L'Iran sposta completamente l'attenzione sull'Irak

Sami Moubayed, analista politico siriano

Tesi:

●    Esisterebbe un accordo segreto tra USA e Iran: gli USA danno mano libera all’Iran in Irak, a condizione che non danneggi gli interessi americani, l’Iran deve però abbandonare i suoi procuratori in Libano e Palestina.

o   Questo spiegherebbe perché gli americani, che governano di fatto l’Irak, tollerano l’influenza iraniana, l’ingresso teatrale di Ahmadinejad in Irak, mentre la nave da guerra americana USS Cole di stanza in acque libanesi minaccia Hezbollah, e Israele bombarda i palestinesi e Hamas.

●    Un tale accordo spiegherebbe la recente cooperazione dell’Iran alla sicurezza in Irak, migliorata a Baghdad del 77%, e come riconosciuto da Maliki in parte grazie all’aiuto iraniano per il controllo dei confini, e all’arresto delle operazioni militari dell’Esercito del Mahdi ordinato da Muqtada.

●    Tehran teme che i suoi alleati in Libano, Hezbollah, e Palestina, Hamas, abbiano i giorni contati, e che perciò non gli siano più utili; sta cercando alternative sciite nel mondo arabo, gli sciiti iracheni, l’ultima opzione rimasta per estendere l’influenza iraniana nei paesi arabi:

o   Hezbollah non può più fare guerra a Israele a seguito della risoluzione ONU 1701 che ha posto fine alla guerra contro Israele nel Sud Libano e che ha portato le truppe ONU nel paese, e Hamas dopo il suo fallimento di governo dal 2006 e la conquista di Gaza del 2007.

o   Teme inoltre che alla guerra di Gaza si aggiunga, prima della fine 2008, una guerra in Libano, come farebbero pensare il cacciatorpediniere americano – chiamato secondo gli iraniani dal primo ministro libanese Siniora e appoggiato dal consigliere saudita alla sicurezza nazionale, Bandar Bin Sultan – e l’appello dell’Arabia saudita ai suoi concittadini ad evacuare il Libano.

– Le ragioni di una guerra in Libano:

o   1. Per poter negoziare con i palestinesi, il primo ministro israeliano Olmert deve riacquistare legittimazione davanti agli israeliani.

o   2. Perché la coalizione 14 Marzo, appoggiata dai sauditi, vinca gli USA devono togliere dal campo da Hezbollah, unico ostacolo al predominio del gruppo attorno al miliardario saudita Saad Hariri e di 14 Marzo.

o   Una guerra civile in Libano non annienterebbe Hezbollah, ma lo distrarrebbe dal suo obiettivo primario, la guerra contro Israele.

o   In Iran c’è chi pensa che l’uccisione del comandante di Hezbollah, Imad Mughniyah, servisse ad Israele per provocare un’operazione di vendetta di Hezbolah, come già fece nel 1992 e nel 1994 (uccisione di Abbas al-Mussawi à attacco all’ambasciata israeliana di Buenos Aires; cattura israeliana di Mustapha al-Drani, membro di Amal e filo Hezbollah à attacco alla Associazione mutua Argentina-Israele di Buenos Aires).

o   Altra ipotesi degli arabi: Israele sfrutta l’attacco di Hamas a Gerusalemme della scorsa settimana come pretesto per un’altra guerra contro Hezbollah (precedente del 1982, fallito assassinio del’ambasciatore israeliano a Londra da parte di Abu Nidal (Sabri al-Banna), che Israele sapeva non ordinato dall’OLP, ma che gli servì per giustificare la guerra presso il segretario di Stato americano, Alexander Haig).

– Un analista iraniano: l’Iran pensa che gli USA puntino ad ottenere il più possibile dall’Iran, non forzatamente con la guerra; sanno che un aggressione che non annienti il regime iraniano lo rafforzerebbe. Gli iraniani hanno cercato di creare contraddizioni in Irak, in attesa che gli Usa fossero costretti a chiedere il loro aiuto per controllare il paese, su modello della Siria in Libano nel 1976.

– Questo potrebbe essere un desiderio di Ahmadinejad, ma gli USA non chiederanno mai all’Iran di inviare loro truppe in Irak … preferirebbero in ultima istanza rivolgersi a Siria o Arabia Saudita.

 

– Soprattutto la stampa araba saudita non ha mostrato entusiasmo per la visita del presidente iraniano Ahmadinejad – su invito ufficiale del governo iracheno in Irak – dove è riuscito ad avere un peso non conquistato dagli arabi.

