Egitto e Iran, nuovi pilastri gemelli
L’Egitto naviga le correnti dei non-allineati
● Tesi Afrasiabi, AT: Oltre che per le questioni regionali, Egitto e Iran sono legati anche da questioni internazionali che rappresentano sufficienti motivi di alleanza per il prossimo futuro: riforma Onu, squilibri economici e gerarchia, cooperazione Nord-Sud.
Se l’Egitto con Morsi continuerà a perseguire una nuova linea di politica estera che presuppone la cooperazione con Tehran, si può parlare di un “nuovo doppio pilastro” di stabilità nel MO;
Se i due maggiori paesi mediorientali mettono assieme le proprie risorse sono in grado di influire sul “rimodellamento del paesaggio politico”, secondo un recente commento diChina News Agency.
Da non dimenticare che il MO è un campo minato da lealtà in concorrenza tra loro e da sovrapposizione di interessi spesso tra loro inconciliabili, e che consentono solo manovre tattiche, a zig-zag, ma non scelte politiche adeguate, ed una strategia di lungo termine.
– Proprio mentre è in corso un avvicinamento tra Egitto e Iran ma, a causa del loro continuo equilibrismo e del coordinamento egiziano della politica verso l’Iran con quella verso gli Usa e i sauditi, Egitto e Iran scoprono che “effetti collaterali” li allontanano.
– Conferenza annuale dei paesi non allineati (NAM), a Tehran; l’Egitto ha simbolicamente trasferito all’Iran la presidenza di NAM.
o Egitto e Iran condividono temi come l’ingiustizia delle strutture internazionali, l’appoggio ai palestinesi, un’area mediorientale senza armi nucleari (israeliane), etc.
o Punti di divergenza: la Siria, il presidente egiziano Morsi ha parlato di solidarietà con il popolo siriano contro l’oppressivo regime siriano;
o Morsi ha parlato anche del piano che aveva già presentato nella riunione della Organizzazione per la Cooperazione Islamica alla Mecca, finora approvato solo da Tehran.
o Atmosfera generale di amicizia tra Teheran e Il Cairo, anche se alcuni alti funzionari egiziani hanno negato la piena ripresa delle relazioni Egitto-Iran.
– Sarebbe in corso una astuta “curva verso Oriente” da parte dell’Egitto, come indica il viaggio di Morsi in Cina che ha preceduto quello in Iran, e nonostante l’invito ricevuto da Washington.
– Morsi e Ban-Ki-Moon si sono dimostrati indipendenti, non ascoltado il consiglio di Usa e Israele di non partecipare alla Conferenza dei non allineati.
– La prossima mossa sulla Siria non sarà una no-fly zone, ma un tentativo di mediazione concertato regionalmente.
– Solo unendo i propri sforzi, assieme ad altri attori regionali come l’Arabia Saudita, Egitto e Iran possono portare le parti in conflitto in Siria ad un dialogo.
L’Arabia Saudita ha inviato un principe alla conferenza come segnale di buona volontà verso l’Iran.
– La Conferenza dei non allineati a Tehran (NAM) è importante dal punto di vista simbolico: oltre 50 delle 120 delegazioni presenti avevano alti rappresentanti: 24 presidenti, 3 monarchi, 8 primi ministri e 50 ministri Esteri.
o Con essa é stato ribadito ad Usa ed alleati occidentali sono stati costretti a prendere atto che gran parte del mondo non è d’accordo con la loro politica estera;
o l’Iran l’ha usata per cercare di rompere il suo isolamento.
o Prima visita di un leader egiziano dalla rivoluzione iraniana del 1979, e primo segnale della nuova assertività egiziana in Medio Oriente, i cui effetti non mancheranno di farsi sentire presto in tutta la regione. È un primo tentativo da parte dell’Egitto di navigare tra i maggiori campi geo-politici del MO.
o Oltre che per la questione siriana l’Egitto si è dato da fare recentemente nel Sinai e per la questione israelo-palestinese. Se il confine tra Egitto e la striscia di Gaza, presso Rafah rimanesse aperta, Gaza importerà dall’Egitto legalmente combustibile e rifornimenti vari e magari (fra pochi mesi/anni) usare i porti egiziani, divenendo sempre più integrata nell’economia egiziana.
