Bill Spindle,
Wall Street Journal 13/10/06:
potere in Iran tutt’altro che monolitico: due gruppi di
potere in continua lotta.
- Gruppo di giovani fondamentalisti intransigenti, con Ahmedinejad;
- Elite clericale, vecchi ex rivoluzionari e uomini d’affari, pure profondamente conservatori e
diffidenti verso riforme, ma contro eccessiva esposizione anti-USA.
Ipotesi accordo Ahmadinejad-Chirac
- Ali Khamenei, 67, Capo Supremo, succeduto a Khomeini,
è la più alta autorità del Paese, che ha l’ultima parola su tutte le questioni.
Egli opera tramite una rete di organismi e poteri che spesso si
controbilanciano: magistratura, militari, Consiglio dei Guardiani e
dell’“Expediency” (termine inglese traducibile con “opportunità, convenienza,
efficacia, pragmatismo”). - È un mediatore, che “fiuta i venti politici e con
grande attenzione si muove con essi”. - Tra il 1997 e il 2005 ha assecondato il presidente
“riformatore” Khatami, poi dal 2004 ha cominciato ad appoggiare i
conservatori, hanno ripreso il
controllo prima del Parlamento poi della Presidenza. - Alle ultime presidenziali aveva appoggiato il candidato
perdente, Ali Larijani, poi nominato a capo del Consiglio Supremo per la
Sicurezza Nazionale, che gestisce le trattative internazionali sul nucleare,
controbilanciando Ahmadinejad. - Ali Larijani è tipico esponente
dell’establishment. Figlio di un Grande Ajatollah, allevato coi fratelli in
centri religiosi protetti, ma inglese fluente e cultura anche occidentale,
famiglia potente, moglie figlia di altro famoso ayatollah, vicino al presidente
del Parlamento, è per linea di compromesso sul nucleare. Nella sua carica
precedente (capo delle trasmissioni radio e TV) aveva introdotto sport e
spettacoli di intrattenimento a fianco dei programmi religiosi e di propaganda
per contrastare l’avanzata delle TV satellitari (anche se illegali). - Entrambe le frazioni sono:
- per procedere nel programma di arricchimento uranio, e
- per un maggior ruolo Iran nella regione e nel mondo,
- ma differiscono sui modi.
- Il gruppo Ahmadinejad è per il confronto con
l’Occidente, ritenendo che Cina e Russia non appoggeranno rigide
sanzioni e continueranno ad offrire all’Iran l’accesso al mercato mondiale. - L’establishment tradizionale è per il
mantenimento di legami economici e politici con l’Occidente, eventualmente
riaprendo il dialogo con gli USA. - Ciò complica la discussione nel CdSicurezza ONU: USA
sostengono che solo sanzioni possono indebolire gli intransigenti; “altri”
sostengono che riducendo le tensioni, anche con dialogo USA-Iran, si
rafforzerebbero i leader prammatici. - Lotta incessante tra le due frazioni: il Parlamento ha
spesso frustrato le iniziative di Ahmadinejad, ad es. bloccandone il tentativo
di mettere un suo uomo a capo del Ministero del Petrolio (che controlla
l’80% delle entrate in valuta dell’Iran). - Con discorsi roboanti Ahmadinejad ha cercato di
rafforzare i suoi limitati poteri, specie sulla questione nucleare; le dure
reazioni dell’Occidente hanno rafforzato il senso di accerchiamento, facendo il
suo gioco. - Mentre Ahmadinejad appoggia i governi antiamericani
come il Venezuela, Larijani indica un altro modello: l’India, che è riuscita a
farsi il nucleare senza pregiudicare i rapporti con USA e “comunità int’le. - Ma con la sua agitazione anti-USA e Israele,
Ahmadinejad ha fatto balenare a Khamenei la possibilità di fare dell’Iran il
paese leader del mondo islamico, e per questo Khamenei lascia che si esprima
sulle questioni nucleari. - Recentemente Ahmandinejad ha riscosso due vittorie
tattiche contro Larijani: - in marzo Larijan espresse disponibilità a discutere con
gli USA sull’Irak; venne attaccato furiosamente dal gruppo di Ahmadinejad.
