Francesco Sisci
– Due gli aspetti di lungo termine delle riforme amministrative annunciate dalla sessione plenaria del parlamento cinese:
– 1: concentrazione e centralizzazione del potere secondo la tradizione imperiale e argine alle forze centrifughe che hanno fatto uscire dal controllo la politica interna ed estera.
– 2. una grande riforma liberale, come strumento per raggiungere questo fine, per digerire la quale l’apparato statale impiegherà mesi.
o Le riforme del 1998 cambiarono in un anno l’intero sistema, dando maggiore potere economico ai gruppi statali, e liberandoli da obblighi amministrativi e sociali;
o esse riuscirono tanto bene che in un decennio i gruppi statali controllano l’economia cinese, e creando monopoli e marginalizzando i gruppi privati.
– La riforma dei ministeri ora annunciata dal parlamento va in senso contrario: dare spazio al mercato; essa è una rielaborazione della filosofia e delle funzioni dei ministeri.
o Il vice-primo ministro, Ma Kai, incaricato della riforma: suo scopo è dare potere al mercato e alla società, ridurre gli interventi del governo nelle questioni spicciole, e accrescerne invece la capacità di gestione nelle questioni macroeconomiche, e fornire una supervisione.
o Sono stati quasi dimezzati ministeri, da 44 a 25,
o e ciò significa che la nuova dirigenza di Xi Jinping – appoggiato dal premier uscente Hu Jintao – è riuscita a imporsi sulle migliaia di interessi configgenti della potente burocrazia.
– Il PCC vuole diventare più liberale, più americano:
o il capo della potente commissione disciplinare del partito ha dato l’indicazione di leggersi Tocqueville – che vantava le virtù del sistema USA – e la sua critica all’ancien regime.
– La prima vera vittoria di Xi Jinping è quella sul ministro delle Ferrovie, che era riuscito a resistere alle riforme del 1998 ed era l’unico ministro a gestire direttamente le finanze del suo settore:
o ora le funzioni amministrative del suo ministero, come quelle degli altri ministeri, saranno separate dalle funzioni economiche e affidate a società statali; inoltre opererà sotto il ministero dei Trasporti.
o Non si sa cosa ne sarà della polizia e dei tribunali che operavano direttamente sotto il potere del ministero delle Ferrovie.
– Sono stati creati nuovi enti:
o una Amministrazione Nazionale per l’Energia, che deve coordinare attività prima divise tra gruppi di controllo di elettricità, petrolio, carbone, etc.
– La riforma amministrativa comprende una misura che ha importanti riflessi per la politica estera; viene creata una sola amministrazione per le aree marine:
o essa si occuperà di tutte le aree costiere, compresi gli arcipelaghi contesi del Mar di Cina Meridionale e le isole Diaoyu, o Sensaku, disputate con il Giappone,
o il quale ha già protestato.
o Avocando a sé ogni questione, semplifica le procedure in caso di tensioni future,
o mentre nel passato il governo centrale cinese aveva dovuto fornire una copertura a o fermare iniziative indipendenti di comandanti di vascelli pescherecci o di ufficiali di marina.
– Le nuove regole di mercato daranno una spinta al piano di urbanizzazione da $6 400 MD che nel prossimo decennio dovrebbe portare nei centri urbani milioni di persone.
Tesi: La Cina oggi non può limitarsi a reagire agli stimoli esterni, deve agire, tenere un profilo alto, agilità di iniziativa, ma il sistema non consente i prendere decisioni improvvise e di muoversi velocemente.
– La riforma generale del processo decisionale di politica estera e lo spazio di manovra del presidente sono due fattori fondamentali per l’adeguamento alle richieste provenienti dalla politica internazionale.
– Data la sua dimensione economica e demografica, la velocità di cambiamento, tutte le decisioni di politica interna della Cina ( più o meno abitazioni, auto, carne o cereali …)
– hanno importanti riflessi internazionali, e li avranno ancora di più man mano cresce economicamente e politicamente.