– Un parametro per valutare la situazione è quello economico-finanziario: Morsi ha bisogno di denaro, l’Egitto ha un forte deficit di bilancio, e deve quotidianamente fare i conti con proteste di strada per il pane e il gas.
o La Cina è uno dei grandi donatori potenziali; Morsi vi si è recato prima di Tehran; Morsi avrebbe siglato accordi in Cina per circa $5MD.
o Un altro finanziatore dell’Egitto è l’Arabia Saudita. Non volendo che emerga una potenza predominante nella regione, il Cairo controbilancia politicamente le relazioni finanziarie con i sauditi ricollegandosi a Tehran (secondo una recente analisi del think tank americano Straford).
– Aspetto geopolitico: l’Egitto potrebbe proporsi come leader per due conflitti mediorientali: la guerra civile siriana e il conflitto israelo-palestinese.
o gioco di equilibrismo di Morsi a Teheran: tenersi buono gli iraniani, mentre colpiva il loro alleati siriani: ha denunciato il “regime siriano oppressivo”,
o mentre alcuni giorni prima aveva suggerito un nuovo gruppo di contatto sulla Siria comprendente Egitto, Arabia Saudita, Turchia e Iran.
– Domanda da 1 milione di $: Morsi manderebbe soldati egiziani in Siria, se non come intervento militare, nel quadro di una missione di peace-keeping?
– Molti i problemi interni in Egitto che lo sconsigliano, ma ne trarrebbe vantaggi meno ovvi: l’Egitto sarebbe forse il paese meglio accolto dalla popolazione siriana in una missione di peace-keeping, dato che è il maggior paese arabo con una maggioranza di popolazione sunnita e con antichi legami con la Siria.
– 1. può rendere molto economicamente fare un lavoro che altri non vogliono fare; si calcola che ci vorrebbero decine di migliaia di soldati anche solo per mettere al sicuro gli arsenali chimici e biologici siriani, senza parlare di quelli necessari per la lotta contro i jihadisti e ribelli radicali.
– Sarebbe un modo per tener occupati altrove i militari egiziani, su cui non è sicuro di avere il controllo.
– 2. solleciterebbe l’orgoglio nazionale e distrarrebbe le masse dai grossi problemi interni.
– 3. Un coinvolgimento diretto egiziano in Siria, potrebbe fare dell’Egitto il negoziatore più adatto tra Occidente e Iran. Obama potrebbe Morsi usare per la sua campagna elettorale, come esempio di “manovra da dietro le quinte”.
o Gli iraniani dipenderebbero dal Cairo per la loro futura influenza su Siria e il Levante.
Potrebbero essere imbarcati anche Russia, Cina e Arabia, ognuna con una sua agenda; la Turchia non avrebbe scelta, anche se irritata.
Egypt and Iran, new twin pillars
– Egypt and Iran this week took a giant step toward overcoming their diplomatic estrangement, brought together by the exigencies of a global movement and, even more so, a complex regional calculus that has a long history of being shaped by foreign powers.
– In a sign of changing times, the Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi used the opportunity of his participation in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit in Tehran to put on full display of the delicate yet significant nuances of a "new Egypt" that has unshackled itself from foreign domination and moves according to its own incandescent atmosphere.
– At the landmark summit’s opening day, the speeches by Morsi and his Iranian hosts such as by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, reflected a symbiosis that explains why the NAM torch was passed from Morsi’s hands to Ahmadinejad, in light of the common themes of decrying unjust global structures, support for Palestinians, a Middle East nuclear weapons-free zone, etc.
– Simultaneously, this was punctuated, yet by no means punctured, by visible disagreements over Syria, as Morsi used the occasion to declare his solidarity with the "Syrian people" against the "oppressive" regime, thus warranting a walk out by the Syrian foreign minister, who likely hoped to see a greater emphasis by Morsi on mediation .
– But, not all hope is lost and in the same speech Morsi referred to that plan, which he unveiled at a recent meeting of Organization of Islamic Cooperation in Mecca, even though so far only Tehran has officially endorsed it; regarding Turkey, a last minute decision to send a special envoy may have saved Turkey from a major self-inflicted wound (see Turkey peculiarly absent at summit, Asia Times Online, August 28, 2012).
– Judging by their warm brotherly hugs at the summit and their bilateral talks on the summit’s side-line, Morsi and Ahmadinejad clearly have a good chemistry between them and it would only make sense to see Ahmadinejad in Cairo before his presidency’s termination next June.