Khamenei appoggiò allora Larijani, ma per scoprire che gli USA, dopo aver per
mesi caldeggiato la trattativa “avevano perso interesse”. Ahmandinejad allora
lanciò l’affondo con la lettera di sfida a Bush, rivolta al mondo musulmano. - Secondo episodio: dopo la scadenza ONU del 31 agosto
per la rinuncia all’arricchimento dell’uranio in cambio di vantaggi economici,
Ahmadinejad inviò uno dei massimi collaboratori a Parigi a parlare con Chirac,
tra le altre cose del Libano (Francia era riluttante a intervenire, per
non doversi scontrare con Hezbollah). Subito dopo, mise a tacere Larijani che
aveva abbozzato apertura sul nucleare. [Tra le righe: Ahmadinejad ha promesso a
Chirac di tenere buoni Hezbollah in cambio di linea morbida francese sul
nucleare iraniano -ndr]. - Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, ex presidente e
grande finanziere membro dell’establishment, candidato all’Assemblea degli
Esperti, che potrebbe pesare sulla scelta del prossimo Capo Supremo, ha fatto
trapelare una lettera di Khomeini di quasi venti anni fa, che rinunciava a
riportare la vittoria finale sull’Irak perché avrebbe richiesto un ulteriore
forte riarmo, forse la bomba nucleare. Un giornale vicino a Rafsanjani commentò
che Khomeini era stato saggio a non farsi fuorviare dall’ideologia
rivoluzionaria rispetto ad una “comprensione realistica della situazione
internazionale” . - Ahmadinejad ha attaccato Rafsanjani per la
pubblicazione, e posto un suo braccio destro in posizione chiave del Ministero
Interni, che controlla elezioni…
In Iran, Two Power Centers Vie Amid Standoff Over Nuclear
Fuel
By BILL
SPINDLE
October 13,
2006; Page A1
TEHRAN,
Iran — As the West debates how to deal with North Korea after its defiant
nuclear test, another atomic confrontation awaits the world’s attention, the
showdown with Iran. In some ways, it is even trickier.
Both
nations’ leaders taunt America with bombastic rhetoric. But unlike Kim Jong
Il’s North Korea, Iran isn’t a one-man dictatorship. Contrary to a common
view of an Iran as being firmly in the hands of its fiery president, Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad, Iran is torn by competing power centers that wage a daily battle
for supremacy.
On one side is a mostly youthful group of
fundamentalist hard-liners, typified by Mr. Ahmadinejad, who are determined
to keep the revolutionary spirit vibrant. On the other is Iran’s elite class
of clerics, aging former revolutionaries and businessmen — also deeply
conservative and wary of reform, but far less interested in confronting the
world and risking the isolation of their country.
Typifying
this less-recognized power center is Iran’s tough but suave chief nuclear negotiator,
Ali Larijani. He is a fluent English speaker whose appointment to
the critical negotiating role was seen inside Iran as a way to counterbalance
the mercurial president.
Mr.
Ahmadinejad tries to shake things up and sometimes succeeds, says Nassar
Hadian, a political-science professor at Tehran University, "but
the entire establishment of Iran is opposed to him."
Both
factions vow to proceed with Iran’s uranium enrichment program, which they insist is solely for
peaceful purposes. Both also seek a bigger role for Iran in the regional and
world stages. But they have quite different ideas about how to
achieve it and about just what kind of role Iran should play in the
world.
President Ahmadinejad’s
group favors confrontation with the West, figuring Russia and China will never
back tough sanctions but instead will always offer Iran access to world
markets. Iran’s more traditional and establishment conservatives, by contrast,
put emphasis on maintaining economic and political ties to the West, and perhaps
even opening some sort of dialogue with the U.S.