– Il presidente cinese deve negoziare ogni decisione della politica estera della Cina con gli altri importanti attori:
o le Forze Armate, uno Stato dentro lo Stato, con interessi tentacolari sia in Cina che all’estero, contano più del ministero Esteri;
o l’apparato di intelligence, il ministero per la Sicurezza statale,
o il dipartimento Esteri del PCC, un tempo più importante del ministero Esteri teneva le relazioni con gli altri PC, ed ora ha incarichi confusi;
o il Fronte Unito, che si occupa dei cinesi all’estero e delle religioni, come ad es. le relazioni con la Santa sede o con Taiwan.
– Il ministero del Commercio, occupandosi dei gruppi con un enorme surplus commerciale, ha un peso rilevante nelle decisioni;
– come pure la Banca Centrale, dato il suo ruolo di lotta alla rivalutazione dello yuan
– il ministero Finanze, legato ai due precedenti (Commercio e banca Centrale);
– il ministero per l’ambiente, dato che la Cina esporta inquinamento oltre che merci.
– Ci sono poi decine di piccoli e grandi gruppi con investimenti all’estero;
– i gruppi petroliferi statali, presieduti da vice-ministri, che pompano profitti per MD di yuan, pesano perché nodo cruciale per sicurezza energetica per il paese,
– tutti i gruppi che cercano di internazionalizzarsi;
– informazione e propaganda sono una parte integrale della politica estera, divisa tra intellettuali falchi e colombe.
– Tutti i nove membri del comitato permanente del politburo:
o fondamentale è Zhou Yongkang, incaricato per la sicurezza;
o Li Changchun, propaganda;
o Li Keqiang, Finanza e Industria;
o Xi Jinping (dal 14.03.2013 presidente, n.d.r.) vice-presidente della commissione delle forze armate;
o Jia Qinglin, Religione e Taiwan;
o Wen Jabao, che controlla l’economia.
o Hanno voce anche il capo della disciplina di partito, He Guoqiang,
o e il presidente del parlamento, Wu Bangguo.
– La responsabilità diffusa nelle scelte di politica estera – con ogni settore che perseguiva i propri interessi in un quadro di lasca coordinazione – ha funzionato finché la Cina non ha fatto ingresso con forza nella politica estera, con il 2° posto dell’economia mondiale, mentre è caduta l’attenzione sulle guerre in Irak e Afghanistan,
o e la sua politica di lungo termine è sottoposta a pressioni e sfide quotidiane con richieste internazionali divergenti.
– Primi segnali, contradditori, sulle idee del nuovo presidente della Cina, e da 4 mesi capo del PCC e comandante supremo delle forze armate, Xi Jinping:
o ha parlato di difesa della Costituzione, stato di diritto, lotta a corruzione e abuso di potere;
o funzionari … demagogicamente ad es. di limitazione di spesa e sprechi nei viaggi e ispezioni,
o ma non di energiche misure anti-corruzione. Già nella scuola di partito aveva anticipato che la lotta anti-corruzione deve essere fatta con appelli moralistici ai membri del partito, non con il controllo della giustizia e dell’opinione.
– Il primo viaggio l’ha fatto nel Sud Cina, a Shenzen e Kanton, dove si è impegnato pubblicamente ad una politica di apertura e riforme,
– ma molto diversi i toni di un discorso interno: ha ammonito il partito, in Cina non deve capitare come in URSS, del cui crollo ha accusato Gorbachov, che ha abbandonato gli ideali del comunismo.
In politica estera, finora si è mostrato nazionalista: una Cina forte, rinascita della nazione cinese;
– la Cina deve essere una potenza marittima;
– compito delle forze armate cinesi saper fare e vincere una guerra.
– Xi Jinping riunisce quattro cariche: capo del PCC, presidente della commissione militare del partito, presidente della Cina e capo della commissione militare del governo;
o non è certo se potrà utilizzarle per grandi cambiamenti, dato che la direzione della Cina rimane collettiva e il capo del PCC deve soprattutto ascoltare soprattutto i membri del comitato permanente del politburo, diviso in fazioni e cricche.
o Non si sa se Xi Jinping riuscir imporsi superando le profonde fratture lasciate dalla destituzione di Bo Xilai, membro del politburo.
– Con la nomina a suo vice del riformista Li Yuanchao (che ha studiato in Occidente), Xi Jinping ha dato un piccolo colpo alla cricca dell’ex capo del partito Jiang Ze; la sua nomina sarebbe un segnale positivo di modificazioni nei quadri dirigenti.
