La Comunità Economica Euroasiatica (EEC) e l’Organizzazione Collettiva di Sicurezza del Commercio (CSTO) si sono rinforzate. La Russia sembra pensare alla trasformazione del CSTO nell’ala politico-militare dell’EEC.
- Il presidente Putin, in un informale summit a Sochi, ha sottolineato il nuovo stadio di integrazione in corso nell’area post-sovietica. Erano presenti i 6membri dell’EEC che comprende Russia Bielorussia Kazakistan Uzbekistan Kirghizistan e Tagikistan mentre Armenia e Ucraina erano presenti come "osservatori".
- La Comunità Economica Euroasiatica (EEC) e l’Organizzazione Collettiva di Sicurezza del Commercio (CSTO) si sono rinforzate. La Russia sembra pensare alla trasformazione del CSTO nell’ala politico-militare dell’EEC.
- La decisione dell’Uzbekistan di entrare a far parte dell’EEC e quella successiva di tornare nel CSTO, insieme al collasso della coalizione arancione in Ucraina, hanno dato una spinta al processo di integrazione che la Russia stava cercando. Essenzialmente gli stati post-sovietici, tacitamente incoraggiati da Washington ad applicare "meccanismi di rottura che avrebbero sovvertito la Csi dal di dentro, soprattutto Georgia Moldavia e Azerbaigian, sono stati emarginati, mentre gli altri sono preparati ad andare oltre.
- La conseguenza più a lungo termine del summit sarà un’unione doganale dei paesi membri dell’EEC: ciò potrebbe accadere entro la seconda metà del 2008.
- Secondo il presidente del Kazakistan Nazarbayev entro Novembre l’unione comprenderà Russia Kazakistan e Bielorussia. L’asse Russia-Kazakistan forma potenzialmente un nucleo importante nell’area post-sovietica.
- Oltre ad armonizzare la propria legislazione con quella degli altri paesi, i membri dell’EEC sono obbligati ad allineare la propria legislazione con le necessità del WTO se vogliono entrare nell’organizzazione. Mosca ha sventato l’obiettivo degli Usa di isolare i piani di integrazione regionali della Russia bloccandone l’ammissione al WTO. Dall’altra parte Mosca sta creando una sua posizione privilegiata nell’Asia Centrale che gli Usa difficilmente potranno contrastare.
- Il summit dell’EEC ha dichiarato anche la formazione di un consorzio idroelettrico, cruciale per l’Asia Centrale.
Allo stesso tempo il Kazakistan è stato oggetto di visita da parte di alcuni rappresentanti degli Usa, mentre una visita del presidente Nazarbayev negli Usa è già in agenda.
In Asia Centrale esiste il problema dell’acqua in quanto il Kirghizistan e il Tagiikistan contano per circa l’80% delle risorse d’acqua della regione, mentre il Kazakistan e l’Uzbekistan ne sono anche i maggiori consumatori.
La Russia ha suggerito che il consorzio fosse finanziato dalla Banca Euroasiatica russa e dal Kazakhistan.
- Intanto gli Usa si sono proposti come leader in una cooperativa per lo sviluppo dell’Asia Centrale che vedrebbe i 5 paesi dell’Asia Centrale e l’Afghanistan come principali membri e i paesi dell’Asia Meridionale, India e Pakistan, come partecipanti.
Nella conferenza internazionale di Giugno organizzata da Washington sulla cooperazione energetica tra Asia Centrale e Asia Meridionale, i partecipanti dei paesi centrali sono stati sensibilizzati riguardo ad una possibile alternativa alla Organizzazione di Cooperazione di Shanghai (SCO) che aumenterebbe l’impulso verso una cooperazione regionale.
- Washington evidentemente conta su Nuova Delhi e Kabul come partner nell’Asia Centrale: l’Afghanistan come canale importante tra Asia Centrale e Sud Asia, l’India come alleata strategica in Sud Asia contrapposta alla Cina.
Washinton conta inoltre sull’India per sostegni energetici dall’Asia Centrale, facendo leva sulla paura dell’India nei confronti dell’espansione cinese verso l’Asia Centrale, senza contare la soddisfazione degli Usa per un’inevitabile tensione nei rapporti dell’India con Russia e Cina, che erano prima amichevoli.
