– Secondo un’analisi dell’agenzia di consulenza IHS Jane’s (che sarà pubblicata a fine settimana), le forze di opposizione al regime siriano sono circa 100 000, frammentate però in 1 000 bande;
– circa 10 000 jihadisti, compresi guerriglieri stranieri, legati a al-Qaeda;
– altri 30-35 000 sono islamisti radicali, che condividono le posizioni jihadiste, ma sono focalizzati sulla guerra siriana;
– altri 30 000 sono moderati, e appartengono a gruppi di tipo islamista;
– solo una piccola minoranza di ribelli sono legati a gruppi laici o nazionalisti.
– Un’analisi che concorda con le stime dei diplomatici occidentali: meno di 1/3 delle forze di opposizione sono gradite alla GB, la cifra è ancora inferiore secondo gli inviati americani.
– L’attacco militare alla Siria, guidato dagli Usa, è rinviato ma non escluso.
– La Siria cerca di limitarne la portata assicurandosi che la Turchia rimanga ai margini,
– e questo può ottenerlo tramite i curdi:
– il presidente Bashar al-Assad ha lanciato un tentativo diplomatico per fare la pace con i leader curdi in Siria e Nord Irak per ostacolare le relazioni tra Ankara e i curdi.
– Sta cercando di stringere un’alleanza con i guerriglieri curdi nel N-E della Siria, contro i ribelli sunniti.
– Il momento è favorevole dato che la Turchia sta avendo difficoltà nei negoziati di pace con il PKK.
– Un parlamentare siriano curdo, Omer Ose, si è recato presso il governo regionale del Kurdistan iracheno per invitare il presidente Barzani in visita ufficiale a Damasco;
– Ose ha comunicato a Barzani che Assad permetterebbe al governo del Kurdistan di inviare i guerriglieri peshmerga in Siria per difendere i civili curdi siriani.
– Il curdo Ose ha mantenuto strette relazioni con il clan Assad durante tutta la guerra civile, e ha stette relazioni con i principali gruppi curdi della regione, compreso il governo del Kurdistan iracheno, il PKK della Turchia (Il fratello di Ose faceva parte del PKK, prima di essere ucciso in un’azione militare), e del Partito di Unione Democratica, la maggiore organizzazione curda della Siria.
– Ose ha cercato di convincere le principali organizzazioni curde della regione a raggiungere un accordo di pace con il governo Assad; ci sono già state cooperazioni tra le forze del governo, i curdi siriani, e i membri del Partito di Unione Democratica sono liberi di circolare.
– Sembra (Strafor) che la maggior parte dei partiti curdi stiano prendendo in considerazione la proposta di cooperazione del governo Assad; anche se il Partito di Unione Democratica ha respinto la proposta di rendere pubblico un accordo di pace.
– Tre gli obiettivi di Assad:
– 1. dissuadere la Turchia da un intervento militare;
– 2. controbilanciare i tentativi turchi di espandere la propria influenza in Siria;
– 3. reclutare alleati contro i ribelli sunniti.
Crescenti complicazioni della Turchia sul fronte curdo:
– Il vuoto di potere creatosi nei territori siriani del N-E a popolazione curda rende ancora più complessa l’attuazione della strategia di Erdogan di risolvere il separatismo curdo con un accordo di pace con il PKK e contemporaneamente stringere le relazioni economiche con il Kurdistan iracheno ricco di petrolio, e rifugio dei guerriglieri curdi. Ankara deve fare i conti con l’autonomismo curdo siriano che guasta i tentativi di integrazione con i curdi in Turchia.
– I leader curdi siriani stanno cercando di ritagliarsi una loro zona autonoma nel N-E, appoggiati dal Partito di Unione Democratica, mentre combattono i jihadisti.
– La Turchia non è riuscita a collegarsi con il Partito di Unione Democratica, dato che si dice appoggi i guerriglieri sunniti per tenere occupati i guerriglieri curdi.
– Il tentativo di pace con il PKK sta deragliando: Ankara non ha attuato le riforme giudiziarie per liberare i prigionieri curdi e garantire diritti culturali ai curdi; il PKK ha comunicato di aver sospeso il ritiro dei suoi guerriglieri dalla Turchia.
– I curdi cercano di far rispettare gli impegni presi dal governo turco chiamando la popolazione a manifestare contro di esso, senza riprendere la lotta armata, approfittando della cultura di mobilitazione che si è instaurata quest’estate con le manifestazioni di Gezi Park.
