L’Iran mette da parte la Siria – per adesso

Quella tra Siria e Iran è un’alleanza per contrastare l’isolamento internazionale e regionale in cui si trovano…

  • Quella tra Siria e Iran è un’alleanza per contrastare l’isolamento internazionale e regionale in cui si trovano.
    E’ la continuazione di un’alleanza che dura da un quarto di secolo. Negli anni ’80 ci fu un commercio attivo di armi e petrolio, la Siria era l’unico paese a prendere le parti dell’Iran dopo l’invasione di Saddam Hussein. Damasco bloccò l’oleodotto in Lattakia che esportava petrolio a Occidente, incanalò armi sovietiche e non a Tehran, promise di fornire armi al leader kurdo Talabani e schierò il suo esercito presso il confine ovest irakeno.
  • Dopo l’assassinio di Hariri, Siria e Iran si unirono per far fronte alla minacce comuni. Un economista siriano afferma che la Siria ha "ripiegato" sull’Iran in quanto esclusa da un’alleanza con l’Europa: quella tra Iran e Siria sarebbe quindi un’alleanza di necessità.
  • Il precedente comandante delle Guardie Repubblicane iraniane, Mahmoud Rezaei, ha dichiarato in Aprile che l’Iran non sarà neutrale se gli Usa attaccheranno la Siria: i diplomatici iraniani sostengono che l’Iran potrà agire solo in modo diplomatico in un caso del genere, ma con una struttura del potere cosi frammentata gli analisti credono che le Guardie Rivoluzionarie troveranno comunque il modo in segreto di rifornire l’esercito siriano come già fatto con Hezbollah.
  • La meta principale dell’accordo, dice Meir Javendafar, un analista israeliano nato in Iran, sarebbe quello di rafforzare l’arsenale siriano con le armi iraniane, che sono migliorate molto nella tecnologia. A differenza della Russia, infatti, l’Iran offrirebbe termini di pagamento migliori e le sue armi non sono costose. Inoltre l’appoggio militare dell’Iran alla Siria non sarebbe soggette a pressioni da Occidente.
  • Nel 1980 la Siria permise con riluttanza a 300-500 Guardie Rivoluzionarie di stabilirsi a Baalbek in Libano, dove poi formarono Hezbollah; la Siria pretese, come sta facendo ora, che le Guardie passassero per il suo territorio, in modo da esercitare un controllo sulle attività di Tehran nel cortile di casa di Damasco.
  • Dopo la guerra tra Hezbollah e Israele, l’Iran procurò una larga fetta dei milioni di dollari che Hezbollah elargirono per coloro che erano stati maggiormente impoveriti dai bombardamenti israeliani, mentre la Siria controllava dal confine che la sua influenza in Libano non fosse ridimensionata.
  • "E’ improbabile che Damasco rinunci alla possibilità di avere totalmente normalizzato le relazioni con Washington per amore di Tehran, o che Tehran metta a repentaglio la pace definitiva e la sicurezza per intervenire in favore della Siria in caso di una minaccia di Israele o degli Usa imminente" afferma Ali Ghezelbash, un analista del Mo presso una compagnia petrolifera Europea.
  • Lo scorso anno, Jane’s Intelligence Digest riportò che l’intelligence iraniana stava programmando di utilizzare suoi uomini nell’intelligence siriana Mukhabarat per destituire Assad nel caso in cui avesse continuato la sua politica pro-occidentale che non si adeguava alle strategie regionali iraniane.
  • "L’Iran vede la Siria come un’importante alleata strategica, dato che Damasco fornisce all’Iran un punto d’appoggio sicuro nella regione del Mediterraneo", afferma un analista del MO.

Iran keeps Syria on side – for now
By Iason Athanasiadis

DAMASCUS
– Syria and Iran are
forging an ever-closer alliance to countenance the gathering regional and
international isolation in which they find themselves
. Their improved
ties include military and intelligence cooperation, according to Syrian
officials and analysts.

"It’s strategic relations free of charge," said Ibrahim Hamidi, the Damascus bureau head of the pan-Arab Al-Hayat newspaper. "The Iranians are giving full support, full protection, full financial
and technical assistance to Syria without expecting anything in return."
Such has been the bloom in ties in recent months that two or three Iranian delegations reportedly pass through Damascus weekly. So common have they become that the Syrian state media have largely ceased to report their comings and goings.
"Syria and Iran are two friendly countries which are brought together by Muslim aspects and common interests, not forgetting the common confrontation over the Greater Middle East," Syrian Minister of Information Mohsen Bilal told Asia Times Online. "There are many relationships that bring us together. But before anything else, Syria and Iran don’t have any aggressive intentions."
The increase in warmth is not a new development but the continuation of a quarter-century alliance held up by international relations experts as a triumph of realism over ideology.