L’India si è inoltre recentemente "riappacificata" con l’Uzbekistan, paese chiave nell’Asia Centrale con cui gli Usa avevano avuto profonde difficoltà nell’ultimo periodo.
- Washington vede in questa politica una rottura dell’Asia Centrale con la Russia e con la SCO, politica che proporrebbe gli Usa come potenza dominante nel Sud e Centro dell’Asia.
- Nel People’s Daily viene sottolineato il pericolo di conflitto con la Russia causato dall’esportazione degli Usa di energia dal Centro al Sud dell’Asia, anche a causa del controllo ridotto degli Usa sull’Afghanistan.
- Col summit di Sochi è stata posta la questione della divisione dell’acqua e della produzione idroelettrica: il consorzio idroelettrico Euroasiatico estrometterebbe Washington dall’arena della cooperazione dell’Asia Centrale coi mercati cinesi, pakistani e indiani.
- Su un giornale delle forza armate russe è stato scritto che la Russia ha ormai iniziato la sua "conquista" in Asia Centrale e che deve continuare in questa direzione aumentando la sua influenza economica militare politica, per contrastare quella americana..
- Al di là dell’aver ricevuto durante il G8 l’appoggio della Cina alla sua posizione sulla sicurezza energetica, Mosca è soprattutto soddisfatta della convergenza di prospettive con Pechino riguardo all’influenza nell’A.C.
By M K Bhadrakumar
When President Vladimir Putin in his State of the Union speech last
year called the collapse of the Soviet Union "the greatest
geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century", cold warriors on both
sides of the Atlantic pounced on the statement as fresh evidence of
Russia’s imperial ambitions.
Very few were prepared to accept Putin’s statement at face value – a
powerful articulation of an incontrovertible fact from the Russian point of view. The fact remains that half a million Soviet
citizens perished during the painful transition, and 50 million
people were displaced. Last week, on the anniversary of the August
19 coup that led to the disbandment of the Soviet Union, public
opinion in Russia looked back at the events 15 years ago as a crude
power struggle devoid of any high principles.
Today, even former Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev acknowledges,
"Things certainly needed to change, but we did not need to destroy
that which had been built by previous generations … The
dissolution of a country that was not only powerful but which,
during perestroika [restructuring], demonstrated that it was
peaceful and that it accepted the basic principles of democracy,
would be a tragedy."
It is no mere coincidence that Putin chose last week for hosting an
"informal" summit at the Russian leader’s summer residence in the
Black Sea resort of Sochi, heralding a qualitatively new stage in
the integration processes at work in the post-Soviet space. Of
course, the participants – the leaders of the six-member Eurasian
Economic Community (EEC) comprising Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as well as of Armenia and
Ukraine attending as "observers" – clearly realized that the Soviet
Union lay buried in the heap of history and was irretrievable.
Equally, they sensed that a chapter of post-Soviet history was
quietly closing and a new one commencing. None in Sochi was talking
about any revival of the Soviet Union, but to quote a Russian
political observer, those present at the Black Sea resort also
couldn’t overlook anymore that "it’s not easy to go it alone, and
it’s worth remembering the past".
The process of winding down the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS) is almost complete. As Putin said last year during a visit to
Yerevan, Armenia, the CIS had served its purpose of facilitating the
divorce among the post-Soviet states. The Sochi summit indicates
that out of the debris of the plethora of CIS mechanisms, Russia is
singling out just two forums for carrying forward the impulses of
integration in the period ahead: the EEC and the Collective Security
Treaty Organization (CSTO).
In a way, EEC and CSTO are mutually reinforcing. The Russian
thinking seems to be that the CSTO will in effect be transformed
into the politico-military wing of the EEC. At Sochi, Putin touched
on this when he said, "You cannot advance the economy without first
ensuring security."
Uzbekistan’s decision early this year to join the EEC and its
subsequent decision to return to the fold of the CSTO have given a
significant boost to the integration processes that Russia has been
seeking. What is taking place, in essence, is that the post-Soviet
states that have been tacitly encouraged by Washington to apply
"breaking mechanisms" on the path of the integration processes so as
to subvert the CIS from within – principally, Georgia, Moldova and
Azerbaijan – are being quietly sidelined, while the others are
preparing to move forward.
