Cina, armamenti, S-E Asia, Oceano Indiano
Le forze armate cinesi (PLA) fanno mosse politiche in prima linea
La Cina modera gli aumenti del bilancio militare
o dopo +12,7% nel 2011, nel 2010 +7,5%, negli ultimi 20 anni una crescita quasi continua a due cifre.
– Il giornale ufficiale China Daily parla di un calo della spesa militare per rassicurare i paesi dell’Asia-Pacifico preoccupati per la potenza militare cinese, che hanno spinto gli Usa a concentrare la politica di Difesa sull’Asia-Pacifico.
o Usa ed alleati pensano che gran parte della spesa militare cinese serva per gli armamenti.
o Gli Usa ritengono potenziali punti di scontro nella regione le aeree marittime del Mar cinese orientale, nel Mar Giallo e nel Mar di Cina Meridionale, che nel 2011 hanno dato luogo a conflitti tra Cina, Vietnam e Filippine. La Cina ha avvertito gli Usa di non interferire in queste dispute territoriali
– La spesa Difesa degli Usa nel 2010 fu pari al 4,8% del PIL (dati BM); quella della Cina nel 2011 fu pari all’1,28% del PIL, e comprende la spesa per ricerca, esperimenti, commesse, riparazioni, trasporto e magazzinaggio di armi ed equipaggiamenti (dati Congresso Nazionale del Popolo, Parlamento).
o Gli esperti militari calcolano che il bilancio reale per la Difesa della Cina sia superiore del 50% alle cifre ufficiali, che escluderebbero, tra l’altro, la spesa per i missili nucleari e i maggiori sistemi di armamenti.
o
1. Crescita media negli ultimi tre annidi: PIL; spesa fiscale; Bilancio per la Difesa;
2. Percentuale del PIL e spesa fiscale
o Nessuno può permettersi di inimicarsi il PLA (People Liberation Army), in particolare perché non precluderne il sostegno in occasione della successione alla direzione del PCC (ottobre o novembre 2012) da Hu Jintao a Xi Jinping (che è stato vice-presidente della Commissione centrale militare (che dirige le forze armate), e in presenza di importanti decisioni da prendere.
o Hu Jintao probabilmente continuerà a dirigere la Commissione, come già fece il predecessore Jiang Zemin.
o Rimane forte la pressione per il mantenimento della spesa militare a fronte della decisione americana, dello scorso anno, di dispiegare soldati in Australia e della nuova strategia di rafforzamento delle alleanze militari nell’Asia-Pacifico
– Negli anni Ottanta Deng Xiaoping ridusse drasticamente il bilancio Difesa (destinato al personale ? n.d.r.) diminuendo di 1/3 le forze del PLA, per fornire risorse alla crescita dell’economia civile.
– In cambio Deng Xiaoping concesse ai militari la modernizzazione degli armamenti, compreso un caccia stealth e una portaerei, e la possibilità di fare soldi con la creazione di vere e proprie imprese capitalistiche.
– I militari vennero riportati nella prima linea politica dalla repressione di Tienanmen, essi entrarono nella lotta per il potere al vertice, che portò alla caduta dell’ex capo del PCC, Zhao Ziyang.
– Nel 1992, 14° Congresso PCC, venne rovesciata la potente fazione militare capeggiata da Yang Shangkun; Deng Xiaoping conferì tutto il potere a Jiang Zemin, e nominò il generale in pensione Liu Huaqing a presiedere il Comitato permanente del Politburo, a sostegno di Jiang.
– 1997, 15° Congresso PCC: altra grossa frattura tra forze armate e partito, causato da due fattori:
o Lo scandalo del contrabbando che coinvolse il PLA a Xiamen, mentre la Cina stava negoziando l’entrata nel WTO;
o la riforma dei gruppi statali (SOE)
– Un gruppo di studiosi cinesi dimostrarono che il contrabbando, che aveva per lo più il sostegno dei militari, costava al governo più delle riduzioni delle tariffe doganali richieste dagli USA; la lotta al contrabbando, avrebbe consentito di raggiungere gli obiettivi tariffari richiesti per l’entrata nel WTO, e di aumentare le entrate doganali.