– Li Yuanchao sosterrà la linea di politica estera di Xi Jinping – anche se a novembre i conservatori gli hanno impedito di divenire membro del comitato permanente del politburo – e dovrebbe avere anche la carica di direttore della scuola di partito
– BEIJING – There are two deep and long-term aspects to the administrative reforms announced at the end the plenary session of China’s parliament, the National People’s Congress (NPC).
– One appears to be fully in the imperial tradition of concentrating power to the center and stemming the centripetal forces that have brought domestic and foreign policy out of control. We pointed out this major problem earlier this year Too many cooks spoil foreign-policy stew (Asia Times Online, January 7, 2011).
– In order to achieve this result, the Chinese Communist Party is embarking on the second aspect, a great liberal reform. In fact, the reform of the ministries that came out of the present NPC session is not just a matter of numbers but a major restructuring of the philosophy and functions related to their work.
– The deputy prime minister in charge of the reform, Ma Kai, has explained that the purpose of restructuring is to give power to the markets and society, to reduce government intervention in small matters, and instead to improve the government’s ability to manage macro-economic matters and provide supervision.
– In this spirit, the number of ministries has been almost halved, going from from 44 to 25. The new number has profound political significance. It means that the new leadership of Xi Jinping – evidently supported by outgoing leader Hu Jintao, who until the end of the parliamentary session on March 17 is still president of the state – has managed to assert power over the thousands of conflicting interests of the powerful bureaucracy.
– There is more, as is evident from the official announcements. Wang Qishan, head of the powerful Committee of Party Discipline and with influence over the Chinese finance, insisted that people read Tocqueville and his criticism of the ancien regime. The French thinker, who extolled the virtues of the United States’ system, has thus become a bestseller. In fact, current reforms seem inspired by Tocqueville. The Chinese Communist Party wants to become liberal and more American, and more in accordance with his system.
– The first real victory is over the Ministry of Railways, which against all logic was able to resist the reforms of 1998 and was the last remaining ministry directly managing finances – in this case of operating the trains. Today, like all other ministries, the administrative functions of the Ministry of Railways will be separated from economic functions and entrusted to state-owned companies. Plus, it will now operate under the Ministry of Transportation. It remains a mystery what will happen to the police and courts that were acting directly under the power of the Ministry of Railways.
– In addition to the abolition of various ministries, new entities are being created. There is now a National Energy Administration, responsible for coordinating activities that were previously divided among groups overseeing electricity, petroleum, coal mining, and so on.
– It will take months for these reforms to be digested by the state apparatus.
– But after the reforms of 1998, within about a year the nature of whole system changed. Then the center was to give more economic power to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), freeing them from administrative and social obligations.
– Those reforms were in fact so successful that after a decade, state-owned enterprises have come to dominate the Chinese economy, creating monopolies and marginalizing private companies.
– Today the real urgency is to give space to the market. This is a clear objective of Xi Jinping.
– In 2010, in a closed door meeting between future-president Xi and Italy’s then-economy minister Giulio Tremonti, the Italian, probably for the sake of hospitality, praised the role of state intervention in the economy, which had stopped the spread of the US financial crisis in China.
– Xi, however, did not remain silent, and in fact did not seem to appreciate the compliment. He pointed out that when the crisis is over, the state must withdraw from the market and allow it to act freely according to market rules.
– In this case, in addition to domestic economic measures, the administrative reform includes a measure that is very important to foreign policy.
o It creates a single administration for marine areas. The entity will be in charge of all coastal areas, including the contested archipelagos of the South China Sea and the Diaoyu Islands, or the Senkaku Islands, fought over with Japan. The new administration was created officially so the Chinese can assert their claims to these areas, which is irritating its neighbors. Japan has already started to protest.
– On the other hand, it creates order in cases of future friction, as it addresses directly the issue in 2011. On several occasions in the past, the central government has been forced to cover for, or stop at the last minute, some independent initiative by the captain of a fishing vessel or a few rogue naval officers.
– These new roles for the market then should provide the real springing board for a 40 trillion yuan (US$6.4 trillion) urbanization plan that should bring millions of people to the cities in the next 10 years.
Francesco Sisci is a columnist for the Italian daily Il Sole 24 Ore. His e-mail is fsisci@gmail.com
(Copyright 2013 Francesco Sisci.)
