- Coalizione Alleanza Irachena Unita (UIA), sciita, 130
deputati su 275, ha votato per il candidato a primo ministro: 64 voti a Ibrahim
al Jafaari (Daawa, appoggiato dalla gerarchia sciita facente capo a al Sistani,
cognato), 63 per Adel Abdul Mehdi (SCIRI,maggior partito sciita). - Jafaari ha prevalso grazie all’appoggio dei deputati del
gruppo di Moqtada al Sadr, il quale avrebbe chiesto in cambio i ministeri dei
trasporti, della Sanità, dell’Istruzione, + altri due. Punta ad acquisire
popolarità attraverso il controllo del welfare (modello iraniano, Fratellanza
musulmana e Hamas). - Tutti rappresentano gruppi di borghesia sciita, collegati al
clero. - SCIRI vuole mantenere il controllo degli Interni e della
polizia, nella quale ha inserito i miliziani della Brigata Badr, e che reprime
sunniti e avversari con squadroni della morte, prigioni e tortura. - Anche i sadristi hanno forte presenza nella polizia, che in
zone di Baghdad porta la foto di Moqtada sul braccio. - Un ufficiale USA: non gli stiamo insegnando tutto, nel giro
di qualche anno la potremmo trovarci a combattere contro di loro. - Il capo SCIRI, al Hakim intende costituire una regione
formata da 9 province meridionali, sciite, che controllerebbe il 60% delle
nuove risorse petrolifere. - Il governo regionale curdo ha già sfruttato la costituzione
per aprire trattative con società petrolifere internazionali. - USA (Khalilzad) stanno invece mediando per inserire
esponenti sciiti, in “gov. di unità nazionale”, e avrebbero presentato elenco
di ex comandanti di Saddam per la direzione dei servizi di sicurezza. - I partiti sunniti chiedono che Difesa, Interni, Petrolio e
Finanze non siano dati a partiti sciiti, e che venga cancellato da Costituzione
il controllo regionale su oil & gas. - Curdi (53 seggi) appoggiano l’ingresso nel gov. del
gruppo di Allawi (25) e chiedono l’annessione di Kirkuk alla loro regione. I
Sadrisiti si oppongono a entrambe le richieste. - Allawi, curdi e sunniti hanno in totale 136 seggi, e possono
bloccare la nomina del presidente e premier. - Prima di nominare il premier parlamento deve eleggere con
>za 2/3 il presidente e due vice, i quali scelgono il premier.
WSWS By James Cogan
17 February 2006
In a vote last Sunday, Ibrahim al-Jaafari
was nominated by the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA)—a coalition of Shiite
fundamentalist organisations and the largest faction in the 275-seat Iraqi
parliament—to continue as Iraq’s prime minister.
Of the 130 Shiite fundamentalist
legislators who won seats in the December 15, 2005 elections, 64 backed
Jaafari, including the supporters of cleric Moqtada al-Sadr within the UIA and the members of Jaafari’s own Da’awa movement. Adel
Abdul Mehdi, the candidate for prime minister supported by the
Iranian-linked Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI),
received 63 votes. One abstained and two independents linked to Sadr but who do
not belong to the UIA were not given a vote.
Over the past year, Sadrists and SCIRI
loyalists have engaged in violent clashes over control of municipal and
provincial governments. Nevertheless the tight vote for prime minister was
followed by pledges of unity between the various factions. In the final
analysis, the Sadrists, SCIRI and Da’awa all represent the interests of the
small Shiite business and clerical elite that views the US occupation as
the best means of gaining wealth and privilege, at the expense of the
predominantly Sunni Arab political establishment that held power throughout
Iraq’s modern history.
SCIRI has made no secret that it wants the
Interior Ministry in the next government. Since
taking control of the ministry in early 2005, SCIRI and the current minister
Bayan Jabr have inserted thousands of their Badr Brigade militiamen into the
interior ministry police and intelligence agencies. Death squads, prisons and
torture have been used against their political opponents and to intimidate
the Sunni Arab population in general.
As well as keeping a tight grip over the
state apparatus of repression, SCIRI leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim has also
made clear that he intends to push ahead with plans for a “regional
government” in nine southern, predominantly Shiite provinces of Iraq, which
would control the revenues from southern oilfields.
The constitution adopted last year gives
regional governments, not the government in Baghdad, exclusive power over all
new oil and gas developments. As much as 60 percent of Iraq’s untapped oil and
gas reserves lie in the provinces that SCIRI intends to weld into a region. The
Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), which consists of Iraq’s three
northern, mainly Kurdish northern provinces, has already exploited the
constitution to enter into contracts with international oil companies.
The Sadrists
have their own ambitions. In order to win their support, Jaafari is believed to
have agreed to their demands for the health, transport and education
ministries, as well as two others. Amatzia Baram, an Iraq analyst for the
Woodrow Wilson International Center, told the Washington Times that Sadr was
seeking greater political influence. “He will get large budgets, he will do
what needs to be done, and the people will be beholden to him for services,
not the state, and his picture will be in each hospital and each school,” Baram
commented.
Sadr already has broad support among the
urban poor due to his movement’s social welfare network and his populist calls
for foreign troops to leave Iraq. In 2004, the
Sadrist Mahdi Army militia fought battles against US troops in Baghdad, Karbala
and Najaf before a ceasefire was struck that allowed the Sadrists to operate as
a political organisation. In the long-term, Sadr and his network are seeking to
supplant SCIRI as the dominant Shiite tendency.
Apart from the uprising called by Sadr, the
Shiite parties have collaborated fully with the Bush administration and the
occupation forces. Their dominance over the government, however, faces
opposition in US ruling circles.
Firstly, Shiite preeminence has come to be
viewed as an obstacle to bringing an end to the mainly Sunni-based armed
resistance to the US occupation. Facing growing opposition to the war at home,
the Bush administration has been forced to admit that it has no timetable for a
substantial withdrawal of American troops.
Washington is currently seeking to split
off sections of the armed resistance by incorporating Sunni leaders into the
Baghdad government, recruiting more Sunnis into the Iraqi military and watering down the prohibitions that were put in place in 2003
against members of the Baathist Party having a political role.
Over recent weeks, US officials have revealed
that talks have been held with representatives of Sunni insurgent groups toward
a ceasefire. One of the key demands of the Sunni elite is that their Shiite
rivals be stripped of their control over the Iraqi security forces.
The second reason for US opposition to a
Shiite-dominated government is Washington’s escalating political, and
potentially military, confrontation with Iran—a predominantly Shiite
country. SCIRI in particular has close ties with the Iranian regime. Moqtada
al-Sadr has also issued statements that his Mahdi Army would fight “inside
and outside” of Iraq if Tehran came under attack.
How the Iraqi security forces would respond to a US
attack on Iran is already the subject of discussion in the US military. The
majority of the US-trained Iraqi Army and police are Shiites, many of whom make
little attempt to conceal their sectarian loyalties to either SCIRI or the
Mahdi Army. The police in parts of Baghdad openly wear photos of Sadr on their
sleeves. In a feature in the latest Newsweek on the US reluctance to
provide Iraqi units with sophisticated weapons, an unnamed American officer
commented: “We’re not teaching them everything we know. We could turn around
and be fighting them in a few years.”