WSJ 21/02/2006
Tesi Henry Sokolski, direttore Nonproliferation
Policy Education Center in Washington:
- Ipotesi di cooperazione nucleare
civile USA-India incontra ostacoli, e non potrà essere definito durante la
visita di Bush in India. - USA hanno posto come condizione
che India voti con USA contro Iran sul nucleare. India ha minacciato
l’astensione e poi votato il documento IAEA a inizio febbraio solo dopo che
Cina e Russia avevano fatto togliere i termini “inadempienza” e “deferimento”. - India ha dichiarato di
avere “interessi nazionali” nel rapporto con Iran: - accordo di cooperazione
strategica firmato gennaio 2003, - contratto intergovernativo per
acquisto $5MD di gas, - progetto di acquisto gas da
gasdotto Iran-India da $7MD; - India raffina quasi il 40% della
benzina consumata in Iran - ed è tra i maggiori importatori
di petrolio iraniano - India addestra la marina iraniana
- fornisce mezzi militari,
condivide tecnologie avanzate. - Da settembre 2004 USA hanno
sanzionato 4 società private indiane per trasferimenti chimici e nucleari a
Iran. - Iran aiuta India a inviare aiuti
in Afghanistan per stornare il malcontento islamico. - USA hanno chiesto che India apra
i reattori veloci alle ispezioni internazionali. Sono inefficienti come
generatori di elettricità, ma efficienti come produttori di plutonio per
utilizzo anche militare. India sta completando un reattore da 500 MW. Il
complesso nucleare indiano rifiuta di inserirli tra gli impianti civili. - I negoziatori USA hanno così
tacitamente sanzionato quasi 9 tonnellate di plutonio, già prodotte dai
reattori “civili”, sufficiente per 2.000 bombe. Hanno inoltre chiuso un occhio
sulla palese violazione dell’impegno preso da India con gli USA di non
utilizzare un reattore importato dal Canada con appoggio USA per costruire
bombe. - Per cautelarsi, il Pakistan
ha chiesto alla Cina di aumentare l’assistenza al nucleare “civile” e ha
ottenuto un impegno per la fornitura di 6-8 nuovi reattori. La Cina
probabilmente aggirerebbe le norme sulla non-proliferazione allo stesso modo
degli USA con l’India. - Anche la Cina è
inviperita; suoi funzionari hanno detto agli americani che non pensino di avere
l’aiuto della Cina per sanzionare l’Iran, se hanno intenzione di fare l’accordo
nucleare con l’India. - India e Cina hanno firmato
un accordo di cooperazione strategica in aprile, che farebbe della Cina il
principale partner commerciale dell’India per i prossimi 15 anni. Ma Cina ha
avvertito l’India che la cooperazione nucleare USA potrebbe “minare le mosse
verso il disarmo globale”, ossia la Cina potrebbe cautelarsi aumentando gli
sforzi nelle armi strategiche. - L’Iran accusa gli USA di
usare due pesi e due misure. - Linea Sokolski:
- non pretendere che India voti con
USA su Iran, bansti non voti contro. Per l’Iran la chiave è la Russia. - Quello che è importante è che India
non stipuli accordi intergovernativi con Iran sull’energia, ben più
importanti di un voto, perché trasferiscono miliardi ai mullah e li
legittimano. India dovrebbe lasciare alle società private di assicurare i
rifornimenti energetici. - Occorre inoltre che Usa pongano
come condizione la limitazione del programma indiano di armi nucleari. - Infine coinvolgere Cina e Pakistan, perché
rinuncino alla produzione di materiale fissile per armamenti e congelino o
riducano il dispiegamento di armi nucleari, come hanno fatto USA, Russia,
Francia e GB.
By HENRY SOKOLSKI
February 21, 2006; Page A18
As U.S. officials prepare for President
Bush’s visit to New Delhi next month, they must resist making a proposed
civilian nuclear cooperation deal the primary theme of future relations with
India, or one that requires immediate agreement. Indeed, failing to get this
nuclear deal right could not only encumber improved U.S.-India relations, but
aggravate the very security threats — Iran’s nuclear ambitions and China’s
growing strategic weapons capabilities — that we are seeking India’s help to
mitigate.
First, a synopsis: President Bush and Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh announced in July their desire to formalize a
nuclear cooperative agreement as soon as possible, under which the U.S.
would supply India with civilian nuclear technology. India would place its
civilian nuclear facilities (but not its nuclear weapons program) under
international monitoring and would continue a moratorium on nuclear testing.
The top U.S. diplomat involved, Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns,
took the nuclear amity a step further. In October, he predicted that the White
House would be in a position to ask Congress to pass legislation authorizing
Indian-U.S. nuclear cooperation "by the time of President Bush’s
visit." That prospect, however, no longer looks bright. After what the
Indian press described as "failed" consultations in New Delhi on Jan.
19 and 20, Mr. Burns warned that "We will have to see if we can be
successful. . . . But there are difficulties ahead."
What happened? Two things. First, Mr. Burns
asked India to refer Iran’s nuclear misbehavior to the U.N. at the planned
International Atomic Energy Agency meeting of Feb. 2. On this, India demurred:
"We will not like to see a situation of confrontation developing in a
region that is very close to India," India’s foreign secretary said. A
week later, the U.S. ambassador in New Delhi, David Mulford, warned
that the deal would "die" if India failed to refer Iran to the U.N.