– Con questa visita l’Iran dichiara pubblicamente che è esso a predominare in Irak accanto agli USA, non l’Arabia Saudita; l’Irak post-Saddam è stato una benedizione per i mullah iraniani, che possono esercitare la propria influenza tramite leader filo-iraniani,

Asia Times      080311                      

Middle East     Mar 11, 2008

Iran shifts focus fully on Iraq

By Sami Moubayed, Syrian political analyst

DAMASCUS –

–   The Arab press covered, with mild enthusiasm, the visit of Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad to Iraq. One reason was Arab preoccupation with the Israeli war on Gaza. Another reason was embarrassment. The Arabs, mainly the Saudi press that dominates Arab media, were ashamed that they had failed to establish the same kind of dominating presence that Iran enjoys in war-torn, oil-rich Iraq.

–   By showing up in Baghdad, Ahmadinejad ended all speculation on who rules contemporary Iraq, along with the Americans. It certainly is not Saudi Arabia. The Iranians say it publicly; post-Saddam Hussein Iraq has been a blessing for the mullahs of Tehran.

–   What was once the stronghold for obstructing Shi’itification is now a stepping stone for the Iranians to export the Islamic Revolution of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, through pro-Iran leaders like Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, Shi’ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, Abdul-Aziz Hakim, leader of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and the Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani. These were the leaders with whom Ahmadinejad met during his visit to Baghdad this month. The Lebanese weekly al-Kifah al-Arabi raised the question, "Was the Iranian president meeting Iraqi officials, or was he conferring with another Mahmud Ahmadinejad?"

To the horror of many Arabs, the only leaders who have dared venture into Baghdad since 2003 are President George W Bush and Ahmadinejad. There are differences, however, between the two visits. Bush lands in Iraq "suddenly" and leaves without notice. His visits are sporadic and never official, in a state-to-state definition.

For security reasons, he never has the luxury of spending a night in Iraq. Ahmadinejad came in broad daylight, with an official agenda agreed to well in advance, and spent the night in Baghdad. Bush comes with no prior appointment; Ahmadinejad comes at the official request of the Iraqi government. Symbolically for the Americans, the American [Iranian N.d.T.] leader refused to stay in the Green Zone, which is under US control, but rather, stayed at the home of his Iraqi counterpart, Jalal Talabani. He seemed to be saying: "Regardless of reality, I still refuse to accept American control of my own backyard."

The only similarity is that both are greeted by Sunni demonstrators who feel neglected and persecuted by post-Saddam Iraq. Bush’s visits to Iraq aim at negotiating current policy, and inspecting US troops. Bush is interested in Iraq as long as his tenure lasts at the White House. Bush’s interests, therefore, end in January 2009. Ahmadinejad’s aims are more futuristic; he seeks a long-term extension of Iranian influence to the Arab world, via Iraq, and the empowerment of fellow Shi’ites.

A secret deal?

–   One issue that puzzles the Sunni Arab mind and raises eyebrows in the Arab Gulf is if the Americans are the de facto rulers of Iraq, why then are they turning a blind eye to Iranian influence in Iraq? How can the Iranians make such a grand appearance in Baghdad while the USS Cole is stationed in Lebanese waters, directly threatening Hezbollah, and while Israeli planes are bombing the Palestinians and Hamas, who are another Iranian proxy in the Arab world?

True, both the White House and the US State Department have been very articulate about Iranian meddling in Iraqi affairs, but they have still done nothing to end it.

–   Some speculate that some kind of under-the-table deal has been made between Washington and Tehran. This "deal" is believed to be: we the Americans give you a free hand in Iraq (provided that you do not harm our interests) while you abandon your proxies in Lebanon and Palestine.

–   This might explain why Iran has recently cooperated at bringing more security to Iraq. According to Maliki, there has been a 77% improvement in security conditions in Baghdad. The Iraqi government admits that part of this is due to direct Iranian cooperation through border control, along with the "freeze" on the military activity of the Mahdi Army of Muqtada.

–   Both ways, Iran gets the credit for relative calm, through its proxies, in Iraq. One Iranian analyst observed: "Iran still believes that it has the luxury of time on its side. They think that the US is not really interested in war but want maximum results from the Iranians, without war. They know that any US attack that does not break the Iranian regime will only make it stronger." He adds, "For years, they used their influence to create havoc in Iraq, waiting for the minute when the US becomes so desperate that it calls on Iran to help control Iraq, a-la Syria in Lebanon-1976."

