Mali: porta d’ingresso per l’intervento in Africa Occidentale
Tesi: Alcuni anni fa venne scatenata la “nuova contesa per l’Africa” dalla crescente influenza della Cina, contesa acuita dagli eventi della “primavera araba”; i recenti eventi in Mali offrono ulteriori opportunità a chi vuole avanzare altre rivendicazioni su una regione a lungo sfruttata.
– La Francia continua a insistere per un intervento militare “rapido” in Mali, i suoi droni hanno continuato a sorvolarne il deserto, con la scusa di ricercare sei ostaggi francesi tenuti da al-Qaeda.
– Parigi otterrà probabilmente ciò che vuole, visto anche il fiasco politico del leader dei putschisti, Amadou Haya Sanogo.
– Anche gli Usa sperano di poter intervenire, per difendere i loro crescenti interessi nel Sahel.
– I paesi africani sono divisi, e non hanno un’alternativa per restaurare l’unità territoriale e la sovranità del Mali, diviso tra i secessionisti Tuareg e i militanti islamisti nel Nord e nel Sud dalle forze armate divise in fazioni a base etnica.
– L’attuale crisi del Mali risale a molto prima di quanto i francesi vogliano ricordare:
o C’è molto astio tra le forze in lotta per il controllo, ma anche tra Mali e Francia, che conquistò il Mali nel 1898 (allora chiamato Sudan francese).
– Dopo decenni di aspra lotta, il Mali ottenne l’indipendenza nel 1960, con il presidente socialista Modibo Keita; una delle sue prime decisioni fu quella di liberarsi dall’influenza francese e della zona franca.
– Le potenze coloniali rimangono profondamente legate alle ex colonie interferendo in vario modo;
– poi appena se ne presenta l’occasione, intervengono militarmente per mantenere lo status quo.
– Nel 1968 Keita fu destituito, e nel 1977 morì in carcere.
– Nel 1992 il Mali raggiunse un certo grado di stabilità politica; alcuni anni dopo migliaia di rifugiati tuareg, negletti e sottorappresentati cominciarono a tornare ai loro villaggi, per la maggior parte nel Nord del paese, a seguito di un accordo di pace tra i tuareg e il governo centrale.
– Nel tentativo di mantenere la sua sfera di influenza in Mali, la Francia decise ad es. nel 2002 di cancellare oltre 1/3 del suo debito.
– Agli Usa interessa la posizione del Mali nel Sahel, e la prospettiva creata dalla ingovernabilità nel Nord.
– La giustificazione per l’intervento americano, in particolare per l’istituzione nel 2008 e lo stanziamento dell’US Africa Command (Africacom) è stata l’onnicomprensiva al-Qaeda, in particolare al-Qaeda del Maghreb (Aqim), a difesa degli interessi americani in tutto il continente, con l’eccezione dell’Egitto.
o La questione al-Qaeda è stata argomento di dibattito anche nella campagna presidenziale americana, con Romney che avvertiva del pericolo che gente di al-Qaeda trasformi il Mali in un nuovo Afghanistan.
– Altri esperti pensano che il Mali diventerà una altro Sudan.
– Varie bande di gruppi islamici, alcuni locali, altri provenienti da paesi confinanti, soprattutto dall’Algeria, hanno trovato un rifugio nel Nord e Ovest del Mali, a volte in lotta tra loro, a volte al servizio di partiti esterni, a volte in alleanza temporanea tra loro.
– Il popolo del Mali patisce le conseguenze del conflitto in corso, risultato di un mix di agende straniere, ideologie estremiste e rivendicazioni reali delle tribù maliane del Nord e dell’Ovest, ma neppure nel Sud non vi è stabilità; l’intero paese ha dovuto far fronte a tremenda carestia e signori della guerra.
– La fazione predominante nelle forze armate del Mali è quella di Amadou Sanogo, addestrato dagli Usa, che il 22 marzo 2012 ha guidato il colpo di Stato contro il presidente Amadou Toumani Touré, accusato di non aver contenuto l’influenza dei ribelli nel Nord. Sanogo di fatto mantiene il potere, nonostante il trasferimento del potere ad governo civile di Traorè.