All this
makes for a complicated task facing the United Nations Security Council
as it tries to hash out sanctions over Iran, following its defiance of
an Aug. 31 U.N. deadline to accept economic incentives in exchange for giving
up nuclear-fuel enrichment. The U.S. argues that only the pressure of tough
sanctions will induce Iran’s hard-liners to back down. Others argue that
lowering tensions, perhaps by direct U.S.-Iran dialogue, would bolster pragmatic
Iranian leaders who don’t want to see the country outside the international
fold.
The two
strains of Iranian conservatism wrangle endlessly, from the oil ministry
to the parliament to the backrooms where much authority really rests. Establishment
conservatives have often checked the 50-year-old Mr. Ahmadinejad’s ambitious
plans for change. For instance, parliament ignored his drive to overhaul
the oil ministry, the spigot for 80% of Iran’s export income. Parliament
rejected three attempts by Mr. Ahmadinejad to place loyalists as oil minister.
But Mr. Ahmadinejad
has stretched the limited powers of the presidency with bombast and provocative
rhetoric, thereby sometimes managing to dominate policy decisions, especially
on the nuclear issue. His ability to create public furors, such as by taunting
Israel and questioning the Holocaust, have brought him Western condemnation but
a burst of popularity in the Muslim world. The result has been to further
his agenda of defiance, as the West’s negative reaction creates a sense in
Iran that it is under siege and thus shouldn’t give ground.
"He’s
tried to provoke a crisis in order to achieve better control," says Saeed
Laylaz, a political analyst in Tehran.
Mr.
Ahmadinejad isn’t Iran’s top official. That is Ali Khamenei, 67, the Supreme
Leader. He gets the last word, and everyone in the system pays homage to him. But Ayatollah Khamenei
is a power broker who tests the political winds in the country and moves
carefully with them.
It wasn’t
many years ago that Iran’s big political battles pitted hard-liners against
liberal reformers pushing democracy and social freedom. The champion of
reform, Mohammed Khatami, was president for eight years until 2005 but
delivered little change. Liberals lost control first of parliament and then of
the presidency. Conservatives have been in the clear ascendancy since President
Ahmadinejad’s election last year.
But it
didn’t take long after that for tensions in the conservative camp to emerge.
Ayatollah Khamenei appointed Mr. Larijani — from the camp opposite
to the president-elect — to oversee Iran’s nuclear negotiations, as Secretary
of the Supreme National Security Council.
Ayatollah Khamenei
had backed Mr. Larijani in the presidential race just weeks earlier. His
appointment was seen as a signal the nuclear portfolio would be kept out of
Mr. Ahmadinejad’s control.
Mr.
Larijani is as close to an establishment blue-blood as there is here. He is
the son of a Grand Ayatollah, the pinnacle of the Shiite Muslim world’s
religious hierarchy. He and his three brothers were reared in protected
religious centers and have held various high political positions over many
years. He is married to a daughter of a famous Iranian cleric and is close
to the powerful speaker of Iran’s parliament.
Refined
and intellectual,
Mr. Larijani, 49, has studied math, computer science and Western philosophy.
In his last role, heading the government broadcasting operation, he introduced
sports and entertainment channels — in addition to a bigger stream of state propaganda
and religious programming — as the regime tried to keep up with satellite TV
that is spreading in Iran despite being illegal.
Like the
president, Mr. Larijani is a true believer in the Iranian Revolution, say
diplomats who know him. "He’s a real hard-liner, purely in it for the
survival of the regime," says a European diplomat who’s been involved
with the nuclear talks. He strikes diplomats as a smooth conveyor of a steely
message. "In the way Larijani acts and talks, even the way he walks…he is
the opposite of a populist or a demagogue," says another European
diplomat who has dealt with him in the current talks.
It’s a
contrast to Mr. Ahmadinejad’s public embrace of U.S. antagonists like
Venezuela. Mr. Larijani has talked up another model for Iran: India, a
nation that, even while developing nuclear weapons, has deepened its ties
with the U.S. and international community.
Ayatollah Khamenei,
the Supreme Leader who made Mr. Larijani the nuclear negotiator, has
nonetheless not stopped Mr. Ahmadinejad from speaking out on the nuclear issue.