In its prime, during the 1980s, the alliance saw a brisk trade in arms and oil between the two countries. Syria was the only Arab country to stand up for Iran after Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Iran. Damascus cut off the pipeline terminating in Lattakia that exported Iraq’s oil to the West, funneled Soviet and other weapons to Tehran, pledged to supply weapons to Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani, allegedly blew up the Iraqi Embassy in Beirut, and amassed its army against Iraq’s western border.

In the days following the assassination of Lebanon’s prime minister, Rafik Hariri, in February 2005, the two allies announced the formation of a united front to face down common threats. A high-level Syrian delegation signed the agreement in Tehran, prompting warnings of a Tehran-Damascus axis stretching from Iran and the Persian Gulf across Iraq to Syria and the Mediterranean.
"Syria turned towards Iran because Europe closed towards Syria, there was no other option but Iran," said one respected Syrian economist. "It’s more an alliance of necessity rather than a strategic choice. Syria will not sell itself to Iran. It’ll ally with it for common interests, but in the end her nationalistic interests are its primary concern."
Ties have grown closer since the election of President Mahmud Ahmadinejad and the acceleration of the confrontation between Tehran and the West. At the same time, the assassination of Hariri and Syria’s suspected role in it further put Damascus under the spotlight of reform.

The former chief of Iran’s Republican Guards, Mahmoud Rezaei, declared in April that Iran "will not be neutral if the US attacks Syria". Iranian diplomats claimed that Iran could not extend anything but diplomatic action to a beleaguered Damascus, but with Iran’s power structure as fractured as it is, analysts believe that the Revolutionary Guards would nonetheless mount a covert resupply of the Syrian army, similar to the one they reportedly have applied on Hezbollah.
"The main goal of the agreement is to bolster Syria’s arsenal with Iranian weapons, which have been improving in terms of technology," said Meir Javendafar, an Iranian-born Israeli analyst. "Unlike the Russians, Iran offers much better payment terms, and its weapons are not as expensive. Furthermore, in contrast to Russia’s case, Iran’s military supplies to Syria would not be susceptible to pressure from the West."

It has not always been plain sailing between Tehran and Damascus. In the 1980s, a reluctant Syria allowed a contingent of 300-500 Revolutionary Guards to establish themselves in Lebanon’s Baalbek, where they set about founding Hezbollah. But Damascus insisted that the Revolutionary Guards come via Syria, and this was a condition that applies until today, as a way of exerting some control over Iranian activity in Syria’s strategic back yard.
Even today, Iranian arms to Hezbollah continue to enter through Syria. Despite this, Iran established itself more successfully in southern Lebanon, where posters of Iranian ayatollahs Ruhollah Khomeini and Ali Khamenei are ubiquitous, while pictures of Hafez al-Assad or his son Bashar, the president, are non-existent.
In the aftermath of Hezbollah’s war with Israel, oil-rich Iran provided a large part of the millions of dollars of rent and furniture money that Hezbollah is distributing among those made destitute by the Israeli bombardments, while Syria’s political elite watched from the sidelines, worried that their influence was being sidelined in Lebanon.
"Both sides have come to the realization that they need to increase their outward portrayal of unity in the face of increasing threats," said Ali Ghezelbash, a Middle East analyst with a European oil company. "It is unlikely that Damascus would give up the chance to have fully normalized relations with Washington for the sake of Tehran, or that Tehran would jeopardize ultimate peace and security to intervene on Syria’s behalf in case of an imminent Israeli or US threat."

Last year, Jane’s Intelligence Digest reported that Iranian intelligence was planning to use assets it had cultivated within Syria’s Mukhabarat (intelligence service) to unseat Assad in the event that he continued following pro-Western policies that did not suit Tehran’s regional strategies.
"Syrian officials say these relations will not be hurtful to Syrian interests," said Hamidi, the bureau chief. "I hope that they’re right, I hope that the Iranians will be committed to their promises to the Syrian government, I hope Syria will not be sacrificed in any possible deal between Iran and the West."
The biographer of Hafez Assad, Patrick Seale, describes how Iran’s then-foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati came to Damascus on New Year’s Eve 1981 in preparation for close ties. In his hotel room that night, he was shocked to observe that Syrian television took its viewers on a tour of the city’s floor shows, celebrating with suitable revelry the end of one year and the beginning of another.
The next morning, Velayati opened official proceedings with a tirade against the flimsily clad dancers he had seen on television. Although it was an early lesson in the susceptibilities of their new ally, the Syrians knew even then that their alliance had progressed to such an extent that a little scandal would not rupture it.

"Even if a deal is made with the West, Syria’s position will still be safe," opined Javendafar, the Middle East analyst. "Iran sees Syria as an important strategic ally, as Damascus provides Iran with a secure foothold in the Mediterranean region."
Iason Athanasiadis is an Iran-based correspondent.

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