WSJ 061025
La sovranità del Pakistan
Un motivo centrale delle difficoltà USA e NATO in Afghanistan
è l’accordo stretto a settembre tra il governo del Pakistan e i capitribù, talebani
e terroristi mujaheddin per il controllo del Waziristan, una provincia del Nord
Pakistan, confinante con l’Afghanistan.
I raids in Afghanistan provenienti da oltre confine sono da
allora triplicati.
Il generale Musharraf che i talebani non sarebbero a lungo rimasti
inerti in Waziristan, visto che ha concesso il rilascio e il condono a tutti i
prigionieri talebani e ha loro restituito le armi confiscate.
Finora Musharaff è stato un’eccezione alla regola dell’amministrazione
Bush che parificava i terroristi a chi da loro copertura, sia perché aveva
aiutato a catturare i sospetti di al-Qaeda. Non può però rifiutare che le
truppe NATO e i missili americani facciano quanto lui dice di non essere in
grado di fare, controllare cioè le aree tribali.
WSJ 061025
Pakistan‘s Sovereignty
Our finest
foreign-policy minds have been abuzz lately trying explain how and why the U.S.
and its NATO allies are, as a recent Newsweek International cover has
it, "Losing
Afghanistan." But no need for deep thoughts here: The largest part of the problem
is neighboring Pakistan.
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In September, the Pakistan government of Pervez Musharraf agreed to abandon
its North Waziristan province — which shares a long border with
Afghanistan — to the de
facto rule of its "tribal elders" and the Taliban and mujahadeen
terrorists they harbor. Since then, as Barnett Rubin observes nearby, the number of cross-border raids
into Afghanistan has risen threefold.
It’s true
that the agreement the Pakistan
government signed with these elders explicitly forbids such raids. But General Musharraf surely knew
that the Taliban would not keep idle in Waziristan
for long, especially since he also agreed to the release and pardon of all
Taliban prisoners and the return of their confiscated weapons.
From day
one in the war on terror, the Bush Administration
has said it would make no
distinction between terrorists and those who harbor them. So far, Mr. Musharraf has earned
an exception to this rule by helping to capture al Qaeda suspects early
on, and then by pleading that his government cannot control its unruly tribal
areas. But then he cannot also refuse to allow NATO troops and U.S. Predator
missiles to do the job for him.
We don’t
know what General Musharraf promised President Bush and Afghan President Hamid
Karzai during their recent conclave in the White House. But we hope it was more
tangible cooperation than we have been seeing of late. Sovereignty has
responsibilities, and General Musharraf is not exercising them.