Il seggio permanente nel C.d.S.: una richiesta difficile

<101706192"/> Usa – Onu – Germania

<101706193"> AICGS Advisor 05-04-07

<101706194"> Il seggio permanente nel C.d.S.: una richiesta difficile

John Van Oudenaren – Chairman of the AICGS Academic Advisory Council

Un seggio permanente tedesco nel C.d.S. Onu è contrario agli interessi americani. La vera questione da porsi è come minimizzare il danno agli interessi americani posti dalla candidatura tedesca. Molto dipenderà da come la diplomazia giocherà nei prossimi mesi.

Gli Usa si trovano di fronte alla difficile la scelta se appoggiare o meno le ambizioni a un seggio permanente del governo più unilateralista e anti-americano dalla fondazione della Repubblica federale tedesca.

Tale decisione potrebbe essere evitata se la Germania non riuscisse a raccogliere la necessaria maggioranza dei 2/3 nell’Assemblea generale, pari a 128 paesi.(che dovrà poi essere ratificata da tutti i membri permanenti del C.d.S.).

Se la Germania riuscirà o meno a conquistarsi tale maggioranza dipenderà a sua volta da una complessa partita diplomatica che comprende anche gli altri candidati, e dal tipo di modello proposto da Hannan (A o B).

Se la Germania riuscisse, gli Usa potrebbero: 1 . bloccare la richiesta tedesca; 2. adottare l’atteggiamento “noblesse oblige”, pensando che gli Usa sono abbastanza forti e generosi da riuscire ad adattarsi alle richieste di Berlino.

Nel rapporto del 21 marzo il segretario generale Kofi Annan ha fatto pressione perché si decida sull’ampliamento del C.d.S. prima del vertice di settembre.

Secondo l’art. III-305 della Costituzione Ue che il parlamento tedesco dovrebbe ratificare il 12 maggio 2005, i paesi membri devono coordinare le posizioni presso l’ Onu e presentare posizioni unificate tramite il nuovo ministro degli Esteri Ue . Quando la Ue avrà una posizione unitaria su un argomento all’O.d.G. Onu , i paesi membri del suo C.d.S. chiederanno che il ministro degli Esteri europeo presenti tale posizione.

La Ue è attualmente sovra-rappresentata nel C.d.S., aggiungere un’altra voce europea, soprattuto visto quanto richiesto dalla Costituzione europea, non farebbe che renderlo meno, invece che più rappresentativo.

I sostenitori del seggio tedesco avanzano diverse obiezioni:

font-weight: bold”> · Non è probabile che si giunga a un unico seggio Ue, data l’opposizione di Francia e Gran Bretagna. Si tratta di un argomento fuorviante perché il motivo principale per cui la Francia ha appoggiato la richiesta tedesca è proprio quello di “nazionalizzare” maggiormente la rappresentanza europea ed escludere per questa via la sfida al seggio francese, sfida che potrebbe essere organizzata solo da una coalizione della Germania con i piccoli Paesi Ue .

• Le posizioni europee sono spesso non unitarie su questioni discusse all’ Onu . È vero, ma non è un argomento valido per aggiungere un altro seggio: come si è visto nella vicenda della guerra contro l’Irak, il forte dissenso tra Francia e Germania da una parte e Gran Bretagna e Spagna dall’altra è stato motivato tanto dalle liti interne su chi decide a Bruxelles quanto sul cosa fare di Saddam Hussein. Portare dentro l’ Onu le battaglie interne alla Ue su tassazioni, sussidi agricoli, etc., non servirebbe certo a rafforzare l’ordine internazionale.

Negli Usa ci sono due gruppi che sostengono che è interesse americano un seggio tedesco nel C.d.S.:

• Gli Atlantisti: sperano di costruire una forte alleanza tra Usa e Europa, andare incontro a Berlino sulla questione servirebbe a fare passi avanti in questo senso. È una visione ingenua. Gli europei hanno chiarito in diversi documenti e accordi bilaterali, ad esempio con Russia e Cina, che essi considerano l’ Onu come luogo dove tenere sotto controllo la potenza americana. Portare la Germania nel suo C.d.S. significherebbe far pendere ulteriormente la bilancia a sfavore degli Usa, senza alcun progresso nell’alleanza transatlantica.

mso-ansi-language: IT; mso-fareast-language: IT; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA”>I critici neo-conservatori mso-ansi-language: IT; mso-fareast-language: IT; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA”>: ben venga qualsiasi cosa mini l’efficacia dell’ Onu, già inefficiente e non legittimato, compreso l’ampliamento indiscriminato del C.d.S.. È una posizione miope. Che ai neo-con piaccia o meno l’ onu rimarrà importante per la politica estera della maggior parte dei paesi del mondo. Coloro che appoggiano o intendono accettare la richiesta tedesca solo perché non prendono in modo serio l’organizzazione dovranno rendersi conto che l’ Onu è ancora uno dei principali fattori della politica estera americana, ma più eurocentrico che mai. <101706195"> AICGS Advisor 05-04-07

<101706196"> The German Seat on the UN Security Council: A Tough Call

by John Van Oudenaren

Chairman of the AICGS Academic Advisory Council

In the coming months, the Bush administration is likely to face a difficult decision about whether to support Germany ’s ambitions for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Despite the improvement in transatlantic relations that followed the president’s visit to Europe, reports from Berlin suggest that the Schröder government may be spoiling for a fight on this issue. In his March 21, 2005 report on UN reform, Secretary General Kofi Annan increased the pressure on the administration by calling on the member states to take a decision on expanding the Security Council before the September 2005 UN summit – whether or not a consensus on reform has emerged. Washington thus could face a choice between acquiescing in the German bid and thereby rewarding the foreign policy stance of the most unilateralist and anti-U.S. government in Germany since the founding of the Federal Republic, or wielding its veto and reigniting U.S.-German tensions.