The Indian Foreign Ministry reacted by threatening to abstain. Once China and
Russia agreed with the U.S. and the Europeans to refer the Iranian nuclear
matter to the U.N., however, New Delhi changed tack, supporting amendments that
deleted use of the words "noncompliance" or "referral" to
assure that the resolution served what India’s foreign ministry described as
India’s "national interests."
These interests were highlighted in a
strategic cooperation agreement India struck with Tehran in January 2003.
Prime among them is Iranian energy. Late last year, India contracted
directly with Tehran for over $5 billion in natural gas and is still interested
in buying gas from a proposed $7 billion pipeline that would be built through
Pakistan. India also is reported to refine nearly 40% of Iran’s domestic
gasoline and is a major importer of Iranian oil.
India also is engaged in defense
cooperation with Iran, training Iran’s navy, supplying military goods, and
sharing advanced technology. Since September 2004, the U.S. has
sanctioned four private Indian entities for nuclear and chemical transfers to
Iran. Finally, Iran is helping funnel Indian aid to Afghanistan to fend
off Islamic discontent that otherwise might march south into Kashmir.
India, of course, would like to continue this collaboration and secure U.S.
nuclear cooperation.
The second troubling request Mr. Burns made
was that New Delhi open up its current and planned fast breeder reactors to international
inspections. These machines are notoriously uneconomical for generating
electricity. They are, however, by far the most efficient nuclear producers of
weapons-usable plutonium. The Indians are completing a breeder capable of
producing 500 megawatts of electricity (and scores of weapons’ worth of
plutonium annually). India’s nuclear establishment is insistent that it be kept
off the civilian roster.
How have U.S. negotiators coped with this and
the other technical-legal problems these nuclear talks have generated? Not
well. Despite official contentions that a deal would limit the potential size
of India’s nuclear arsenal, our negotiators have quietly grandfathered
nearly nine tons of weapons-usable plutonium in spent fuel that India has
already produced in its "civilian" reactors. This is enough material
for roughly 2,000 weapons. They also winked at India’s clear violation of its
pledge to the U.S. not to use a reactor it imported from Canada with U.S. help
to make bombs: India used this plant to make its first explosive device
in 1974. The U.S. is now willing to let India count it as a military production
plant.
All of this has the Pakistanis flustered. They thought they had enough nuclear weapons to keep India in
check. With the nuclear fuel the nuclear deal will allow India to import,
though, India may be able to dedicate more of its domestic nuclear resources to
making bombs. As a hedge, Pakistan has appealed to China for more
"civilian" nuclear assistance of its own and received a pledge for
six to eight additional reactors. China presumably would seek to bend
international nuclear rules forbidding such sales to a non-NPT weapons state
along the lines the U.S. is seeking for India. China is also fuming.
Officials there have told U.S. visitors that Washington can forget getting
Beijing’s help to sanction Iran as long as India is to be cut loose with the
proposed nuclear deal.
India and China signed a strategic
cooperation agreement last April, which locks China in as India’s largest
commercial partner for the next 15 years. Yet with the hawkish nuclear
rumblings the U.S. nuclear deal is stirring in India, China has warned India
that the U.S. nuclear cooperation may "undermine global disarmament
moves" — i.e., China may now hedge its bets by augmenting its own
strategic weapons efforts. And Iran? It’s been making hay of
Washington’s generosity toward India, accusing the U.S. of backing nuclear
"double standards."
* * *
None of these developments are what Mr. Bush
had in mind last July when he promised India nuclear assistance. So what should
he do? First, stop pressuring India to vote precisely as the U.S. might
on Iran. Given that Russia rather than India is the key to securing
international consensus on Iran, we should urge India not to side with Iran but
tolerate its abstaining if it stops seeking government-to-government energy
deals with Tehran. These deals in the long-run are far more important than any
U.N. vote. They transfer billions of dollars and constitute an unnecessary vote
of confidence that keeps the mullahs in power. Here, U.S.-India security
should oblige India to secure its energy needs through private firms on the
open world market.
Second, our diplomats need to recalibrate
what our nuclear cooperation is trying to accomplish. India needs U.S. help
to secure fresh, affordable foreign supplies of nuclear fuel to keep its
civilian reactors running. If we want to keep this aid from freeing up
India’s domestic nuclear resources to make more bombs, though, we have to
get serious about India capping its nuclear weapons program. Officials
claim this would be a "deal breaker." Yet, Under Secretary of State
Robert Joseph noted last month that the U.S. ought to "seek additional
nonproliferation results" in "separate discussions." Here, the
administration would do well to specify what results it is seeking and time
their achievement with the signing of any U.S. nuclear cooperative agreement
with India.
Finally, given Pakistan’s fears and China’s
declarations, it would be wise to involve Beijing and Islamabad. They,
after all, are the key reasons India has nuclear weapons. One idea would be to urge
them all to do as all other nuclear weapons state members of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty — the U.S., Russia, France and the U.K. — have
already done: publicly forswear making fissile material for military purposes
and freeze or reduce the number of nuclear weapons they deploy. To be sure,
this may slow things down. But it runs a far greater risk of avoiding the
growing downsides of our current course, which looks to be in an embarrassing
slog towards getting things wrong.
Mr. Sokolski, executive director of the
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center in Washington, is editor, with Patrick
Clawson, of "Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran" (Institute for
Strategic Studies, 2005).