– I militari hanno di nuovo preso il potere, quando masse filo-Sanogo hanno picchiato a morte il presidente Traorè; è seguito un governo di unità nazionale con il primo ministro Diara, destituito quando Diarra è stato arrestato dagli uomini di Sanogo.
– Non è chiaro chi stia dietro Sanogo: Francia e Usa lo tollerano;
– l’Unione Africana ha invece sospeso il Mali dall’associazione; le potenze occidentali non hanno preso una posizione chiara.
– Mentre Ecowas e UA sono concentrate sul porre fine alla disintegrazione territoriale del Nord e dell’Ovest, Sanogo mantiene il potere.
– Nel Nord il conflitto è fluido, cambiano le alleanze, e di conseguenza la natura del conflitto.
– Durante la guerra Nato in Libia, sono stati possibili grossi rifornimenti di armi a vari gruppi di ribelli e guerriglieri della regione.
– I Tuareg hanno avuto aiuti dal governo libico di Gheddafi, e poi si sono dispersi durante e dopo la guerra, molti tornati in Mali, induriti dalla guerra e imbaldanziti dalle armi.
– Nel Nord gli scontri sono iniziati nel gennaio 2012, il colpo di Stato di Sanogo ha creato il vuoto politico utile al Movimento Nazionale di Liberazione di Azawad (MNLA) dei Tuareg per dichiarare l’indipendenza due settimane dopo.
– Questi successi hanno incoraggiato gruppi islamici e altri gruppi di ribelli per prendersi varie città del paese.
o Ansar al Dine ha prima operato con l’MNLA, ma appena presa Timbuctu, si è dichiarato contrario all’indipendenza e per l’Islam.
o Si sono poi mossi Al-Tawhidwa al-Jihad, e Aqim, poi divenuti nemici.
o Lo scorso settembre ribelli di vari gruppi islamici che controllavano il Nord hanno cominciato ad avanzare in altre aree strategiche del Centro e del S-O, e ora contro le città controllate dal governo e aree ancora sotto il controllo dei tuareg di Azawad.
– Attualmente c’è un mezzo consenso sulla necessità di un intervento militare esterno, ma ci sono divergenze sul tipo e grandezza dell’intervento.
– Sanogo ha poco interesse a che altri paesi dell’Africa Occidentale si disputino l’influenza in Mali.
Tesi: Le forze armate del Mali non sono più in grado di fermare da sole la marcia dell’Alleanza jihadista; occorre un aiuto esterno. La Francia sembra pronta ad intervenire.
– Giovedì 10 gennaio gruppi di guerriglieri islamisti radicali hanno assalito e preso Konna, un villaggio a circa 70 km da Mopti la capitale regionale del Mali, dopo aver preso Douetza (145 km a nord di Mopti)
– Si tratterebbe della prima iniziativa militare islamista congiunta dalla occupazione del Nord nove mesi fa’, operazione descritta come massacro:
o avrebbero partecipato all’azione guerriglieri del gruppo Ansar al Dine, dei gruppi terroristici al-Qaeda del Maghreb (Aqim) e del movimento per l’Unità e la Jihad dell’Africa Ocidentale (Mujao), oltre che di membri del gruppo islamista nigeriano Boko Haram.
o I jihadisti puntano ora su Mopti e poi sulla capitale Bamako.
o Le forze governative si sono date alla fuga, il presidente ad interim, Diocounda Traorè ha chiesto ufficialmente assistenza militare al governo francese.
Giovedì stesso sono atterrati due aerei militari C-160 (usati dalle forze armate francesi e tedesche), e 4 elicotteri vicino a Mopti, dove si trova un avamposto delle forze governative del Mali.
– La Francia dispone di una base con oltre 800 fanti di marina (l’83° battaglione) ad Abidjan, Costa d’Avorio, distante solo un’ora di aereo da Bamako; si sono aggiunte unità speciali stanziate in Niger.
