Brian M Downing,
analista politico-militare e autore di “La rivoluzione militare e il mutamento politico”, e “I sentieri della gloria: guerra e mutamento sociale in America dalla Grande Guerra al Vietnam” (Military Revolution and Political Change and The Paths of Glory: War and Social Change in America from the Great War to Vietnam).
● Non è probabile che la Russia voglia ostacolare a lunga durata i rifornimenti per la guerra in Afghanistan, dato che ha molto più da perdere degli USA in caso di vittoria dei ribelli.
● Gli obiettivi strategici di Russia e Usono meno conflittuali in Asia Centrale che non in Est Europa.
● Al di là delle promesse fatte dalla Nato che non si sarebbe allargata in quest’area, è quanto in realtà ha fatto;
● la strategia russa in Kirghizistan è di lungo respiro: temendo l’intrusione nella sua periferia occidentale e meridionale, intende accrescere la propria influenza in Kirghizistan e sfruttarla a suo favore per le questioni più rilevanti delle forze Nato in Est Europa;
o dato che i giochi geo-politici sfuggono a volte di mano, gli esiti di questa strategia potrebbero portare ad un aggravarsi del conflitto tra le due potenze, anche se i recenti accordi sugli armamenti non lo fanno pensare.
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● Pur non essendo chiaro cosa abbia scatenato il sollevamento della scorsa settimana in Kirghizistan, è indubbio che la Russia ha appoggiato la destituzione del presidente Bakijev e che trarrà vantaggio dal nuovo governo in formazione, prontamente da essa riconosciuto.
o Rosa Otunbayeva, capo del governo provvisorio, è una ex segretaria del Partito Comunista, anche se probabilmente non è rimasta legata al Cremlino.
o La Russia cercherà di volgere gli eventi a proprio vantaggio, dal Baltico alla frontiera con la Cina.
– I popoli della regione che va dal Caspio alla Mongolia non sono mai esistiti come Stati naizionali, ma hanno fatto parte dell’impero zarista o sovietico, nella forma di kanati.
o Durante l’era Breznev (1964-82) le repubbliche centroasiatiche erano governate da autocrati indigeni legati a Mosca, ma a capo di redditizie reti clientelari di collegamento tra il governo e vari clan e tribù.
o Essi resistettero al tentativo di riforma di Gorbacev (1990-91) facendo appello a sentimenti etnico-nazionalisti, utilizzati anche per legittimare l’indipendenza durante il colpo che estromise Gorbacev:
o ex vassalli e funzionari si trasformarono in nuovi governi, mentre rimase l’autocrazia e le reti clientelari.
o nell’Est Europa la maggior parte degli ex paesi sovietici e satelliti, temendo la rinascita della Russia si allinearono con la Nato e si integrarono nella UE, viste come assicurazioni per la loro indipendenza.
– L’Asia Centrale evidenzia relazioni differenziate verso Usa e Russia:
o alcuni nuovi Stati considerano la Russia un partner commerciale importante, data l’integrazione delle loro economie dal XIX sec.
o Altri mantengono relazioni cordiali con entrambi,
o altri ancora, come il Turkmenistan, un atteggiamento neutrale.
– Il Kirghizistan si appoggia sulla Russia per una quota importante del proprio commercio, negli ultimi anni si è rivolto agli Usa, concendo l’utilizzo della base aerea di Manas di appoggio alle operazioni in Afghanistan; circa il 20% della logistica occidentale passa per essa. La pressione russa a limitare l’utilizzo di Manas ha avuto come unico risultato quello di aumentarne il prezzo d’affitto, ai $60 mn. attuali.
– Nel timore che gli eventi in Kirghizistan condizionino la guerra anti-talebana, gli Usa hanno esagerato i rischi a riguardo, in realtà non è verosimile che un cambio di governo in Kirghizistan influirebbe in modo significativo.
– Di tanto in tanto avvengono attacchi nelle aree tribali vicino al Khyber pass contro i convogli di materiale inviato in Afghanistan e proveniente dal Pakistan; quelli provenienti dal Nord sono attaccati quando entrano nella provincia di Kunduz, area pashtun, che nel 2009 ha visto incrementare l’azione dei ribelli; anche il porto di Karachi, nel Sud, con una importante quota di popolazione pashtun è a rischio.
– La Russia cerca di scoraggiare i rifornimenti occidentali dal Kirghizistan, assieme agli altri membri della SCO (Cina, Kazakistan, Kirghizistan, Russia, Tagikistan e Uzbekistan) teme che i guerriglieri talebani possano diffondersi dall’Asia Centrale nelle sue regioni – Cecenia, Daghestan e Ingushezia – a forte componente islamica, dove però, al di là della propaganda, i ribelli sono soprattutto indigeni, pur riceendo il plauso nella propaganda di al-Qaeda;
– per questo i paesi SCO addestrano la polizia nazionale afghana, soprattutto nelle aree del Nord con popolazioni turkmene.
I guerriglieri sono aumentati nella valle di Fergana, che attraversa Kirghizistan, Tagikistan e Uzbekistan, e che è ritenuta una via per entrare nell’Afghanistan orientale.
Apr 13, 2010
Russian concerns weigh heavily
By Brian M Downing
– The precise nature and inspiration of the uprising last week in the remote Central Asian republic of Kyrgyzstan is not presently known. Few, however, doubt that Russia has supported President Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s ouster and will benefit from the government that is coalescing in Bishkek. Russia quickly recognized the new government and even sent a modest number of paratroopers to its military facility in the country.