And Mr. Ahmadinejad has proved adept at using his pulpit to influence the
Supreme Leader.
Mr. Khamenei
got the top position in a period of intense political maneuvering following
Ayatollah Khomeini’s death in 1989. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the late
hero of the 1979 revolution, had fused, in the Supreme Leader role, the Islamic
Republic’s two founding values: religious faith and revolutionary spirit.
The
Supreme Leader enforces the values through a network that includes the
judiciary, the military and the Guardian and Expediency Councils. The 12-member Guardian Council,
whose membership is controlled by the Supreme Leader, is especially powerful:
It decides who is allowed to run for office, and it has overturned hundreds
of laws passed by parliament.
Ayatollah Khamenei
after 1997 went along with some moves by the reformist president then in office
to relax political and social rules. But by 2004, the Supreme Leader was
working with conservatives to oust the reformers.
Critics of
Mr. Ahmadinejad believe he has used the crisis atmosphere of nuclear dealings
to offer Ayatollah Khamenei something that previously eluded him: a chance
to make Iran a leader in the wider Muslim world. They say this dynamic gives Mr.
Ahmadinejad pull with the ayatollah on nuclear issues, where the president
has little formal role.
Critics
of the radical president worry that his clout may be growing, based on two key diplomatic
exchanges this year.
One was in
March, when Mr. Larijani announced Iran was willing to discuss Iraq with the
U.S. Mr. Ahmadinejad and his backers attacked the idea bitterly in speeches and
newspaper editorials. Ayatollah Khamenei publicly backed Mr. Larijani. But it
turned out the U.S., whose offer to talk had been on the table for months, had
by this time lost interest. Mr. Ahmadinejad then stole Mr. Larijani’s
thunder by writing a rambling letter to Mr. Bush that renewed Iran’s
defiant stance — and that spoke to a wider Muslim populace angry with America.
Mr.
Larijani fared worse in the second exchange. It involved the U.N.’s Aug. 31
deadline for Iran to give up uranium enrichment in return for economic
benefits. After the deadline passed with no compliance by Iran, President Ahmadinejad
sent one of his top aides to Paris to meet French President Jacques Chirac.
Among issues they would discuss was Lebanon, where France was
reluctant to contribute to a U.N. peacekeeping force because of the risk of
coming into conflict with Hezbollah. Iran has long supported and advised that
group.
Just two
days later, Mr. Larijani was talking about a softer line on the nuclear issue.
As before, President Ahmadinejad was assailing the softer line. Ayatollah
Khamenei remained silent. Soon, Mr. Larijani gave up discussing any sort of
enrichment suspension, in what appeared to be a tactical victory for Mr.
Ahmadinejad.
Yet, the
struggle for power over Iran’s policy has hardly ended. And as always, it’s
taking place in the larger context of the establishment’s attempts to keep Mr. Ahmadinejad
in check. Consider a recent move by a former president of Iran, Ali Akbar
Hashemi Rafsanjani, a man who is hard to categorize politically but is surely
part of the Iranian establishment.
Mr.
Rafsanjani is a man Mr. Ahmadinejad defeated in the 2005 presidential vote. He
also is a candidate for the Assembly of Experts, a panel that could have
a big say over who becomes the next Supreme Leader.
This month,
Mr. Rafsanjani released a secret letter that the late Ayatollah Khomeini
wrote almost two decades ago, explaining why he was willing to end the
eight-year war with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq short of victory. Ayatollah Khomeini
said military officers had told him that to continue, they would need far more
firepower, perhaps even a nuclear weapon. A newspaper close to Mr. Rafsanjani
then editorialized that Ayatollah Khomeini was wise not to let his
revolutionary ideology get in the way of "a realistic understanding of the
international situation." For Mr. Rafsanjani’s supporters, the message
was unmistakable: Today’s Iran, too, should proceed with caution and
pragmatism.
Mr. Ahmadinejad now is striking back. He
spent much of the week denouncing Mr. Rafsanjani for releasing the letter. He
also put his right-hand aide into a key position in the Interior Ministry —
one that oversees Iran’s elections.