– Su mandato di Ecowas (la Comunità Economica dell’Africa Occidentale) il Burkina Faso aveva mediato tra le parti in conflitto, riuscendo a portare ai negoziati Ansar Dine e i ribelli tuareg del Movimento Nazionale per la Liberazione dell’Azawad (MNLA).
– Inizialmente il gruppo Ansar Dine era stato considerato semi-moderato e desideroso di negoziare. Gli islamisti tuareg hanno usato i negoziati per riunire le forze, come ha dimostrato l’incontro di inizio gennaio tra Ansar Dine, Aqim, Mujao e Boko Haram, nei pressi di Timbuktu.
– L’offensiva di Konna è iniziata poco dopo questo incontro. Secondo i servizi segreti nigerino ci sarebbe nell’area un grande campo di addestramento in cui si incontrano jihadisti di tutta l’Africa, compresi somali della milizia Shabaab, legata ad al-Qaeda.
– Anche il CdS ONU chiede ora il rapido invio delle truppe africane d’attacco, il cui intervento già programmato è stato frenato per una serie di condizioni poste per l’ingaggio dei suoi 3300 soldati provenienti dai paesi limitrofi (tra queste condizioni un programma di addestramento per loro e per le forze armate del Mali).
– La debolezza delle forze armate del Mali dipenderebbe secondo FAZ dalla mancanza di direzione prima che dalla scarso addestramento e dalle armi obsolete.
– Dopo il colpo di Stato del marzo 2012, quando i militari deposero il presidente Amadou Amani Touré per l’incompetenza dimostrata di fronte all’avanzata dei ribelli tuareg, le forze armate del paese si sono divise in base alla loro etnia.
– Un problema che non sono riusciti a risolvere neppure gli istruttori militari europei, dato che presupporrebbe l’allontanamento dei putchisti dal governo di transizione.
– Il leader dei putschisti, il colonnello Amadou Sanogo, ha agito a suo piacimento, come ha dimostrato la deposizione e incarcerazione del primo ministro Modibo Diarra, a metà dicembre.
– C’è divisione sull’opportunità di intervento tra i paesi confinanti:
o Costa d’Avorio e Nigeria sono per un veloce invio di truppe, per fermare gli islamisti in Mali, dato che in entrambi i paesi ci sono importanti gruppi di popolazione musulmana, inparticolare la Nigeria non vuole che Boko Haram si crei una base al di fuori del paese.
– Mauritania e soprattutto Algeria sono contrarie all’intervento militare: l’Algeria pensa che si creasse in Mali uno Stato tuareg, laico o islamista, essa verrebbe liberata dalle richieste dei tuareg algerini, che potrebbero spostarsi in Mali.
– Sono poi ancora da chiarire i legami tra reparti delle forze armate algerine e il gruppo terroristico Aqim.
o Quando nell’estate 2003 un gruppo di turisti, per gran parte tedeschi, venne sequestrato dai jihadisti del gruppo salafita per la predicazione e il combattimento (GSPC), i diplomatici tedeschi si trovarono di fronte alla complicità di ufficiali algerini e sequestratori.
o I sequestrati vennero poi liberati in Mali, dietro pagamento di denaro, e in questa operazione ebbe un importante ruolo l’attuale leader di Ansar al Dine, Iyad Ag Ghaly; poco dopo GSPC si riconobbe parte di al-Qaeda del Maghreb.
– Come nel 2002 con lo scoppio della guerra civile in Costa d’Avorio (Operazione Licorne), dovrebbe esserci l’intervento massiccio dei militari francesi, su mandato Onu. Quell’intervento militare venne considerato poi utile per aver posto fine alla guerra, e aver aperto un negoziato tra governo ivoriano e ribelli.
Ma la situazione in Mali è molto diversa, tanto per la dimensione del territorio da mettere in sicurezza, che perché gli islamisti in Mali non sono disposti a negoziare, e un intervento militare estero rischia di divenire una guerra come quella in Afghanistan.
Mali: West Africa’s gate to intervention
– France is insisting on "rapid" military intervention in Mali. The European country’s unmanned drones have reportedly been scouring the desert of the troubled West African nation – although it claims that the drones are seeking the whereabouts of six French hostages believed to be held by al-Qaeda.
