La decisione della Cina di spedire 1000 militari nel sud del Libano con la missione Onu è l’ultimo esempio del maggiore coinvolgimento di Pechino nel MO
- La decisione della Cina di spedire 1000 militari nel sud del Libano con la missione Onu è l’ultimo esempio del maggiore coinvolgimento di Pechino nel MO.
- La Cina giocherà un ruolo sempre maggiore nella scena globale, ha bisogno di rinforzare la sua presenza in una regione fondamentale per l’equilibrio politico mondiale.
- L’Iran si inserisce in questa strategia in quanto maggiore fornitore di petrolio e gas e in quanto possibile fonte di energia per lo sviluppo e la modernizzazione della Cina, che dipende sempre di più da importazioni di petrolio.
- La Cina vuole poi aumentare la sua presenza in Asia Centrale allo scopo di raggiungere le risorse energetiche della regione del Mar Caspio: ciò aiuterebbe la Cina a diminuire la sua dipendenza da importazioni di petrolio marittime dai paesi arabi del Golfo Persico, assicurando perciò maggiormente un flusso ininterrotto di petrolio.
- La Cina sta sfruttando opportunità anche in paesi dove la presenza internazionale è minima, ad esempio in Sudan, Angola e Siria. Tehran è in questo senso un partner ideale, sia per le sue risorse naturali sia per la sua influenza geopolitica: le riserve iraniane di gas e greggio sono poco sfruttate perché il paese è stato ostacolato dall’Occidente, lasciando una gran parte dei giacimenti di petrolio inesplorati, dal momento che Tehran non ha una tecnologia adeguata per aumentare la sua produzione di petrolio raffinato. La Cina si propone come aiuto nella modernizzazione dell’industria petrolifera iraniana e nella più vasta economia dell’Iran con tecnologia industriale, capitale, servizi di ingegneria e tecnologia nucleare.
- Oltre all’esplorazione petrolifera, Pechino è interessato a un ingresso nel mercato iraniano tramite le sue imprese, che potrebbe essere un buono sbocco per le esportazioni cinesi. L’appello della Cina all’Onu di evitare sanzioni a Tehran e la vendita di armi cinesi e di tecnologia militare all’Iran sono chiari esempi della relazione stretta tra i due paesi.
- L’Iran è entrato nella SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) come osservatore, ciò dimostra la sua preferenza verso un ruolo più forte di Cina e Russia nella regione piuttosto che degli Usa.
- Nonostante la violenta lotta interna per il potere e l’eterogeneità sociale e politica all’interno del paese, che rivela la frammentazione della leadership iraniana e di tutto il paese, il "nazionalismo nucleare" è un elemento che unisce la nazione nel suo insieme, minimizzando le divisioni politiche e sociali e rinforzando la proiezione dell’Iran verso le potenze estere. L’Iran vuole aumentare il suo status diplomatico e militare nel MO e il suo programma nucleare ne è un esempio; ha bisogno però di tecnologia civile e militare e Pechino sembra essere il partner ideale in questo senso.
- La relazione più stretta tra i due paesi non significa che i loro interessi a lungo termine siano gli stessi, ma che nel medio periodo i due stati hanno obiettivi comuni nella sfera economica e geopolitica.
La Cina sta cercando in questa regione nuove alleanze per: avere accessi privilegiati a riserve di greggio, trovare nuovi mercati per i suoi prodotti e per la tecnologia e per competere con gli Usa per la supremazia in un’area fondamentale del sistema internazionale. L’Iran rappresenta l’alleanza migliore in questo senso.
si inserisce in questa strategia in quanto maggiore fornitore di petrolio e gas e in quanto , che dipende sempre di più da importazioni di petrolio.
Con la crisi del Libano è emersa poi la maggiore capacità di influenza dell’Iran nelle dinamiche regionali. Inoltre, in un periodo in cui i mercati energetici mondiali mettono in luce la maggiore dipendenza di potenze industriali dai prezzi del petrolio, Tehran ha un importante strumento di pressione geopolitica essendo il maggiore produttore di petrolio e controllando lo Stretto di Hormuz.
Iran, Beijing’s key to the Middle East
By Dario Cristiani
China’s decision to send 1,000 soldiers to southern Lebanon with the United Nations peacekeeping mission is the latest example of Beijing’s increased involvement in the Middle East. The overall importance of the broader Middle East for China’s geostrategy is growing. China is searching for new regional allies because it wants to pursue strategic aims such as gaining privileged access to crude-oil reserves, finding new markets for its products and technology, and competing with the United States for supremacy in an area that is a fundamental part of the international system.
Iran seems to be the best ally for such an approach, thus the strategic relationship between the two countries has increased strongly during the past few years.
Why China is eyeing Iran
The Middle East is a region with significant geostrategic importance for the entire global political balance. China will play an increasing role on the global scene, and therefore it needs to reinforce its presence in regions that are fundamental for the overall fate of the global political balance.
On this chessboard, China could have an important role in terms of economic, strategic and ideological influence. Beijing, therefore, is trying to strengthen its ties with those regional powers that represent an opportunity for entering into the regional political balance. Iran is the main target of such a strategy – it is a major supplier of oil and gas and it could represent a fundamental source of energy for the development and modernization of China, which is increasingly reliant on oil imports.
Moreover, China wants to reinforce its relations with Iran and to deepen its presence in Central Asia with the goal of reaching the energy resources of the Caspian Sea region; tapping Caspian energy would help China lessen its dependence on maritime oil imports from the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, thus better securing an uninterrupted flow of oil.