Ukraine falls in a category by itself. In fact, a significant point
about the Sochi summit was the presence of Ukraine’s pro-Russia
prime minister, Viktor Yanukovich. To be sure, there is a hint
somewhere that with the collapse of the "orange" coalition in Kiev,
Russia hopes to involve Ukraine in deeper integration, and
Yanukovich himself may have meaningfully scheduled his first visit
to Russia after assuming office this month to coincide with the EEC
summit in Sochi.
The most far-reaching outcome of the Sochi summit would be to
implement on a priority basis a long-standing objective to set up a
customs union of the EEC member countries. Speaking at a press
conference after the summit, Putin announced that steps would be
taken within the next three months to put in place the legal
foundation for establishing a customs union. The indications are
that realistically speaking, the modalities of establishment of the
customs union will be complete by the second half of 2008.
According to Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, by November, the
customs union will have taken place comprising Russia, Kazakhstan
and Belarus, while the other EEC members may join in the next
18-month period or so. It is a dramatic gain for Russia to have
reached such a high level of integration with Kazakhstan. The
Moscow-Astana axis potentially forms a formidable core within the
post-Soviet space. Russia has in effect rebuffed the US strategy of
making inroads into its ties with Kazakhstan.
Astana has been a frequent destination for US dignitaries in the
recent months, including Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice and Energy Secretary Sam Boden. A visit by
Nazarbayev to the US is in the cards. Of late, US officials have
openly singled out Kazakhstan for flattering, fulsome praise in the
hope of playing on Astana’s perceived vanities as a geopolitical
fulcrum.
Furthermore, Russia has hit back at the US for the latter’s delaying
tactic apropos its membership in the World Trade Organization by
getting the Sochi summit to agree that the integration within the
EEC and the accession of its members to the WTO should be harmonized
until the establishment of the customs union. In real terms, Russia
is counting on the customs union being assigned the role of an
alternative to the WTO.
Putin emphasized this point at the Sochi summit. He said the
ambitions of the EEC member countries to join the WTO should be
coordinated with regional integration plans. "Our intentions to
deepen cooperation within the framework of the EEC, including the
setting up of a customs union, should be clearly and precisely
coordinated with the pace and details of WTO accession by each of
our countries," Putin added.
What this means is that apart from harmonizing their customs
legislation within the EEC, the member countries are obliged to
bring their legislation in line with WTO requirements if they are to
join the organization. Moscow has, at the very least, thwarted any
US design to isolate Russia’s regional integration plans by means of
stalling its WTO membership. On the outer side, Russia is placing
itself in a privileged position in Central Asia that the US will
find impossible to breach.
Eyes on the energy market
However, it is the common energy market in Central Asia taking shape
within the ambit of the EEC that will alter the region’s geopolitics
in the immediate term. The EEC summit deliberated on the formation
of a hydropower consortium, which is crucial for Central Asia.
The proposal was so sensitive that the summit kept this part of its
deliberations confidential. Obviously, sensitivities cut across
different levels. First, there is an acute "water problem" in
Central Asia insofar as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan account for about
80% of the region’s water resources, while Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan
are the main users.
In the absence of the Soviet-era common economic system, the
apportioning of water resources and, more important, the maintenance
and use of water resources (and the financial outlay for sustaining
the same) pose problems.
In spring, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan receive an excess flow of water
from the Pamir glaciers and need to get rid of this, whereas the
farms and cotton fields in Uzbekistan and Uzbekistan need more water
in summer, during which the catchment facilities also need to store
water for the normal operation of power plants in winter.
The EEC seems to have taken the first steps in the direction of
evolving a technologically and economically powerful system for
addressing the interconnected problems of water distribution and the
development of hydropower infrastructure for the region. From the
details available, Russia has suggested the creation of a hydropower
consortium financed by the Eurasian Bank of Russia and Kazakhstan.
Significantly, the Russian proposal has appeared at a time when the
US has waded into the region with its so-called "Great Central Asia"
policy in recent months. The US strategy aims at its "re-entry" into
the Central Asian region after severe setbacks to its diplomacy in
the period under the cumulative weight of the clumsily executed
"Tulip Revolution" in Kyrgyzstan in March last year and the abortive
uprising in Andizhan in the Ferghana Valley two months thereafter.