– The French are likely to get their wish, especially following the recent political fiasco engineered by the country’s strong man and coup leader Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo.
– The United States also covets intervention, but one that would serve its own growing interests in the Sahel region.
– African countries are divided on the issue and have no clear alternative on how to restore Mali’s territorial integrity – and equally important political sovereignty – disjointed between Tuareg secessionists and Islamic militants in the north and a factionalized army in the south.
– The current crisis in Mali is the recent manifestation of a recurring episode of terrible suffering and constant struggles.
– It goes back much earlier than French officials in particular wish to recall.
– True, there is much bad blood between the various forces that are now fighting for control, but there is also much acrimony between Mali and France, the latter having conquered Mali (then called French Sudan) in 1898.
– After decades of a bitter struggle, Mali achieved its independence in 1960 under the auspices of a socialist government led by president Modibo Keita. One of his very early orders of business was breaking away from French influence and the franc zone.
– Former colonial powers rarely abandon their ambitions, even after their former colonies gain hard-earned freedom. They remain deeply entrenched by meddling in various ways that destabilize the former colonies. Then when opportune, they militarily intervene to uphold the status quo.
– In 1968, Keita was ousted from power, and few years later, in 1977, he died in a lonely cell. His death ushered in mass protests, compelling a few cosmetic gestures towards a new constitution and half-hearted democracy.
– Turmoil has defined Mali for many years since then, even after the country achieved a level of political stability in 1992. At the time, it was believed that Mali was fast becoming a model for democracy, at least in the West Africa region. A few years later, thousands of refugees from the ever-neglected and under-represented Tuaregs began returning to their towns and villages mostly in the vast desert region in northern Mali.
– That return was introduced by a peace agreement signed between Tuaregs and the central government. Little on the ground has changed. Various bands of Islamic groups, some homegrown, others fleeing fighting in neighboring countries, especially Algeria, found haven in Mali’s north and west.
– At times, they fought amongst each other, at times they served some unclear agendas of outside parties, and at times they created temporary alliances amongst themselves.
– While France attempted to keep Mali in its sphere of influence – thus its decision in 2002 to cancel more than a third of Mali’s debt – the United States was also taking interest in Mali’s crucial position in the Sahel regions and the prospects created by the ungovernability of the northern regions.
– Of course, the all-inclusive definition of al-Qaeda served as the ever-convenient ruse to justify American involvement. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has been used by Washington to rationalize the establishment of the US Africa Command (AFRICOM). It was set up in 2008 to manage US military interests in the whole continent with the exception of Egypt.
The US State Department claimed that AFRICOM "will play a supportive role as Africans build democratic institutions and establish good governance across the continent".
– The importance of the al-Qaeda narrative to the US role in the Sahel was highlighted in the last presidential debate between President Barack Obama and his Republican opponent, Mitt Romney. To flex some political muscle perhaps, Romney warned of "al-Qaeda type individuals" threatening to turn Mali into a new Afghanistan.
– Some Western experts on the Sahel dispute the analogy, claiming instead that Mali is descending into a Sudan-like model.
– Either way, the people of Mali are currently suffering the consequences of the burgeoning conflict, which reflects a convoluted mix of foreign agendas, extremist ideologies and real grievances of Malian tribes in the north and west.
– The south of the country is not exactly an oasis of stability. The ongoing territorial struggle and political volatility are threatening the whole country, which has been battling a cruel famine and pitiless warlords.
– The most dominant faction in the Malian army is led by US-trained Amadou Sanogo, who on March 22 led a coup against president Amadou Toumani Toure.
– Sanogo’s reasoning – blaming Toure for failing to stamp out growing militant influence in the north – sounded more like a pretense than a genuine attempt at recovering the disintegrating country.
– It remains unclear who Sanogo’s backers are. France and the US are relatively tolerant of his political transgressions and violent conduct. Sanogo’s coup came shortly before elections, scheduled for last April.
– While the African Union[e] (AU) reacted assertively to the coup by suspending Mali’s membership, Western powers remained indecisive.