China has also been exploiting opportunities in countries where the presence of major powers is weak. Clear examples of this are the moves it has made in Sudan, Angola and Syria. As part of this strategy, Tehran is an ideal partner for Beijing, both for its natural resources and for its geopolitical influence. Iranian crude oil-and gas reserves are largely untapped because the country has been ostracized by the West, leaving a large part of its petroleum fields unexplored, since Tehran does not have adequate technology to increase its refined-oil production. China proposes itself as the country that can help Iran modernize its petroleum industry and the wider Iranian economy with industrial technology, capital, engineering services and nuclear technology.
The Sino-Iranian economic relationship extends beyond the oil and gas spheres. Beijing is not only interested in the exploitation of Iran’s oil reserves. For example, it wants to deepen the presence of its firms in the Iranian market, which could be a good outlet for Chinese exports. The development of a strong economy is fundamental for China’s external projection of power. Economic concerns, however, are only part of China’s Iran strategy.
Iran as a geopolitical instrument
Beijing perceives Tehran as a geopolitical instrument to combat US influence in the Middle East, even though this rivalry is not emerging as an
overt competition. Beijing’s calls to avoid United Nations sanctions against Tehran’s nuclear program and the selling of Chinese weapons and military technology to Iran are two clear examples of the deeper relationship between the two countries. Moreover, Iran joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as an observer; the organization is largely a Sino-Russian instrument for containing the US presence in Central Asia. Additionally, Central Asia represents an important concern for Iran in its security calculations, thus Tehran prefers the stronger role of China and Russia in the region to that of the United States. Iran is emerging as a new regional power and it is playing a lead role in the Middle East’s diplomatic balance. The recent crisis in Lebanon demonstrated that Iranian capabilities in influencing the regional dynamics are stronger than before. Moreover, in a period in which world energy markets highlight the increasing dependence of industrial powers on petroleum prices, Tehran has an important instrument of geopolitical pressure through its status as a major oil producer and its control of the Strait of Hormuz. In spite of the harsh internal struggle for power and the country’s inner social and political heterogeneity, which displays the fragmentation of the Iranian leadership and the country as a whole, "nuclear nationalism" is an element that rallies the nation together, minimizing the political and social cleavages and reinforcing the Iranian projection of power overseas. Conclusion
China needs new allies and privileged access to the oil reserves in the Middle East. Iran appears to be the best target for such an approach. The importance of energy reserves for China rests on the country’s desire to develop its economy, which is the foundation of its attempts to play a stronger role in the international system. Also, Tehran’s position in the Middle East is stronger than before, so it can help Beijing in the fight against unrivaled US influence. As for Iran, it needs a powerful ally to help it develop its economy, especially its oil industry. Moreover, it wants to improve its diplomatic and military status in the Middle East. Its nuclear program is a clear example of this. Iran needs civil and military technology, and Beijing could be a good partner in these fields. Finally, both countries are struggling against the supremacy of the United States in the world system, even though publicly Tehran is more aggressive toward this end than Beijing. The improving relationship between Iran and China does not mean that their long-term interests are the same, but it does mean that in the medium term the two states have common aims in the economic and geopolitical spheres. Beijing perceives Tehran as a geopolitical instrument to combat US influence in the Middle East, even though this rivalry is not emerging as an overt competition. Beijing’s calls to avoid United Nations sanctions against Tehran’s nuclear program and the selling of Chinese weapons and military technology to Iran are two clear examples of the deeper relationship between the two countries. Moreover, Iran joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as an observer; the organization is largely a Sino-Russian instrument for containing the US presence in Central Asia. Additionally, Central Asia represents an important concern for Iran in its security calculations, thus Tehran prefers the stronger role of China and Russia in the region to that of the United States. Iran is emerging as a new regional power and it is playing a lead role in the Middle East’s diplomatic balance. The recent crisis in Lebanon demonstrated that Iranian capabilities in influencing the regional dynamics are stronger than before. Moreover, in a period in which world energy markets highlight the increasing dependence of industrial powers on petroleum prices, Tehran has an important instrument of geopolitical pressure through its status as a major oil producer and its control of the Strait of Hormuz. In spite of the harsh internal struggle for power and the country’s inner social and political heterogeneity, which displays the fragmentation of the Iranian leadership and the country as a whole, "nuclear nationalism" is an element that rallies the nation together, minimizing the political and social cleavages and reinforcing the Iranian projection of power overseas. China needs new allies and privileged access to the oil reserves in the Middle East. Iran appears to be the best target for such an approach. The importance of energy reserves for China rests on the country’s desire to develop its economy, which is the foundation of its attempts to play a stronger role in the international system. Also, Tehran’s position in the Middle East is stronger than before, so it can help Beijing in the fight against unrivaled US influence. As for Iran, it needs a powerful ally to help it develop its economy, especially its oil industry. Moreover, it wants to improve its diplomatic and military status in the Middle East. Its nuclear program is a clear example of this. Iran needs civil and military technology, and Beijing could be a good partner in these fields. Finally, both countries are struggling against the supremacy of the United States in the world system, even though publicly Tehran is more aggressive toward this end than Beijing. The improving relationship between Iran and China does not mean that their long-term interests are the same, but it does mean that in the medium term the two states have common aims in the economic and geopolitical spheres.