The new US strategy professes a "cooperative partnership for
development" of Central Asia that will have the United States in the
lead, the five Central Asian states and Afghanistan co-opted as the
principal members, and South Asia (India and Pakistan) roped in as
robust participants.
The main thrust of the strategy is to take the US grip over
Afghanistan as a strategic opportunity or "bridge" for promoting
optional and flexible cooperation in security, democracy, economy,
transport and energy, and make up a new geopolitical compass by
combining Central Asia with South Asia. Washington’s new policy
brief first surfaced last October when the State Department
reorganized its South Asia Bureau and expanded it to include the
Central Asian countries.
The new strategy was fleshed out in great detail during a
congressional hearing on April 25-26 in Washington. In June,
virtually in the run-up to the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO), Washington organized an international conference
at Istanbul called "Electricity Beyond Borders" for discussing
energy cooperation between Central Asia and South Asia. The Central
Asian representatives who participated were sensitized at the
conference that a viable alternative to the SCO was indeed available
for them for advancing the impulses of regional cooperation.
The US strategy must be seen against the backdrop of the
unprecedented expansion of US influence in South Asia in the period
post-September 11, 2001, especially in India. Washington is
evidently counting on New Delhi and Kabul as its critical partners
in the "Great Central Asia" policy. Afghanistan is geographically an
important channel connecting Central Asia with South Asia. As
regards India, Washington has been focusing on New Delhi as its key
strategic ally in South Asia and as a counterweight to China.
The "Great Central Asia" policy plays on New Delhi’s manifest
aspiration (with indifferent results so far) through the past 15
years to be an effective participant as a great power in the affairs
of Central Asia.
Furthermore, Washington is counting on New Delhi’s keenness to
secure energy supplies from Central Asia and is playing on the
atavistic fears in sections of Indian opinion as regards China’s
rapidly expanding influence in Central Asia. Equally, Washington is
acutely conscious that today like at no time before, there is also a
willingness in New Delhi to bend Indian foreign policy orientations
to "harmonize" with the United States’ geostrategies.
In the case of the "Great Central Asia" policy, in the event of it
succeeding, Washington could also derive immense satisfaction that
India’s traditionally friendly relations with Russia and its
increasingly cordial ties with China would inevitably come under
immense strain. The fact remains that Central Asia lies in the first
circle of security interests for both Russia and China, and these
two countries cannot be expected to take lying down any US ingresses
into their strategic back yard.
The indications are that New Delhi (in contrast with Islamabad,
which is somehow still persisting with its policy of forging ever
closer links with the SCO) is seriously considering the
opportunities offered by the US policy toward Central Asia. India
was the only participant to keep a low-key representation at the SCO
summit in June. Lately, India initiated some fence-mending with
Uzbekistan, a key country in Central Asia with which the US has had
profound difficulties in the recent period.
Moreover, New Delhi just hosted a visit by Emomali Rakhmonov,
president of Tajikistan, which is fast emerging as a new theater of
the Great Game – a country that is being assiduously courted by
Washington and encouraged to place distance in its relations with
Russia. (Indeed, a major item during Rakhmonov’s visit devolved on
Indian participation in Tajikistan’s hydropower projects.)
Obviously, in geopolitical terms, the United States’ "Great Central
Asia" policy aims at crafting the sinews of cooperation in the areas
of energy, transportation and infrastructure construction with a
view to bringing the region out of the current orbit of
Russian-Chinese influence within the SCO framework and to forge
cooperative relations between the region and South Asia. Washington
calculates that the policy will inevitably break the long-term
Russian influence over Central Asia, disintegrate the cohesion of
the SCO and, inevitably, catapult the US as the dominant power on
the new template of Central Asia and South Asia.
Both China and Russia can be expected to counter the United States’
"Great Central Asia" policy. The People’s Daily concluded an
unusually lengthy and detailed commentary on the subject recently
with the following assessment:
Magnificent as it appears, the "Greater Central Asia" strategy
will have to face some practical problems in its implementation.