– Despite a half-hearted handing over of power from the coup leaders to a civilian government of president Dioncounda Traore, Sanogo remains firmly in charge. In May, the junta struck again, retaking power, as pro-Sanogo mobs almost beat president Traore to death inside his presidential compound.
– Sanogo, empowered by the lack of decisiveness to his conduct, continued to play some political game or another. A short-lived "national unity government" under prime minister Cheick Modibo Diarra was more or less toppled when Diarra was arrested by Sanogo’s men. He was forced to concede power and install a little-known government administrator as his predecessor.
– Sanogo’s political show continues, especially as the West African regional grouping (ECOWAS), along with the African Union[e] remains focused on what they perceive as a more urgent priority: ending the territorial disintegration in the north and west.
– The conflict in the north is in a constant influx. Alliances change, thus the nature of the conflict is in perpetual alteration. Large consignments of weapons that were made available during the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s war in Libya early last year, made their way to various rebel and militant groups throughout the region.
– The Tuaregs had received support from the ousted Libyan government and were dispersed during and following the war. Many of them returned to Mali, battle-hardened and emboldened by the advanced weapons.
– Fighting in the north began in stages, most notably in January 2012. Sanogo’s coup created the needed political vacuum for Tuaregs’ National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) to declare independence in the north a mere two weeks later. The declaration was the result of quick military victories by MNLA and its militant allies, which led to the capture of Gao and other major towns.
– These successive developments further bolstered Islamic and other militant groups to seize cities across the country and hold them hostage to their ideologies and other agendas.
– For example, Ansar al-Din had reportedly worked jointly with the MNLA but declared a war "against independence" and "for Islam" in June, as soon as it secured its control over Timbuktu. Al-Tawhidwa al-Jihad, along with AQIM, made their moves. The allies soon became bitter enemies.
– Last September, rebels from various Islamic groupings in control of the north began advancing onto other strategic areas in the center and south-west parts of the country. Their territorial advances are now made against government-held towns and areas that are still controlled by Azawad Tuareg rebels.
– There is now a semi-consensus on the need for military intervention in Mali, although some differences persist over the nature and scope of that intervention. Sanogo himself has little interest in seeing other West African powers jockeying for influence in Bamako, which could threaten his thus far unchallenged rule. Moreover, it is unclear how effective military force can be, as the territorial fragmentation, many militant groupings and political discord throughout the country are almost impossible to navigate.
– The stability of West Africa is surely at stake. The chances of a political solution are all but completely dissipated. The growing chaos will likely benefit interventionist states – France and the US in particular. A long-drawn new "war on terror", will justify further intervention in West Africa and more meddling in the affairs of ECOWAS countries.
– A few years ago, a new "scramble for Africa" was unleashed due to China’s growing influence in the continent. It was heightened by a more recent North African turmoil caused by the "Arab Spring". Opportunities now abound for those ready to stake more claims over a long-exploi
– ted region.
Ramzy Baroud (www.ramzybaroud.net) is an internationally syndicated columnist and the editor of PalestineChronicle.com. His latest book is: My Father was A Freedom Fighter: Gaza’s Untold Story (Pluto Press).
(Copyright 2012 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
– 11.01.2013 · Die Malische Armee kann den Vormarsch der vereinten Dschihadisten nicht mehr aus eigener Kraft stoppen. Sie braucht Hilfe von außen. Paris scheint nun schnell in die Bresche zu springen.
– Wenn es denn stimmt, was Augenzeugen aus der am Donnerstag von den radikalen Islamisten eroberten Ortschaft Konna berichten, dann steht Mali tatsächlich am Abgrund. Der Angriff auf das Dorf rund 70 Kilometer nördlich der Regionalstadt Mopti, so schilderten es Bewohner am Freitag telefonisch, sei eine gemeinsame Aktion der islamistischen Tuareg der Gruppe Ansar al Dine, der beiden Terrorgruppen Al Qaida im islamischen Maghreb (Aqim) und Bewegung für Einheit und Dschihad in Westafrika (Mujao), sowie Mitgliedern der nigerianischen Islamistengruppe Boko Haram gewesen.