– La Turchia si preoccupa per i tentativi siriani e iraniani di rafforzare le relazioni con le fazioni curde militanti, che usano la Siria come base per attaccare la Turchia.
– Per decenni il regime siriano ha contenuto il separatismo curdo tramite reti clientelari e, nonostante le complicazioni date dalla guerra civile, una comune minaccia per curdi e regime siriano è rappresentata dai guerriglieri ribelli sunniti, compresi i numerosi jihadisti entrati in Siria, che non vogliono cedere il controllo di una quota delle risorse energetiche siriane ai curdi.
– I curdi sono però anche consapevoli che un forte regime alawita in Siria, che riprenda il controllo del paese, farà causa comune con i sunniti arabi per contenere il separatismo curdo, come prima della guerra. Spesso i curdi devono scendere a compromessi con l’avversario per uscire nel modo migliore dall’accerchiamento.
– Per ora per i curdi è prioritario perseguire l’autonomia e isolare il territorio curdo dalla minaccia jihadista, sia in Siria che in Irak.
– Per avere alleati nel campo di battaglia Assad è disposto a riconoscere l’autonomia curda e un governo regionale.
I gruppi curdi della regione cercheranno di utilizzare questa offerta di Assad come leva nei negoziati con la Turchia, mantenendo pubblicamente le distanze da Assad.
Daily Telegraph 130916
Syria: nearly half rebel fighters are jihadists or hardline Islamists, says IHS Jane’s report
– Nearly half the rebel fighters in Syria are now aligned to jihadist or hardline Islamist groups according to a new analysis of factions in the country’s civil war.
Syria: nearly half rebel fighters are jihadists or extreme Islamists, says IHS Jane’s report
Opposition forces have fragmented into as many as 1,000 bands Photo: Rex Features
By Ben Farmer, Defence Correspondent, and Ruth Sherlock in Beirut
– Opposition forces battling Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria now number around 100,000 fighters, but after more than two years of fighting they are fragmented into as many as 1,000 bands.
– The new study by IHS Jane’s, a defence consultancy, estimates there are around 10,000 jihadists – who would include foreign fighters – fighting for powerful factions linked to al-Qaeda.
– Another 30,000 to 35,000 are hardline Islamists who share much of the outlook of the jihadists, but are focused purely on the Syrian war rather than a wider international struggle.
– There are also at least a further 30,000 moderates belonging to groups that have an Islamic character,
– meaning only a small minority of the rebels are linked to secular or purely nationalist groups.
– The stark assessment, to be published later this week, accords with the view of Western diplomats estimate that less than one third of the opposition forces are "palatable" to Britain, while American envoys put the figure even lower.
A Turkish soldier watches as Syrians cheer on pro-Kurdish demonstrators (not pictured) in southeastern Turkey on Aug. 3.
– The U.S.-led military strike in Syria has been delayed by Russia’s diplomatic proposal, but Syria knows the danger is not over. With the threat still looming, Syria is trying to limit the scope of a potential strike by ensuring that its northern neighbor, Turkey, is sufficiently intimidated so it remains on the sidelines of the operation. The most effective way for Syria to accomplish this is through the Kurds.
– To that end, Syrian President Bashar al Assad has already launched a diplomatic effort to make peace with the Kurdish leadership in both Syria and northern Iraq in order to drive a wedge between Ankara’s relations with the Kurds. At the same time, he is trying to forge an alliance with Kurdish fighters in northeast Syria against Sunni rebels.
– There are limits to al Assad’s strategy, but the move comes at an opportune time since Ankara is seeing its own peace negotiations with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party in Turkey derail.
– Omer Ose, a Kurdish member of the Syrian Parliament, traveled this week to northern Iraq with an important message for the Kurdistan Regional Government leadership from al Assad. Ose told Kurdish media outlet Rudaw on Sept. 10 that al Assad had instructed him to communicate to the Iraqi Kurdish leaders that the Syrian government is not against them and that he would like to invite Kurdistan Regional Government President Massoud Barzani to Damascus for an official state visit.
– Ose said that al Assad is also aware of Barzani’s pledge on Aug. 10 to use all capabilities to defend Syrian Kurdish civilians against jihadist attacks in Syria and that he would allow the Kurdistan Regional Government to send its peshmerga fighters to Syria to fulfill that pledge.
– Ose appears to be an ideal emissary for al Assad to reach out to the Kurds. Based out of Damascus for the past three decades, Ose has maintained close relations with the al Assad clan even through the civil war. At the same time, Ose has a strong relationship with the region’s main Kurdish groups, including the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party in Turkey (Ose’s brother was a member of the group before he was killed in action) and the Democratic Union[e] Party, Syria’s largest and best-organized Kurdish organization.