– Although some top Cairo officials have denied that a full restoration of diplomatic relations with Tehran is imminent, after this summit they will be hard pressed to justify their opposition – after all, Iran and Saudi Arabia have their own fair share of issues and yet have managed to keep the diplomatic ship afloat, so why not Egypt?
– By all indications, we are now witnessing a subtle "turn to the east" by Egypt that is reflected in Morsi’s China trip prior to his Iran visit, despite an invitation by the White House. Rebuffing Washington’s and Tel Aviv’s pressure not to attend the summit, Morsi like UN secretary general Ban Ki-moon showed independent judgment, just as both men used the summit’s podium to raise issues that irritate Iran, such as the nuclear issue, Israel, human rights and Morsi’s support for the opposition in Syria.
– Yet, the next move on Syria will not be a no-fly zone but rather a concerted regional effort at conflict-mediation, in order to complement the current effort of UN special envoy to Syria Lakhdar Brahimi.
– Only by joining hands can Tehran and Cairo make a tangible difference in bringing the warring parties to a meaningful dialogue, together with input by other important regional and extra-regional players, such as Saudi Arabia, which sent a prince to the summit as a sign of good will toward Iran, basking in the reward of proving its international solidarity to the coercive Western powers.
– Beyond regional issues, however, a good many international matters pertaining to UN reform, global economic injustice and hierarchy, and South-South cooperation, also bind Egypt and Iran today, sufficient reason to anticipate their full cooperation in the international organizations in the coming years.
– Morsi clearly shares Iran’s view of Israel’s nuclear arsenal as a threat to itself and the rest of the Arab world and, henceforth, we should witness a common effort with Iran to bring international pressures on Israel to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to open its nuclear sites to inspections.
– Assuming that Cairo under Morsi manages to continue charting a new foreign policy orientation that dictates cooperation with a like-minded Tehran, we may legitimately speak of a "new twin pillars" of stability in the Middle East, akin to the Iran and Saudi "twin pillars" prior to the Islamic Revolution.
– Indeed, by pulling their resources together, as the two biggest Middle Eastern states can achieve much in the direction of "reshaping the political landscape" to paraphrase a recent commentary by the China News Agency.
– Lest we forget, this is a rough landscape with minefields of competing loyalties and overlapping (religious, ideological, material) interests that do not always fit each other or allow consistent policies, but rather zigzags and tactical maneuvers in place of settled long-term strategies.
Consequently, it is hardly surprising that Cairo and Tehran may discover certain side-effects pushing them away from each other precisely at a time when they are pulled together, simply because of their constant balancing act and the Egyptian coordination of their Iran policy with their Washington or Saudi policies, requiring a "near distancing".
For now, however, as a result of the landmark summit that has "blown" a new life to NAM, to paraphrase ayatollah Khamenei, the breath of fresh Iran-Egypt diplomacy is inescapable, much as it should not be mistaken for a complete harmony.
Kaveh L Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After Khomeini: New Directions in Iran’s Foreign Policy (Westview Press).
Egypt navigates non-aligned currents
By Victor Kotsev
On Friday, the summit of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) in Tehran enters its second and final day. Amid fresh suspicions voiced by the International Atomic Energy Association toward the Iranian nuclear program and indirect criticism on the part of United Nations secretary general Ban Ki-moon of Tehran’s Holocaust denial and threats to destroy Israel, the parley has caused significant divisions even among its participants.
– Reportedly, barely over 50 of the 120-plus delegations in attendance have top officials in them: the list includes 24 presidents, three monarchs, eight prime ministers and 50 foreign ministers, sometimes more than a single dignitary per country.
By most accounts, the gathering is significant in its symbolism – and may serve as a stepping stone for other initiatives – but fairly inconsequential on its own. The Unites States and its Western allies were clearly forced to reckon with the fact that much of the world disagrees with their foreign policy agendas. This, however, is hardly news: as veteran American negotiator and analyst Aaron David Miller put it in an analysis in Foreign Policy Magazine, "No shocker there, except maybe to Americans."
– Iran received a diplomatic boost in its otherwise growing isolation. The Islamic Republic tried hard to make the most out of the public relations opportunity, though the jury is still out on the quality and effect of these efforts. After being forced to retract an offer to take the conference members on a tour of their nuclear and military sites, it remains to be seen whether the ayatollahs will proceed with their plans to execute a prominent dissident on Friday. [1]
Given the list of distinguished guests – such as Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir, wanted by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity – one has to wonder if any invitations to the execution have been extended as well. (Perhaps, a more cynical observer might argue, this would be a special treat reserved for the private after-party.)