– Ein solch konzertiertes Vorgehen radikaler Islamisten hat es in den neun Monaten, in denen sie den Norden Malis besetzt halten, noch nicht gegeben. Ein nach Mopti geflohener Bewohner von Konna beschrieb die Kämpfe am Freitag fassungslos als Massaker.
– Die völlig demoralisierte malische Armee, die noch am Donnerstag kundgetan hatte, sie marschiere auf Douentza rund 145 Kilometer nordöstlich von Mopti zu, suchte ihr Heil – wieder einmal – in der Flucht. Dort hat die Terrorgruppe Mujao das Sagen.
– Die Dschihadisten bedrohen inzwischen die Stadt Mopti und damit unmittelbar die Hauptstadt Bamako. In seiner Verzweiflung richtete der malische Übergangspräsident Dioncounda Traoré ein offizielles Gesuch an die französische Regierung um militärischen Beistand. Dem wurde offenbar sehr schnell entsprochen.
– Noch am Donnerstag waren zwei ausländische Militärflugzeuge vom Typ C-160, wie sie die französische und auch die deutsche Armee benutzen, und vier Hubschrauber mit Verstärkung in Sévaré bei Mopti gelandet, wo die malische Armee einen vorgeschobenen Kommandoposten unterhält.
– Nach Angaben von Flughafenarbeitern waren unter den neuen Soldaten auch solche mit weißer Haut. Woher diese stammen, wurde zunächst nicht mitgeteilt. Am Freitag aber bestätigte ein Mitglied des malischen Kabinetts anonym, dass es sich um Franzosen handele. Frankreich unterhält nur eine Flugstunde von Bamako entfernt, in Abidjan in der Elfenbeinküste, einen Stützpunkt mit mehr als 800 Marineinfanteristen („83. Bataillon d‘Infanterie de la Marine Française à Abidjan“). Hinzu kommen Spezialeinheiten zur Geiselrettung, die in Niger stationiert sind.
– Mit dem Vormarsch der Islamisten jedenfalls sind alle Hoffnungen auf ein friedliches Ende des malischen Konfliktes hinfällig. Daran ändert auch die nach wie vor optimistische Haltung des burkinischen Außenministers Djibrill Bassolé nichts. Sein Land vermittelt im Auftrag der Westafrikanischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (Ecowas) zwischen den Konfliktparteien und hatte es geschafft, sowohl Ansar al Dine als auch die Tuareg-Rebellen der Nationalen Bewegung zur Befreiung von Azawad (MNLA) an den Verhandlungstisch zu bringen.
– Aber die Gruppe Ansar al Dine war anfangs zu Unrecht als halbwegs moderat und verhandlungswillig eingestuft worden. Die Tuareg-Islamisten haben die Verhandlungen offenbar nur dazu genutzt, ihre Kräfte neu zu bündeln, wie das Treffen zwischen Ansar al Dine, Aqim, Mujao und Boko Haram Anfang Januar in Bambara Maouda nahe der Stadt Timbuktu zeigte. Kurz darauf begann die Offensive auf Konna. Dort, in Bambara Maouda, existiert nach Erkenntnissen des nigrischen Geheimdienstes ein großes Ausbildungslager, in dem sich Dschihadisten aus ganz Afrika treffen, unter ihnen auch Somalier von der mit Al Qaida verbündeten Shabaab-Miliz.
– Angesichts der sich dramatisch zuspitzenden Lage in Mali plädierte nun auch der UN-Sicherheitsrat für eine schnelle Entsendung der geplanten afrikanischen Eingreiftruppe.
– Dieser hatte allerdings vor Monatsfrist noch auf die Bremse getreten und einen möglichen Kampfauftrag für die 3300 Soldaten aus den Nachbarländern von zahlreichen Bedingungen abhängig gemacht, darunter ein umfangreiches Trainingsprogramm sowohl für die Eingreiftruppe als auch für die malische Armee.
– Dabei liegt die maßgebliche Schwäche der malischen Armee nicht in ihrer rudimentären Ausbildung und ihrem alten Gerät, sondern in ihrer Führungslosigkeit.