– La riforma dei gruppi statali era necessaria per una maggiore efficienza economica, questo significava che i militari dovevano abbandonare tutti i gruppi e riformare il sistema interno delle commesse.
o I militari, non potendo più potuto far soldi direttamente, con un’impresa, dovevano ora essere finanziati dallo Stato; altro segnale della demilitarizzazione della politica fu che dal 15° Congresso PCC nessun militare fece più parte del Comitato permanente del Politburo.
o In cambio i militari ebbero l’aumento del bilancio e il via ad un programma di modernizzazione, a lungo rinviato.
– Nello scorso decennio il PLA divenne le maggiori forze armate del mondo, ma questo non ha migliorato la posizione internazionale della Cina, ha anzi accresciuto nella regione e nel mondo i timori di “un pericolo giallo”, l’invasione di prodotti e soldati. Nascono sospetti su fini strategici per qualsiasi operazione di fusione o acquisizione condotta dai gruppi cinesi.
– Nel 1999 viene elaborata la proposta di strategia asimmetrica (nel libro di Qiao Liang e Wang Xiangsui, Guerra oltre i limiti, ed. Chao Xian Zhan:
o Per acquisire un peso militare maggiore e una maggiore credibilità politica, alla Cina occorre una strategia complessa, è controproducente l’aumento verticale del settore militare.
– Sta crescendo la competizione della Cina con gli Usa per lo spazio e sulla sicurezza internet, campi entrambi cruciali per la sicurezza futura, e in cui la Cina non è molto dietro agli Usa,
o non deve perciò temere un attacco con una facile sconfitta da parte degli Usa, un motivo per diminuire la spesa militare e cercare il dialogo con gli Usa.
– Cosa vuole il PLA in cambio di una rinuncia a una parte del flusso di denaro e del potere?
– Ma il PLA è diviso in varie fazioni, come dimostra il recente l’attacco del generale Liu Yuan conto Gu Junshan, accusato di corruzione. Se il PLA non trova un nuovo modo per avere peso nel partito, la logica del potere militare prevarrà su quella generale della potenza cinese.
– il congresso del partito del prossimo autunno deciderà quale fazione militare prevarrà:
o quella che vuole subito più soldi per i miliari,
o quella che accetta una nuova strategia più sofisticata per la Cina.
– BEIJING – It was more than many in Asia and the Pacific were hoping to see, but was also less than in the past – and it possibly shows a trend for the future. China on March 4 announced it would boost military spending by 11.2% in 2012, describing its first defense budget since United States President Barack Obama promoted a policy of bolstering the American presence in the region, in non-hostile terms.
– The new official budget for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will be 670.3 billion yuan (US$110 billion), after a 12.7% increase last year and a near-unbroken string of double-digit rises reaching back two decades.
– In 2010, the PLA announced an increase of only 7.5%. Unofficial estimates reckon the increases to be much higher. But the official newspaper for the foreign audience, China Daily, took the pains to show an overall decrease of the Chinese military spending.
– The latest official budget shrinks the increase by 1.5% compared to last year, while the complex calculations of the China Daily show a decrease, and in so doing aim at achieving two goals:
o to signal to Asia-Pacific countries, which are growing concerned about China’s military might, that PLA expenditures could be drastically reduced in the future;
o and at the same time, since the increase is still quite significant, to pays political dues to the military establishment during the year of leadership succession from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping.
– The PLA represents the single largest political asset in the party. Deng Xiaoping for years had no major role in the government or the Chinese Communist Party, but was chairman of the military commission. After him, both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao wore three major hats together; head of state, general secretary of the party, and chairman of the military commission.
– In 2002, Jiang gave up the first two posts, but retained for two more years the military commission leadership, proof that he was still the paramount leader in China. In October, at the 18th Party Congress, China should have its second peaceful transition of power with the one from Hu to Xi, which follows that of Jiang to Hu. In this transition, when many things have yet to be decided, nobody can afford to antagonize the PLA. And the PLA wants money for its weapons and its people, as money, besides being money, is power in the party and in China.
– This, in a way, goes beyond the normal military logic of many countries, where militaries seek more money for their aggrandizement. It is part of the current logic of power in China. Jiang in the 1990s was the first party chief who had no combat experience and no great familiarity with the military. Before him, Deng drastically reduced the military budget to open up resources to grow the civilian economy, and in the early 1980s, he cut down PLA forces by one third.
– In return for this, Deng allowed the military to seek business on its own, start companies, make money, be capitalist, and de facto not be interested in military affairs.