– The extravagant public relations sensibilities of the Iranian leaders aside, a major event at the summit was the presence of Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi. Egypt symbolically transferred to Iran the leadership of the NAM during the first visit of an Egyptian leader to Tehran in over three decades – the two countries have had no official diplomatic relations since the Iranian revolution.
– What is even more important, however, is that this appears to be an early face of a more assertive Egyptian stance in the Middle East. The repercussions may be felt sooner than expected, and will likely reverberate throughout the region.
– One way to assess the situation is that Morsi is jockeying for money – Egypt is in dire straits financially, with multiple holes in its budget and almost daily bread and gas riots on the streets. China with its vast cash reserves, where the Egyptian president spent three days before traveling to Tehran, is a major potential donor. In fact, Egyptian media claimed following the visit that Morsi had signed close to US$5 billion worth of investment deals with his hosts. [2]
The stunt in Tehran can also be interpreted in the same vein. As the United States-based intelligence analysis organization Stratfor put it in a recent analysis:
– Cairo wants to hedge its dependence on Saudi financial support by [eventually] re-establishing relations with Iran. Egypt does not want to see a region dominated by any one power, and although Saudi Arabia cannot completely dominate the region, Riyadh’s financial resources give Saudi Arabia an overwhelming advantage. By warming up to Tehran, Cairo gives itself more leverage in its relationship with Riyadh.
– Besides a purely economic dimension of Cairo’s overtures, however, there is a larger geopolitical one. There are two major conflicts where Egypt could take the lead in the near future, and both seem to be high on Morsi’s agenda. One is the Syrian civil war, while the other is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
– Morsi has had to walk a fine line between warming up to his Persian hosts and clamping down on their close ally, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. One could speculate even that he is their best bet for a ladder to climb down the metaphoric high tree of this alliance.
– "The revolution in Syria is against the oppressive Syrian regime," Morsi proclaimed in Tehran, prompting a walk-out by the Syrian delegation. On the other hand, however, a few days ago the Egyptian president suggested a new contact group on Syria including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran. (After Turkey reportedly threw a fit, joined by saber-rattling France and Britain, Morsi is rumored to be looking for new contact group members.)
– The million-dollar question is whether Morsi would be willing to send the Egyptian military into Syria down the line – if not as part of an intervention that may shape up, perhaps as a peace-keeping mission in the event of a government implosion.
– Given the many domestic problems Egypt faces, such an action may seem somewhat counter-intuitive, and at this stage is almost entirely in the realm of speculation. However, there are some less obvious benefits from it, and given the urgent situation both Morsi and his international interlocutors find themselves in, it could make a lot of sense. Egypt, being the largest Arab country with a majority Sunni Muslim population and long-standing ties with Syria, would perhaps be the most welcome peacekeeper by the Syrian people themselves.
– Firstly, as any contractor knows, doing the work others are reluctant to do can be economically lucrative – even more so if the "others" need it done badly. According to the most recent reports, it might take tens of thousands of troops just to meaningfully secure the feared Syrian chemical and biological weapons stockpiles. Counteracting radical jihadists among the rebels and die-hard remnants of the regime would be even more difficult.
– Secondly, this could be a good way for Morsi to keep the troublesome Egyptian military occupied elsewhere than at home. Despite his veritable coup d’etat of two weeks ago (see A Brotherhood coup in Egypt, Asia Times Online, August 14, 2012), the Egyptian president is hardly secure in his newly acquired dominance over the army.
– Besides, given the truly grave domestic problems Egypt faces, a demonstration of military prowess and a boost to Egyptian national prestige could go a long way to distract the masses. The Romans perhaps had it right – bread and spectacles – and if both could come in a single strike, Morsi might be tempted.
– Thirdly, a direct Egyptian involvement in Syria, if accompanied by the right diplomacy, could turn Egypt into the best-placed negotiator between the West and Iran. US President Barack Obama would be elated to showcase Morsi as a success story of "leading from behind," especially were this to happen before the elections in November.
– The Iranians would be dependent on Cairo for their future influence in Damascus and the Levant.
– Even Russia, China and Saudi Arabia, each with its own agenda, might be brought on board; while Turkey would likely be the most upset, absent its own military muscle, it may have little choice but to go along.