– Roza Otunbayeva, the head of the provisional government, is a former Communist Party secretary, though unlikely to be an apparatchik with lingering loyalties to the Kremlin, regardless of who presently occupies it. Russia will almost certainly seek to turn events to its advantage, from the Baltic to the Chinese frontier.
Central Asian republics, then and now
– The peoples of the vast region from the Caspian to Mongolia have never existed as nation states, only as amorphous khanates, transient empires, and hapless parts of tsarist and Soviet empires.
o During the Leonid Brezhnev era (1964-1982), Central Asian republics were governed by indigenous autocrats, tied to Moscow but standing atop lucrative patronage networks linking the government to various clans and tribes.
– When Mikhail Gorbachev (1990-1991) sought to reform the Central Asian governments, the autocrats resisted with ethnic/national sentiments. Amid the coup that briefly ousted Gorbachev, they invoked those same sentiments to legitimize independence. Former party vassals and their functionaries became new governments. Autocracy and patronage networks persisted, with occasional eruptions and pretenses of democracy.
– Dispositions toward Russia and the United States varied. In Eastern Europe, most former Soviet states and satellites feared an eventual Russian resurgence and raced to align themselves with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and integrate into the European Union[e] – assurances of independence, the states calculated.
– Central Asia displays variation in relations to Moscow and Washington. Some new states see Russia as an important trade partner, as their economies had been integrated since the 19th century.
– Others are cordial with both power centers while still others, such as Turkmenistan, maintain a staunchly neutral stance.
– Kyrgyzstan relies on Russia for a considerable portion of its commerce, yet in recent years it has leaned toward the US, granting it use of Manas airfield to support operations in Afghanistan. About 20% of Western logistics flow through Kyrgyzstan. Russian pressure to restrict access to Manas in recent years led only to more generous emoluments from the US and the airfield remained open. The US pays an annual rent of about US$60 million to use the base.
The war in Afghanistan
– The US and NATO are naturally fearful that events in Kyrgyzstan will affect the war against the Taliban. National security institutions often overstate dangers. The consequences of the change of government in Bishkek, however, are unlikely to be significant.
– Materiel coming into Afghanistan from Pakistan is intermittently attacked in the tribal regions near the Khyber Pass and convoys entering from the north are increasingly attacked as they enter Kunduz province – a Pashtun area that has seen stronger insurgent activity in the past year. The southern port city of Karachi has a large Pashtun refugee population that could cause supply woes at the main port of entry.
– This presents Russia with the opportunity to choke off Western supplies coming through Kyrgyzstan. As appealing as avenging its loss in Afghanistan 20 years ago might appear, Russia has much to fear about a resurgent Taliban spreading militancy across Central Asia then into Russian regions with significant Islamic populations. Unlikely as a new caliphate is, the fear will be augmented by national security institutions in a country whose political culture has been greatly shaped by foreign invasions over the centuries.
– Russia and other members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO – China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) are deeply concerned by regional militancy. The SCO sees militancy growing in the Fergana Valley, which cuts across Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and is thought to be an infiltration route into eastern Afghanistan. Accordingly, SCO countries play supportive roles in Afghanistan by training its national police, especially in the northern areas with Turkic populations.
– Russia worries about an inflow of foreign fighters into contested parts of Muslim Russia, such as Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia. The struggles in those regions enjoy prominence in al-Qaeda propaganda and that of kindred groups, but those insurgencies are mainly indigenous. Nonetheless, success in Afghanistan could lead to greater ambitions and more foreign volunteers to an area through which Caspian oil flows.
NATO and Eastern Europe
– Russia is unlikely to choke off supply lines into Afghanistan in a significant, long-term manner; it has far more to lose from an insurgent victory than the US. Russian and US strategic goals in Central Asia do not conflict nearly as greatly as they do in Eastern Europe.
– The collapse of the Soviet Union[e] in 1991 led to new states and new security concerns. Despite assurances from NATO that it would not expand into these areas, it did just that. The import of national security institutions and political culture recur. Americans who recognize the cultural legacy of the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the September 11, 2001, attacks might well ponder the legacy of Russia’s loss of 27 million dead in World War II, affording insight into Russia’s present-day concerns along its western and southern periphery.
– Russia will seek to increase its influence in Kyrgyzstan and use it in the more important matter of NATO forces in Eastern Europe. Temporary and partial restrictions of access are more likely than shutdown; as noted, that could harm Russia more than it would the US. In any event, the US will likely be able to maintain access to Manas airfield by boosting its payments to Kyrgyzstan, as it did in recent years. US finances are strained as never before, but emoluments to Bishkek will be found.
– Russian strategy here is long term – and less blunt than many of the hare-brained schemes of Soviet policymakers. Russia seeks to impress on the West that it is an important partner in Central Asia and that its concerns about NATO expansion cannot go unaddressed any longer.
– The upshot, however, could be sharper conflict; geopolitical games often get out of hand. But recent agreements by Washington and Moscow on missile defense and arms reductions have provided a basis for greater dialog and for cooperation in avoiding another cold war that neither state can afford.
Brian M Downing is a political/military analyst and the author of The Military Revolution and Political Change and The Paths of Glory: War and Social Change in America from the Great War to Vietnam.