– However, with the crackdown on the Tiananmen movement, the military were brought back to the political frontline. They were asked to move against the students and take sides in the power struggle at the top, which brought about the political demise of former party chief Zhao Ziyang.
– At the 14th Party Congress in 1992, the powerful military faction headed by Yang Shangkun was toppled, and Deng conferred all the power on Jiang, while putting general Liu Huaqing, then formerly retired, in the Standing Committee of the Politburo. Liu was to back Jiang in his hold of power, which at the beginning was not too firm.
– Around the 15th Party Congress, in 1997, another major break took place between the army and the party. Two elements brought this split about.
o The first was the PLA involvement in a major smuggling scandal in Xiamen,
o and the other was the reform of the state-owned enterprises (SOE).
– The Xiamen scandal occurred when China was negotiating its entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO).
– The official line was of resistance, but then a group of Chinese scholars produced a study proving that if China were to cut back on smuggling, it could achieve the tariff targets to get into the WTO, and it would actually increase its total income from customs.
o In other words, smuggling in China, conducted mainly with the support of the army, was costing the government more than the tariff cuts requested by the United States.
– Moreover, for China’s economy to become more efficient, China needed to reform its SOEs, making them fully commercial and separate from their old ministries. In this way, in a few years, the military had to shed all its companies and drastically reform its internal procurement system.
– It meant that the military stopped making money for itself, had to officially cease being a capitalist enterprise, and thus had to get money from the state. As a further sign of the demilitarization of politics, there has been no soldier on the Standing Committee of the Politburo since the 15th Party Congress.
– In return, the military got the green light to increase its budget and proceed with a long-delayed program of modernization.
– Over a decade later, the PLA has become the second-largest military in the world, in line with its economic power. But this stronger military is not increasing China’s international standing; it is conversely undermining China’s position in the region and the world as it multiplies fears of a "yellow peril" invading the world with its products and soldiers.
– Not only does China not affirm its power through the military (for a wide number of reasons), but China may also find it more difficult to conduct simple business, such as mergers and acquisitions, because of the military shadow. Every M&A conducted because of a normal interest becomes suspicious: is it an act of military invasion? Is it part of a convoluted Chinese plot to conquer the world?
– If this were so, now would be the time for the asymmetric strategy expounded by Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui in their 1999 book War Beyond Limits (Chao Xian Zhan). That is, to acquire a greater military voice and greater political credibility in the world, China should conceive a complex strategy – a simple vertical military increase is just counterproductive. It only multiplies fears and reactions that start with the military but cover all kinds of Chinese activities at home and abroad: any purchase of a mine or factory abroad and any crackdown on turmoil could become evidence of China’s conquering spirit.
– Moreover, competition with the United States in space [1] and on Internet security is heating up. In these two fields, crucial for future security (through the ”conquest” of the Internet or space I can make your weapons follow my commands, or I can block all your weapons’ systems), China is not lagging far behind the US, so Beijing should have no real fear of being attacked and easily beaten by America.
– This logic is simple enough to be grasped by all generals, and this should be reason enough to decrease military spending and seek a major dialogue with the US on transparency and military collaborations.
– But, as we saw, the purely military-strategic element is only part of the story. There is also the part about domestic politics. Money is power everywhere – and in the PLA, as well – and what does the PLA want in China in return for giving up part of its money and present power?
– This is a general question, which then goes down to the various factions of the PLA, as the army is not totally united.
– The recent alleged offensive of general Liu Yuan against his colleague Gu Junshan, who fell accused of corruption, proves that in-fighting in the military is no less cruel than among civilians. But unless the PLA fails to find a new model to balance its power within the party, its internal logic (more power – more money) will prevail over the external logic (more money for the PLA – more trouble for China).
– The answer will not be found in the coming days but over the next few months, when the political balance leading to the party congress this autumn will require different factions to take into consideration the military vote. We shall see who in the military will win:
o those who are after the money or the ones more broadly in favor of a new, more sophisticated strategy for China.
1. See, for instance, Moore, Gregory (2011). An International Relations Perspective on the Science, Politics, and Potential of an Extraterrestrial Sino-US Arms Race. Asian Perspective, 35, 643-658.