Too many cooks spoil foreign-policy stew
By Francesco Sisci
BEIJING – In just a few days, the presidents of the United States and China, Barack Obama and Hu Jintao, will meet in Washington for a summit that’s bound to be labeled "historic", as the two will try to mend fences after a year of stormy relations. They are the final decision-makers, the ones who call the shots over their countries’ foreign policies.
– Still, in authoritarian China, despite all the clout Hu might have, foreign policy – unlike finance, industry, coal mining, etc – is not a brief with clear-cut responsibilities and decisions do not depend on the ultimate nod of one man.
– The Foreign Ministry is involved in decisions on foreign policy, but everybody knows that the military’s perspective counts for more. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is not just a ministry; it is a state within the state with sprawling interests at home and abroad.
– Furthermore, there is the intelligence apparatus, the fearsome Ministry of State Security (Anquan Bu), whose brand-new offices symbolically tower over the east side of Tiananmen Square, China’s political heart.
– Moreover, there is the Party Foreign Department (Zhonglian Bu), once an institution bigger than the Foreign Ministry that was dedicated to relations with other communist parties, and now surviving with confused and confusing assignments – yet it can’t be ignored.
– Nor can the United Front be ignored: with responsibilities related to ethnic Chinese abroad and religions, issues like ties with the Holy See and Taiwan fall into its lap.
There was once an easy, traditional and institutional non-division of labor regarding foreign policy, but then globalization brought up the interests of other formerly inward-looking ministries.
– There is the Ministry of Commerce, presiding over the huge interest group of surplus traders, whose gigantic earnings gain them huge clout in domestic decision-making. There is also the Central Bank, whose effort to fight off revaluation and to sterilize trillions of dollars make it a big player in policy decisions.
– The Ministry of Finance, tied with the two previous ministries, can’t be ignored, and
– the Ministry of Environment has gained global attention as China exports pollution as well as goods.
– Following these institutional interests, there is concern from dozens of large and small companies with investments abroad. State oil companies, presided over by deputy ministers and pumping in billions of yuan in profits for themselves and for China, can’t be ignored as they represent a crucial hub of energy security for the country. Neither can all other companies, trying to find a place in the world, be neglected.
– Last but not least, information and propaganda is also an integral part of foreign policy, and the crucial Publicity Department projects China’s image abroad. Under this, more or less loosely, fall the increasingly divergent voices of Chinese intellectuals, some hawks and some doves, who also push the Chinese boat in one direction or another.
– In sum, among the nine members of the politburo standing committee, all nine have a voice and a particular stake in foreign policy.
o Li Changchun is in charge of propaganda, so has a say in China’s foreign policy.
o Li Keqiang, sitting over finance and industry, can’t ignore foreign affairs.
o Xi Jinping, vice chairman of the PLA commission, has a hand in it, too,
o as does Jia Qinglin, ultimately responsible for religion and Taiwan.
o Wen Jiabao, presiding over the whole economy, is also an important part of the game. When everybody else is involved how can He Guoqiang, chief of party discipline, and Wu Bangguo, head of the parliament, not utter their opinions?
– In fact, China’s economic size, population and speed of change are such that all its domestic decisions have global relevance. Everything domestic is by itself important to the rest of the world, and it will be even more so as its economic and political size grows in the future. China can no longer think of its domestic issues as only its own concern.
– When last year in Mexico Vice President Xi Jinping said that China’s great contribution to the world was to take care of over one-fifth of the world’s population without allowing its problems to spill abroad, in fact he was revealing another side, too: anything decided by this population – more or less houses, more or less cars, more or less meat or grain for food – has a global impact that the world can’t ignore.
– So, as with domestic policies, Hu is the coordinator and the most important man in the field, but in the Chinese style of division of powers and responsibilities, he is not the only decision-maker. Most likely, he has to negotiate every decision with all the other major players.
– These broad responsibilities in foreign policy are not something new to China after the demise of paramount leaders like Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. The scattered accountability worked well when China was out of the limelight of global foreign politics. Every sector looked after its own interests with some kind of loose coordination and then reacted to inputs.
– Long-term policies were decided and carried out by the president but were not subject to constant pressure and daily challenges with different, diverging requests from all over the world. Loosely reacting to daily disputes and holding the long-term helm steady was enough. And it was enough to concentrate and react once in a while to sudden shocks, like the 2001 landing of the US surveillance plane EP3 on Hainan Island.