– Ose has been on a mission to convince the region’s main Kurdish organizations to reach a peace settlement with the al Assad government. Quiet security cooperation has already taken place between government forces and Syrian Kurds, and Democratic Union[e] Party members are able to come and go through government checkpoints. Stratfor has received indications that most of the Kurdish parties are seriously considering the government’s proposal for further cooperation, though the Democratic Union[e] Party has so far rejected the idea of holding a news conference with Ose to publicly unveil a peace settlement with the Syrian regime.
– Al Assad’s strategy behind this outreach to the Kurds is based on three critical goals:
– deterring Turkey from military action in Syria,
– counterbalancing Turkey’s attempts to expand influence in Syria and
– recruiting allies in the regime’s battle against Sunni rebels.
– Turkey is already facing growing complications on the Kurdish front. The Turkish government prided itself on pursuing a grand strategy to resolve its Kurdish separatist problem by pursuing an ambitious peace deal with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, known by its Kurdish acronym, PKK, while simultaneously strengthening economic linkages with energy-rich northern Iraq, a refuge for Kurdish fighters. This strategy was already facing a number of hurdles, but the power vacuum that developed in Syria’s heavily Kurdish-populated northeast only compounded the problem for Ankara.
– Under the leadership of the Democratic Union[e] Party and in the footsteps of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq, Syria’s Kurdish leadership is now trying to carve out its own autonomous zone while battling jihadists for territory in the northeast. Already dealing with an active battle zone next door — fighting that will serve as prime recruiting ground for both Kurdish militants and jihadists with potential interest in attacking Turkey — Ankara now must also worry about Syrian Kurdish autonomy derailing its integration efforts with Kurds in Turkey.
– Turkey has tried forging a relationship with Syria’s Democratic Union[e] Party with little success, as rumors abound of Turkey backing local Sunni fighters at the same time to keep Syrian Kurdish fighters occupied. Meanwhile, as Stratfor predicted, Turkey’s peace track with the PKK is derailing. Alleging that the Turkish government has stalled in fulfilling its end of the first phase of the peace process (the passing of judicial reforms to free Kurdish prisoners and grant Kurdish cultural rights), the PKK has announced that it is halting the withdrawal of its fighters from Turkey.
– Internal Kurdish communiques are calling for popular demonstrations against the Turkish government to pressure Ankara to fulfill its pledges. Notably, the group is not calling for a resumption of attacks, which would erase the progress made thus far on the peace track, but is instead taking advantage of the protest culture that formed this summer with the Gezi park demonstrations to apply a different kind of pressure on the Turkish government.
– Syria can try to take advantage of Turkey’s multifaceted Kurdish problem by splitting Turkey and the region’s main Kurdish groups through its own diplomatic outreach. Turkey is already wary of Syrian and Iranian efforts to strengthen covert ties with Kurdish militant factions using Syria as a staging ground for attacks in Turkey.
– Syria’s Kurdish leadership will be especially wary of publicly aligning itself with the pariah of the region, but there is a precedent for a working relationship between Damascus and Syrian Kurds. Ose, the Syrian Kurdish emissary, illustrates the patronage networks the Syrian regime relied on for decades to contain Kurdish separatism. The current, polarizing civil war conditions obviously complicate those arrangements, but the Kurds and the regime are, for now, facing a common threat from Sunni rebel fighters, including a growing number of jihadists who have made their way to Syria and are unwilling to cede control over a sizable share of Syria’s energy resources to the Kurds.
– At the same time, the Kurds are well aware that a strong Alawite regime in Damascus with consolidated control over the country would find common cause with Sunni Arabs to contain Kurdish separatism, as it did before the civil war.
– Surrounded, the Kurds often have to make deals with their adversary to make the most of their current condition.
– For now, the Kurdish imperative is to advance Syrian Kurdish autonomy and insulate Kurdish territory in both Syria and Iraq from a growing jihadist threat. With the country already deeply fragmented, al Assad will be willing to pay the price of recognizing Kurdish autonomy and empowering the regional Kurdish leadership in exchange for allies on the battlefield.
– The region’s Kurdish groups — from Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government to the PKK in Turkey to the Democratic Union[e] Party in Syria — will all try to use this offer from al Assad as leverage in their own negotiations with Turkey while keeping public distance from al Assad. Turkey will not be able to prevent quieter cooperation between the Syrian regime and the Kurds, however, and that will add yet another significant complication to a Kurdish containment strategy already fraught with problems.