– Syria, in fact, could become a test case for negotiations on other issues such as the Iranian nuclear program. Just where such talks would go is another question, but for now both sides seem to have an interest in negotiating, while Egypt could gain much by becoming the principal go-between.
– Morsi’s diplomatic overtures in China and Iran, preceded by a trip to Saudi Arabia and followed by a planned visit in the United States next month, would certainly aid such a bid.
– Another area of frantic Egyptian activity recently has been the Sinai peninsula and the Israeli-Palestinian diplomatic scene.
– Some Israeli observers claim that the ongoing rocket fire from Gaza into southern Israel – a rocket struck a house in the town of Sderot on Friday morning, luckily without causing any injuries – is a response to the on-again off-again Egyptian military operation in the Sinai and a warning to Cairo not to seek the extradition of three Palestinians allegedly involved in the terror attack earlier this month which claimed the lives of 17 Egyptian soldiers.
– By threatening to cause trouble with Israel, the argument goes, the militants are telling Cairo to hold off or risk ending up on the same side as Israel in a violent confrontation in Gaza. The latter would be unpalatable to Morsi due to the overwhelming anti-Israeli public sentiment in Egypt. (Click here to watch a media adviser to the Muslim Brotherhood accuse Israel of bringing "cancer, hepatitis and kidney infections" to Egypt. Compare with the following allegation that Israel sent a shark to ruin Egypt’s tourist industry two years ago.)
– Moreover, from all the different bargaining tracks among Palestinians and Israelis in which Egypt is involved – Hamas is looking for a new foreign base, the Palestinian Authority is looking to preserve its political positions, Israel is looking for security – several recent developments are worth mentioning. After a brief public spat with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, Hamas refrained from attending the NAM summit on the invitation of Iran. Abbas, on his part, announced that he would not renew the Palestinian bid for statehood next month.
The latter development would suit both the US – whose president, whatever his intentions, would find it hard to support the Palestinians in the run up to the election – and Hamas, which rejects any territorial concessions inherent in the bid. It remains to be seen if the intra-Palestinian reconciliation talks will be revived, as Morsi has vowed to do in the past.
– Perhaps most important right now, however, is the status of the border crossing between Egypt and Gaza at the town of Rafah. After a prolonged closure, Egypt first tentatively opened the crossing in May last year, allowing a trickle of human traffic to go through every day.
– Morsi, a former Muslim Brotherhood leader with relatively close ties to Hamas in Gaza, expanded the use of Rafah soon after his victory in the presidential elections this summer, but following the August 5 terror attack closed it again. Most recently, Reuters reported last Sunday that Rafah had reopened once more.
– If the border crossing between Egypt and Gaza remains open indefinitely – as seems likely to happen – this would officially put an end to the Israeli blockade on the strip. Moreover, since Gaza is not economically sustainable by itself, most analysts agree that once the crossing opens, an increasing Egyptian involvement there would be inevitable.
– The strip would begin to legally import fuel and various supplies (as opposed to using underground tunnels for smuggling, as in the past few years), perhaps also electricity, and in a few months or years it may even begin to use Egypt’s ports in order to export the food it grows. Whether or not it would preserve its political independence from Cairo, Gaza would become increasingly integrated into the Egyptian economy, and this would be a major transformation in the region.
– The Israeli analysts are ambivalent about this scenario. Some worry about it, claiming that it would make any military operation in Gaza in the future exceedingly difficult and would grant a degree of impunity to Gaza militants seeking to provoke Israel with terror. On the other hand, however, Jerusalem would have considerably fewer responsibilities in Gaza, and would be able to essentially dump the strip on Egypt. In the event that the two-state solution collapses, Gaza’s integration into Egypt would become a major strategic asset for the Jewish State, which might then attempt to similarly transfer the West Bank to Jordanian responsibility.
Overall, it is clear that Egypt is stirring, not only at home, but also abroad, and it appears that the NAM summit in Tehran witnessed one of its early attempts to navigate between the major geopolitical camps in the Middle East. Many possibilities remain open, and while there are few certainties on the Nile these days, we can expect the effects of Cairo’s shifts in course to be profound.
1. Execution awaits the Non-Aligned Summit, Foreign Policy, August 29, 2012
2. Morsy scores US$4.9 bn in investments on China trip, Egypt Independent, August 29, 2012
Victor Kotsev is a journalist and political analyst.