– All of this changed when China became the number-two global economy, and foreigners and Chinese alike braved the idea of a Group of 2 with America. Then everything in China came under greater scrutiny, and the country gained special weight in the world.
– China had sentenced dissidents in the past – not just Liu Xiaobo, who was later awarded a Nobel Peace Prize; it had had many controversies about the Internet – not only with Google. It dragged its feet on the environment earlier, and it shielded North Korea before without being singled out and burned at the stake for it.
– But China’s new size and status, coupled with the drop in global attention to wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, made some Chinese behavior, which in the past was almost ordinary, now much less acceptable. China in the future can no longer behave like some second-rate country, just as when a big, grown-up man yells it is scary and objectively dangerous, while a kid screaming can be just a nuisance.
– However, there are many difficulties given China’s present situation.
– In big countries like America, official decisions and public opinion are separated. Official decisions are very cautious and public voices can be loud and strident. In the Chinese "comprehensive" system, conversely, there is little difference between the official central government opinion and voices uttered by government-controlled newspapers.
– This is a further complication of foreign affairs in the Chinese system: there are too many opinions and too many people involved in the foreign affairs decision-making process and far too many constituencies to be considered, while on the outside there is only one voice. This voice then is bound to be the least controversial, the most traditional, and the least innovative for the domestic constituency – the most conservative available.
– Yet, China can no longer simply react to foreign actions and pushes. It has to be proactive. Because of its new global role and position, it is required to have new high profile with positive, imaginative, and nimble initiatives, but its system can’t cope with it.
– Nobody can make sudden decisions and move fast on challenges coming from all over the world. Some things can wait but some need immediate responses, and looming challenges should be met before they have time to gain momentum and become too big to be dealt with. The cumbersome Chinese unaccountability system makes it impossible to have a proactive decision-making process.
Then, the question is, how much leeway will Hu have in talks with Obama? How free will Hu be in talks with his American colleague to impress or be impressed?
– Here there are two separate issues: one is the general reform of the decision-making process in China’s foreign affairs to make it more efficient, and the other is the leeway the Chinese president has or should have in China.
The short-term solution for the present quandary with the Obama summit, is great preparation. Beijing will possibly try to prepare very well and very comprehensively to make sure the meeting will be a success. The structural changes of Chinese policy will have to wait, as they might be part of some of the urgent broader political reforms China is awaiting in the next few years.
Francesco Sisci is the Asia Editor of La Stampa. His e-mail is fsisci@gmail.com
14.03.2013 · Xi Jinping ist jetzt auch Staatsoberhaupt Chinas. Er spricht viel von Veränderung. Vieles bleibt aber einstweilen vage. Immerhin hat er einen als Reformer geltenden Funktionär zu seinem Stellvertreter gemacht. Von
– Xi Jinping, der neue Staatspräsident Chinas, ist bereits seit vier Monaten Parteichef und Oberbefehlshaber der Volksbefreiungsarmee. Erste Anzeichen dafür, was seine Überzeugungen und Ideen sein könten, gibt es. Sie sind nicht ohne Widersprüche. Reformer schöpften Hoffnung, als er gleich nach seinem Amtsantritt von der Wahrung der Verfassung sprach sowie davon, dass China sich weiter in Richtung auf einen Rechtsstaat entwickeln solle.
– Dann gab er auch neue Anweisungen im Kampf gegen Korruption und Machtmissbrauch. Seine erste konkrete Anweisung war, den Aufwand und die Verschwendung bei Reisen von Funktionären und Inspektionen zu begrenzen. Zum Beispiel wurden Bankette abgeschafft, rote Teppiche eingerollt, Straßensperrungen verboten und die Behörden verpflichtet, weniger Geld für solche Anlässe auszugeben. Das war publikumswirksam, aber tiefer gehende Maßnahmen gegen Korruption lassen noch auf sich warten.
– Dann erklärte Xi Jinping der Partei, sie müsse mehr und auch scharfe Kritik akzeptieren. Doch hat er sich gegen Kritiker außerhalb des Systems keineswegs nachsichtiger gezeigt als seine Vorgänger. Seine erste Reise führte Xi auf den Spuren des chinesischen Reformarchitekten Deng Xiaoping in den Süden des Landes, nach Shenzhen und Kanton. Dort legte er öffentliche Bekenntnisse zu einer weiteren Reform- und Öffnungspolitik ab. Auch dies scheint das Bild eines Reformers zu bestätigen.