– Seit dem Putsch vom März vergangenen Jahres, bei dem Präsident Amadou Amani Touré wegen seiner angeblichen Inkompetenz angesichts des Vormarschs der Tuareg-Rebellen von der Armee gestürzt worden war, ist diese entlang ethnischer Linien tief gespalten.
– Und dieses Problem können auch europäische Militärausbilder nicht beheben, weil die Voraussetzung dafür wäre, die Putschisten aus der Übergangsregierung zu entfernen.
– Doch da schaltet und waltet der Putschistenführer Oberst Amadou Sanogo nach Belieben, wie die Absetzung und anschließende Verhaftung von Ministerpräsident Modibo Diarra Mitte Dezember vergangenen Jahres bewiesen hat.
– Schnelle Hilfe gegen den Vormarsch der radikalen Islamisten kann deshalb nur aus dem benachbarten Ausland kommen. Doch auch dort herrscht Uneinigkeit. Die Länder südlich von Mali – allen voran die Elfenbeinküste und Nigeria – dringen auf eine schnelle Entsendung von Kampftruppen, um den islamistischen Spuk im Nachbarland zu beenden. In beiden Ländern gibt es große muslimische Bevölkerungsgruppen und insbesondere Nigeria hat ein handfestes Interesse daran, dass die Extremisten von Boko Haram keinen Stützpunkt außerhalb Nigerias aufbauen.
– Demgegenüber steht die ablehnende Haltung Mauretaniens und vor allem Algeriens.
– Nach dem algerischen Kalkül würde ein Tuareg-Staat in Mali, ob laizistisch oder islamistisch, Algerien von den Forderungen der eigenen Tuareg erlösen – diese könnten dann schließlich nach Mali ziehen.
Welche Verbindungen pflegt Algeriens Armee zu Aqim?
– Zudem sind die Verbindungen zwischen Teilen der algerischen Armee und insbesondere der Terrorgruppe Aqim ein Umstand, der noch der Aufklärung bedarf:
o Als im Sommer 2003 eine überwiegend aus Deutschen bestehende Reisegruppe in Algerien von den Dschihadisten der Groupe salafiste pour la prédiction et le combat (GSPC) entführt worden war,
o hatten sich deutsche Diplomaten frustriert über die „Komplizenschaft“ von algerischen Offizieren und den Entführern gezeigt.
o Die Geiseln waren schließlich gegen Zahlung eines Lösegelds in Mali freigekommen, wobei der heutige Führer von Ansar al Dine, Iyad Ag Ghaly, eine große Rolle spielte. Wenig später benannte sich die GSPC in Al Qaida im islamischen Maghreb um.
– Angesichts der derzeitigen Situation in Mali dürfte alles auf eine massive Militärmission der französischen Armee hinauslaufen, die sich auf ein Mandat der Vereinten Nationen stützt. Das hat es schon einmal gegeben, nach Ausbruch des Bürgerkrieges im Nachbarland Côte d’Ivoire im Jahr 2002. Auch da gab es für die französische „Opération Licorne“ ein UN-Mandat; es wurde damit keine Blauhelmtruppe entsandt, sondern den Franzosen nur der Einsatz in dem Land erlaubt.
– Im Nachhinein betrachtet war diese Militäraktion entscheidend für die Beendigung des Krieges, weil die französischen Soldaten die Frontlinie konsequent eingefroren und damit Raum für Verhandlungen zwischen ivorischer Regierung und den Rebellen geschaffen hatten.
– Doch die Situation in Mali ist eine völlig andere, nicht nur wegen des ungleich größeren Gebietes, das abzusichern wäre. Die Rebellen in der Côte d’Ivoire wollten einen Politikwechsel und waren deshalb von vorneherein gesprächsbereit. Die Islamisten in Mali aber sind Fanatiker, die einen Gottesstaat anstreben, womit ein ausländischer Militäreinsatz ein ebenso brutaler Kampfeinsatz wie der in Afghanistan zu werden droht.
Am Freitag meldete die malische Armee, sie habe eine Offensive auf die Ortschaft Konna gestartet, zusammen mit „Soldaten befreundeter Länder“. Damit waren französische Kampfhubschrauber gemeint, die seit Freitagmorgen die Positionen der Islamisten unter Feuer nehmen.