On the face of it, the German bid is problematic. Under the terms of the European constitution that the German parliament is scheduled to ratify on May 12, 2005, EU member states are supposed to coordinate positions in the UN and use the newly established post of EU Foreign Minister to present unified positions. According to Article III-305:

Member States which are members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, defend the positions and interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the United Nations Charter.

When the Union has defined a position on a subject which is on the United Nations Security Council agenda, those Member States which sit on the Security Council shall request that the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs be asked to present the Union’s position .

One of the major motivations for UN reform is to make the Security Counci
l more representative of the international community and thus more effective. The EU is already over-represented on the Security Council. Adding yet another European voice – particularly given the constitutional requirement for EU member states to coordinate positions – will make the Security Council less rather than more representative.

Proponents of a German seat offer several rebuttals to the argument that Europe should rationalize and consolidate its representation rather than increase the number of national seats. One is that a combined EU seat is unlikely to happen, given French and British opposition. This argument is misleading, however. The key reason that the French have backed the German bid is precisely in order to further “nationalize” European representation and thereby rule out a challenge to the French seat, which could be mounted only by a coalition of Germany and the smaller EU member states.

Second, proponents argue that EU positions often are not unified on issues before the Security Council. This is indeed the case, but it is not an argument for adding yet another EU seat. As was seen in the run-up to the Iraq war, the bitter split between France and Germany (then a non-permanent member) and the UK and Spain had as much to do with internal European squabbling over who calls the shots in Brussels as it did with the question of what to do about Saddam Hussein. Further importing Europe’s internal battles over taxation, agricultural subsidies, and other issues into the UN by increasing EU representation on the Security Council is hardly a recipe for strengthening international order.

In the United States, there are two groups who argue that a Security Council seat for Germany is in the U.S. interest. The first are Atlanticists who hope to build a strong U.S.-EU partnership and think that accommodating Berlin on this issue will advance this goal. Such a view is naive. Europeans have made clear, in strategy documents on the UN and in bilateral agreements with such “strategic partners” as China and Russia, that they regard the UN as a place to check U.S. power. Bringing Germany into the Security Council will further tip the balance in the UN away from the United States , while doing nothing to advance transatlantic partnership.

The second are neo-conservative critics who argue that the UN is ineffective and illegitimate and that anything that is done to undermine its effectiveness – including indiscriminate enlargement of the Security Council – will further diminish support for the organization. Such a view is shortsighted. Whether U.S. critics like it or not, the UN will remain important for the foreign policies of most countries around the world. Those who support or are willing to acquiesce in German membership simply because they do not take the organization seriously will wake up to find a UN that is still a major factor for U.S. foreign policy, but one that is more Eurocentric and EU-centric than ever.

A permanent German seat on the UN Security Council is not in the U.S. interest, and the less time U.S. foreign policy circles spend trying to discern reasons why it is, the better. The real question is how to minimize the harm to U.S. interests posed by the German candidacy. Much will depend upon how the diplomacy plays out in the coming months. Under Article 108 of the UN Charter, amendments to the charter come into force only after they have been adopted by a two-thirds vote of the members of the General Assembly and have been ratified by two-thirds of the member states, including all of the permanent members of the Security Council. All of the other permanent members – France, Britain, Russia and China – support the German bid.

If Germany fails to secure the necessary 128 votes in the General Assembly , the administration (and, for that matter, the U.S. Senate, which would have to approve ratification of amendment of the UN Charter) will not face the prospect of having to take sole responsibility for dashing German hopes by wielding its veto. Whether Germany secures the necessary two-thirds vote in turn will depend upon a complex diplomatic game involving the other leading contenders for permanent seats – Brazil, India, and Japan – and the question of whether the Secretary General’s proposed Model A, Model B, or some other variant is put to a vote. (Model A calls for adding six new permanent seats to the Security Council, one of which would be in Europe, and thus is tailor-made for the German bid. Model B envisions adding eight new four-year renewable seats to the Security Council, two of which would be in Europe, and probably would not fully satisfy German aspirations.)

Should Germany garner the necessary votes in the General Assembly in support of Model A or some variant of it, the administration would face a difficult decision. One course of action would be to block the German bid on the grounds that it is unreasonable – and live with the negative consequences for bilateral relations. The other is to adopt an attitude of noblesse oblige – to decide that even though the German bid is unjustified on its merits, the United States is sufficiently strong and generous to accommodate Berlin’s demands. This is a decision that President George W. Bush would not be facing were the German government more interested than it appears to be in improving U.S.-German relations. But it is one that the president may well have to make, given German insistence on forcing the issue. It would be a tough call.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies.

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