Intern ganz andere Töne
– Später allerdings wurde eine interne Rede auf derselben Reise über das Internet verbreitet, in der er ganz andere Töne anschlug.
o Demnach betrauerte er in Südchina den Zerfall der Sowjetunion und tadelte den damaligen KP-Generalsekretär Gorbatschow. Xi ermahnte seine Partei, das so etwas in China nicht passieren dürfe. Grund für den Niedergang der Kommunistischen Partei in der Sowjetunion sei gewesen, dass diese die Ideale des Kommunismus aufgegeben habe. „Die große Kommunistische Partei der Sowjetunion ging unter, weil niemand Manns genug war, sich Gorbatschow entgegenzustellen“, sagte er.
– Diese Rede entsprach eher dem, was man von Xi Jinping schon zu seiner Zeit als Leiter der Parteischule der Kommunistischen Partei Chinas gehört hatte. Dort hatte er in Grundsatzreden die „Reinheit“ der Partei beschworen. Korruption, so war seine Nachricht, solle nicht durch Überwachung und Kontrolle von Justiz und Öffentlichkeit, sondern durch moralische Appelle an die Parteimitglieder bekämpft werden.
Nationalistisch nach außen
– In der Außenpolitik zeigt Xi Jinping sich bislang betont nationalistisch. Der neue Staatspräsident will ein starkes China. In seinen Reden beschwört er die „Wiederbelebung“ der chinesischen Nation. Es sei der chinesische Traum, wieder ein großes und mächtiges Land zu werden. Eine Seemacht solle China sein. Der „Volksbefreiungsarmee“, deren Oberbefehlshaber er ist, hat er eine neue Doktrin gegeben. Einen Krieg führen und gewinnen zu können, lautet jetzt die Aufgabe der Streitkräfte.
– Vier Ämter hat Xi Jinping jetzt in Personalunion inne: bereits im vergangenen November wurde er zum Parteichef und zum Leiter der Militärkommission der Partei gewählt, jetzt ist er zudem noch Staatspräsident und Leiter der Militärkommission der Regierung. Ob Xi Jinping diese Machtfülle für große Veränderungen nutzen kann, ist dennoch nicht sicher.
– Denn trotz der starken Stellung des Parteichefs bleibt Chinas Führung eine kollektive, und der Parteichef muss vor allem auf seine Genossen im Ständigen Ausschuss des Politbüros hören. Dort aber bekämpfen sich Fraktionen und Seilschaften.
– Der Fall des gestürzten Politbüro-Mitglieds Bo Xilai hat tiefe Gräben sichtbar werden lassen. Man weiß deshalb nicht, ob Xi Jinping sich über diese hinwegsetzen kann.
Kleiner Coup in einem großen Kampf
– Zumindest mit der Ernennung von Li Yuanchao zu seinem Stellvertreter im Amt des Staatspräsidenten ist Xi Jinping jetzt ein kleiner Coup im Kampf gegen die Seilschaft des ehemaligen Parteichefs Jiang Zemin gelungen. Auf dem Parteikongress im November hatte Li Yuanchao eigentlich als Kandidat für den Ständigen Ausschuss des Politbüros gegolten. Doch dann verhinderten konservative Kräfte in der Partei die Wahl des als Reformer geltenden Li Yuanchao, weil er, so auslandschinesische Kommentatoren, den Sturz von Bo Xilai betrieben hatte.
– Jetzt konnte Xi Jinping durchsetzen, dass Li Yuanchao stellvertretender Staatspräsident wird, ohne dass er der obersten Parteiriege angehört. Er soll, so glauben chinesische Beobachter, Xi Jinping in seiner Außenpolitik unterstützten.
– Der Vize-Präsident wird zumeist auch mit der Leitung der Parteischule betraut. Mit der Berufung Li Yuanchaos, eines im Westen ausgebildeten und reformistisch orientierten Funktionärs in diese wichtige Position, gäbe Xi Jinping ein positives Signal für Veränderungen in der Kaderschmiede.