–   This means, the Iranians are waiting for the Americans to invite them to send troops to Iraq to help bring security. The Iranians, after all, know the terrain well. They are bound to Iraqi Shi’ites by religion and geographical proximity, in addition to inter-marriage, customs and history, just like the Syrians were to the Lebanese when they sent their army into Lebanon in 1976.

–   This theory might be on Ahmadinejad’s mind, but it would be madness to believe that the Americans will even consider such an option, with so much luggage on their shoulders in US-Iranian relations. They would rather talk to other parties, like the Syrians or Saudi Arabians, than plead to the Iranians for such assistance.

–   The first theory sounds more reasonable, being that for now, the Iranians agreed to turn a blind eye to their proxies in the Arab world, in exchange for a free hand in Iraq.There is considerable alarm in Iran that the days of Hezbollah and Hamas are numbered. Both parties have outlived their usefulness, Hezbollah after the passing of UN Resolution 1701 that brought about the end of the war against Israel in southern Lebanon in 2006 and Hamas after its failed experience in government since 2006 and the seizure of Gaza in 2007.

–   There is also concern that in addition to the current war in Gaza, an upcoming one is in the horizon in Lebanon. The Iranians have watched, with great alarm, the arrival of the USS Cole in Lebanese waters, and Saudi Arabia’s call on all citizens to evacuate Lebanon. The Iranians believe that the US destroyer was called into Lebanon by Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad al-Siniora and backed by Saudi National Security Advisor Bandar Bin Sultan. As far as the Americans are concerned, the war between Israel and Hezbollah, which ended in August 2006, is not over.

–   Iran knows this and is preparing for the worst, expected before the end of 2008.

–   First, none of the declared objectives of that war (the release of the two Israeli soldiers, and demolishing Hezbollah) was achieved. With such a record, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert cannot possibly conduct a peace treaty with the Palestinians. He needs to polish his image in the eyes of ordinary Israelis, to regain legitimacy, before talking peace with the Arabs.

–   Second, for the Saudi-backed March 14 Coalition to succeed, the Americans need to get rid of Hezbollah. They are the only serious obstacle to the dominance of the Sunni billionaire politician Saad Hariri team and March 14 in Lebanese politics.For the Iranians, this places Hezbollah in a tight situation.

–   They can no longer wage war against the Israelis, due to the Security Council resolution and the stationing of UN troops in the country. A civil war in Lebanon would not destroy Hezbollah, but would certainly distract it from its original objective, being war with Israel. If there is a new stage of hostility between Israel and Hezbollah, this time the Israelis are more prepared for the Lebanese guerillas, sending red sirens to Tehran.

Shi’ite future and Persian worries

–   When Hezbollah commander Imad Mughniyah was assassinated in Damascus in February, some in Iran believed that Israel wanted to provoke Hezbollah into a revenge operation. That would give Israel all the pretext it needed to launch a new war on Lebanon, this time with more intelligence and better strategy.

The Israelis have studied and observed Hassan Nasrallah well since he became secretary general of Hezbollah in 1992. When they killed his predecessor, Abbas al-Musawi, he responded with an attack at the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, where 29 people were killed. In May 1994, Israeli commandos penetrated into Lebanon and captured Mustapha al-Dirani, a pro-Hezbollah member of Amal. An infuriated Nasrallah responded in July with another attack at the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association in Buenos Aires. He was certainly going to do the same for Imad Mughniyah, and Nasrallah was very public about it on February 14 during the funeral of his slain comrade.

–   Another scenario floating in the Arab world is that the Israelis will use the Hamas attack that took place in Jerusalem last week as a pretext for another war on Hezbollah. Israel has done it in the past when, in 1982, a terrorist militia headed by the notorious Sabri al-Banna (Abu Nidal) tried and failed to assassinate Shlomo Argov, the Israeli ambassador to London.

–   Then-Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin was clearly informed that Abu Nidal (who was actually an opponent to Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat) was not operating under orders from the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). It did not really matter to him; it was the perfect pretext he had been searching for to justify his upcoming war before then-US secretary of state Alexander Haig.

Rafael Eitan, the Israel Defense Forces commander, famously said, "Abu Nidal … Abu Shmidal … I don’t know, we need to screw the PLO." And today, regardless of whether or not Hezbollah did it, the Israelis "need to screw Hezbollah".

–   This means that Ahmadinejad must be on the lookout for Shi’ite alternatives in the Arab world. Hamas is no longer a good bet, leaving one option, being Iraqi Shi’ites. They are the only ones left who can serve as an extension of Iranian influence into the Arab world.

Bush has promised one more visit to Iraq before his term expires in 2008. Ahmadinejad will like make many more.

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