Francesco Sisci is a columnist for the Italian daily Il Sole 24 Ore and can be reached at fsisci@gmail.com
Beijing Trims Growth of Its Budget, but Neighbors Likely to Remain on Edge Over Territorial Disputes
– BEIJING—China said on Sunday that it would boost its military spending by 11.2% in 2012, slightly less than last year’s increase but still enough to aggravate the concerns that have prompted the U.S. to refocus its defense policy on the Asian-Pacific region.
Military delegates from the Chinese People’s Liberation Army walk toward the Great Hall of the People Sunday in Beijing.
– The slightly slower growth in military expenditure—spending had increased 12.7% in 2011—appeared to be designed to ease worries about China’s rapidly expanding arsenal and its increasingly robust diplomacy in the region, while still satisfying Chinese generals eager to continue modernizing the armed forces.
The latest in a series of double-digit rises in military spending was revealed on the eve of an annual meeting of the National People’s Congress, or NPC—China’s parliament—which is being closely watched this year as it comes a few months before a once-a-decade Communist Party leadership change.
– A substantial increase was widely expected, partly because civilian party leaders are eager to ensure the support of the military, an increasingly powerful and vocal political constituency, ahead of the succession in October or November, political analysts say.
– The People’s Liberation Army has largely forgone a formal role in Chinese politics for the past two decades in exchange for billions of dollars of spending on modern equipment, including a stealth fighter jet and an aircraft carrier, both of which were unveiled last year.
The NPC will set key economic priorities for 2012 but as the WSJ’s Aaron Back tells Deborah Kan, it’s often what goes on behind the scenes that’s most telling.
– Current and future leaders are under extra pressure to maintain the pace of military spending since the U.S. decision last year to deploy troops in Australia and strengthen defense ties throughout the Asian-Pacific region following a decade of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, analysts say.
– President Hu Jintao is expected to retire as Communist Party chief in the fall, but he is expected by some analysts to emulate his predecessor, Jiang Zemin, by staying on as head of the Central Military Commission, which commands the army, for a year or two after that, analysts say.
– Xi Jinping, who is expected to take over as party chief in the fall, has been vice chairman of the commission—and the only other civilian on the body—since late 2010, but he needs to curry favor with the military before taking over as commander-in-chief.
At the same time, the Chinese leadership is thought to be eager to ease the concerns among many of its neighbors that have spurred them to boost their own military spending and to shore up military ties with the U.S., especially in the past year, analysts say.
– "China’s limited military strength is aimed at safeguarding sovereignty, national security and territorial integrity and will not pose a threat to other countries," Mr. Li said. He said China’s military spending had decreased as a proportion of GDP and overall fiscal expenditure, and was still relatively small compared to that of the U.S. He said China’s defense spending was 1.28% of GDP in 2011. The U.S.’s spending on defense equaled 4.8% of its GDP in 2010, the World Bank said.
– "You see, China has 1.3 billion people, a large territory and long coastline, but our defense spending is relatively low compared with other major countries," he said. He added that the defense budget would mostly be spent on daily necessities, training and equipment for military personnel but also covered "research, experiment, procurement, repair, transport and storage of all weapons and equipment, including new types of weapons."
– Many military experts believe China’s real defense budget may be as much as 50% higher than the official figure, which they say excludes spending on its nuclear-missile force and major weapons systems, among other things.
– The U.S. and many of its allies worry that much of the real budget is going into armaments designed to keep U.S. and other foreign forces out of the seas and air space around China’s shores so it can enforce its territorial claims in the region.
– Those fears are particularly acute in Vietnam and the Philippines, which clashed repeatedly with China over the past year over the disputed waters of the South China Sea, seen now by U.S. officials as one of the main potential flash points in the region. China has repeatedly warned the U.S. to stay out of those territorial disputes, and to cease aerial and naval reconnaissance operations around its shores.
– "It is important to note that Beijing views itself as reacting to the increasingly assertive policies of other countries and has repeatedly said that it does not want to provoke military confrontation," said Sarah McDowall, senior analyst at IHS Jane’s. "That said, the increase will be partially motivated by Washington’s strategic campaign to re-assert itself in Asia-Pacific and will underscore China’s growing means to assert its power over maritime claims in disputed waters of the South China Sea, East China Sea and Yellow Sea."
A version of this article appeared Mar. 5, 2012, on page A16 in some U.S. editions of The Wall Street Journal, with the headline: China Tempers Military Increases.