– Die ersten Opfer dieser ausländischen Intervention in Mali jedenfalls stehen schon fest: Die sieben Franzosen, die von den radikalen Islamisten im Sahel nach wie vor als Geiseln gefangen gehalten warden
– .
Hollande schließt Kampfeinsatz in Mali nicht aus
Malische Armee stoppt Vormarsch der Islamisten
Islamisten in Mali rücken nach Süden vor
Mali: Diango Cissoko zum Premierminister ernannt
Mali: Ministerpräsident Diarra von Armee zum Rücktritt gezwungen
Malische Regierung und Rebellen führen direkte Gespräche
President Hollande confirms French forces are supporting Bamako’s counter-offensive against al-Qaeda-linked fighters.
President Francois Hollande has said France is intervening to stop al-Qaeda-linked fighters in Mali who have been moving toward the capital, Bamako.
The announcement by the leader of France, the former colonial overseer in West Africa, came on Friday after Mali’s interim president Dioncounda Traore had appealed for French help in stopping the rebels’ advance.
"I have agreed to Mali’s demand, which means French forces have provided support to Mali this afternoon," Hollande said on Friday. "The operation will last as long as is necessary."
Earlier on Friday, a Mali government official told the AFP news agency that the Malian army was being backed by Western military personnel in a fresh counter-offensive against the fighters.
"European military, including French, are present in Mali to repel any southward advance by the Islamists," the official told AFP on Friday.
"We will not reveal their number, nor where they are based, nor what equipment they have.
"They are here. We thank these countries who have understood that we are dealing with terrorists."
Efforts to retake the central town of Kona were launched from Sevare, a town about 70km to the south, where the Malian army has a command base.
Kona was seized by Islamist armed groups on Thursday and about 1,200 fighters have moved to within 20km of Mopti, a strategically important town on the frontier between rebel-held and government-held territories.
Mopti hosts a key Malian military airstrip, which would be vital for any missions into the north of the country.
"We’re talking about no ECOWAS intervention until September, so taking that airport would delay everything," political analyst Sylvain Touati told Al Jazeera.
"The situation has been the same for seven months. I don’t know why Hollande has talked about intervention today, since [Mali] is already destabilising."
Until now, France – like other EU countries – had limited its plans for assistance to training and logistics support for Mali’s troubled army, and had deferred to Mali and its African neighbours to resolve the crisis.
"They really needed to be propped up by another force," said Al Jazeera’s Rory Challands, reporting from Paris. "It doesn’t seem like Mali’s government has much time."
The EU will also speed up preparations to send a team to Mali to help train the country’s army to fight Islamist rebels, EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton said on Friday.
Earlier, the UN Security Council had called for the "rapid deployment" of an African-led international force to Mali.
France has hundreds of troops across western Africa, with bases or sites in places such as Senegal, Ivory Coast, Chad and Gabon.
The rebels "have even tried to deal a fatal blow to the very existence of Mali", Hollande said in an earlier speech on Friday to the French diplomatic corps.
"France, like its African partners and the entire international community, cannot accept that."
France will act under authority of three recent UN Security Council resolutions that call on member states to help Mali resolve its crisis in the face of a terrorist threat, both through political and military means, French diplomats have said.
Speaking to the AP news agency after the president’s speech, a top French diplomat said his country has completed its deployment of two surveillance drones to the region – to help boost reconnaissance of the rebels’ movements and activities.
The official said France is now able to deploy military assets "very quickly" and insisted that Hollande’s speech was "not just words … When you say that you are ready to intervene, you have to be."
France’s position has been complicated because armed groups in northern Mali currently hold seven French hostages.
In an updated travel advisory, the French foreign ministry said on Friday all non-essential French citizens should leave. International aid organisations have begun evacuating staff from the narrow central belt of the country.
For months, Hollande had explicitly said France would not send ground forces into Mali, but the president’s speech suggested that French air power would be used – marking a shift from recent public statements from Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian that it would not be.