached the problem."
Since North Korea claimed a successful nuclear detonation early this week, Democrats and Republicans have traded barbs about which administration bears more responsibility for allowing the reclusive country to acquire such weapons.
Republicans accused the Clinton administration of failing to take tough steps in the 1990s to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear-weapons program. Democrats say Mr. Bush’s refusal to engage Pyongyang drove North Korea to accelerate that program, culminating in the announced test this week.
"It’s difficult to say that the Clinton policy failed, but it’s crystal clear that the current policy has failed," said Larry Wilkerson, who was chief of staff to former Secretary of State Colin Powell. "You need a carrot-and-stick approach — you can’t just use the stick."
Neither approach has succeeded, underscoring the challenges for the U.S. and its allies in deciding how to respond to the test, and ultimately, how to get Pyongyang to stop its nuclear program.
Yesterday, the U.S. and key Asian partners were divided over how to proceed. U.S. diplomats circulated a draft Security Council resolution that, among other measures, called for international inspections of cargo coming in or out of North Korea to prevent the transfer of weapons-related material. U.S. officials said they wanted to see the resolution brought to a vote today, but Russia and China said they preferred delaying the vote to allow more time for arriving at an international consensus.
China opposes the cargo inspection measure and didn’t like that the American draft resolution came under Chapter 7 of the U.N. charter, which would preserve the option of military action against North Korea. China wanted the resolution to be introduced under Article 41, which permits only nonmilitary sanctions. A compromise resolution was being circulated late last night.
A senior Chinese envoy, State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan, met with Mr. Bush and members of the president’s national security team in Washington yesterday to discuss China’s preference for more moderate sanctions.
The disagreements over what to do next are being shaped, in part, by the various assessments of what happened the last time the U.S. tried direct negotiations with the North Koreans.
National-security experts from both parties say the Clinton approach of engaging in talks succeeded in temporarily lowering tensions between the two sides and curbing North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. Some argue that the U.S. should, for this reason, resume talks while also preparing punitive measures that could be used if Pyongyang refused to alter course.
In 1993, North Korea threatened to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Clinton administration, fearing that Pyongyang was close to deploying nuclear weapons, considered a pre-emptive military strike. President Clinton ordered the Pentagon to craft plans to send tens of thousands of additional U.S. forces to South Korea, along with war planes and other combat vehicles.
At the same time, the Clinton administration began negotiations with Pyongyang, which culminated in a 1994 deal. The so-called Agreed Framework provided a blueprint for gradually normalizing relations between the U.S. and North Korea. It called for Pyongyang to halt efforts to build nuclear weapons, and in return, the U.S. would help build two light-water reactors for power generation and provide North Korea with hundreds of thousands of tons of heavy fuel oil.
Key parts of the deal held for eight years: North Korea halted its plutonium-reprocessing work and allowed international inspectors to return. But other aspects of the agreement frayed. A Republican sweep of Congress weeks after the signing of the deal undermined the Clinton administration’s ability to implement it.
Congressional opposition
to building the light-water reactors delayed their construction for several years. The U.S. and its allies ended the program earlier this year without completing either plant. The U.S. suspended shipments of the heavy fuel oil in November 2002 and did little to normalize ties between the two countries.
Supporters of the Clinton administration’s approach say its strength was that it prioritized the threats North Korea posed to U.S. national security interests and systematically sought to address them. They say the Agreed Framework stopped Pyongyang’s most advanced nuclear program, using plutonium fuel, and secured a promise from North Korean leader Kim Jong Il in 2000 to shelve missile tests. Officials had hoped to build on these gains to address other security challenges posed by North Korea, particularly its illicit businesses, human-rights abuses, and its placement of conventional forces within striking distance of the South Korean capital of Seoul.
The Bush administration’s approach, in contrast, has tried to address all the issues at once and — critics say — resolved none. Some current and former U.S. diplomats say the Bush administration’s hard-line approach has resulted in Pyongyang restarting its plutonium-based nuclear program and its missile tests. And there are no signs that Pyongyang plans to address the other issues.
"My biggest concern has always been the nukes," said one State Department official who has worked on Korea policy during both administrations. "But if you allow these other issues to distract from the most important one, you’ll get nowhere. And this has happened."
The Clinton approach wasn’t a total success, either, analysts note. Both critics and supporters say it failed to spur North Korea to decisively abandon its nuclear-weapons ambitions. U.S. intelligence officials now believe that North Korea launched a secret uranium enrichment program a few years after signing the 1994 agreement.
That agreement formally collapsed when the Bush administration confronted Pyongyang in October 2002 with evidence of its secret nuclear-weapons program and North Korea acknowledged its existence.
"It’s true that we’ve talked to our enemies in the past, but I don’t know if it would do a … bit of good because North Korea hasn’t shown any willingness to give up its nuclear program once and for all," said David Asher, a former senior State Department official.