For historical and cultural reasons, Central Asian and South Asian
countries lack a basic sense of [mutual] identification and
experience in in-depth cooperation. The mutual trust between India
and Pakistan is not enough for implementing large-scale,
cross-border infrastructure projects.
Afghanistan is the most critical "pawn" in the US strategy. But
currently, the US and the Afghan government exercise very little
control over the situation in Afghanistan … The "Great Central
Asia" policy strategy visualizes most major transport
infrastructure and pipelines passing through Afghanistan. The
risks are too high.
An important part of the US strategy is to export the energy from
Central Asia to South Asia. However, the total energy reserves and
the current exploitation capacity in the Central Asian region are
quite limited. A large part of it is under control of Russia. To
export energy to the South Asian countries will inevitably cause
conflict with Russia.
The EEC summit’s energy initiative, especially the decision on
forming a hydropower consortium, will no doubt be seen in Washington
as aimed at frustrating the "Great Central Asia" strategy. Actually,
it may be an accurate reading of the emerging equations. The EEC
decision, if it carries momentum, ensures a watery grave for the
desperate US attempts to make a forceful comeback in the geopolitics
of Central Asia.
From available details, the Sochi summit has moved in the direction
of bringing the issues of water-sharing and hydropower generation
within the framework of EEC cooperation. A wide-ranging plan was
apparently discussed at Sochi to manage the region’s water
resources. (Russia itself possesses one-quarter of the world’s
freshwater resources.)
The Eurasian hydropower consortium will summarily kick Washington
out of the arena of Central Asia’s regional cooperation with the
Chinese, Pakistani and Indian markets. Coupled with the formidable
Russian presence in the Central Asian region’s oil-and-gas sector,
the consortium idea can be expected to give massive geopolitical
momentum to Moscow’s policy.
The influential daily newspaper of the Russian armed forces,
Krasnaya Zvezda, recently wrote:
Over the past 12-18 months, Russia has gone on the offensive in
Central Asia … Our country is making a comeback to the region
but it’s coming back as a reliable economic partner, not as a
politically dominating force. As economists describe, banks are
better than tanks … But "tanks" should not be overlooked either.
Russia remains the leading supplier of arms and military hardware
to Central Asian countries, much of it at concessional prices. The
overwhelming majority of the officer corps is trained in Russia.
Moreover, there are the CSTO and the SCO … In other words,
Central Asian states are still within the orbit of Russia’s
political, military-political and economic influence. And Russia
must not stop here; it needs to continue building up its influence
in all areas of activity.
One reason to do this is for minimizing the possibility of any
further American military facilities being established in Central
Asia, no matter what they are called – be it "training centers"
for military personnel, points for monitoring drug-trafficking
from Afghanistan or anything else. For, one way or the other, they
would be military facilities controlled by the US or NATO – our
traditional geopolitical rivals.
It is highly significant that Russia is assertively charting new
frontiers in regional energy cooperation in Central Asia, confident
in the knowledge that Moscow and Beijing are nowhere near facing a
clash of interests in this sphere. China’s support of the Russian
stance on energy security at last month’s Group of Eight summit in
St Petersburg apart, the contours of Beijing’s perspective give
satisfaction to Moscow.
Liu Jianfei, a leading professor at the International Strategic
Research Center of China’s Central Communist Party School, recently
identified the principal elements in the Chinese thinking on energy
security. He acknowledged that although energy security is treated
as a part of non-traditional issues in the global agenda, there was
no denying that it would affect the "traditional military, security
and influence in international relations". Liu illustrated this
point by saying that energy security was at the bottom of the Iran
nuclear issue.
Liu took an indirect swipe at the US for applying its reflexes of
"traditional realism" to criticize "some developing countries’
increasing energy demand". He said the specter of "energy threat"
was a contrived one based on the premise that only the developed
industrial countries were "the only eligible countries to consume
energy on the Earth. It’s irrational to ensure one’s own supply by
limiting the demand of other countries."
Liu cautioned that such a self-serving approach to energy security
would "easily trigger conflicts and undermine world peace". Almost
echoing Moscow’s stance, Liu concluded that the important point was
not to divide the existing energy market for securing the "vested
interests" of developed countries, but "how to make a bigger cake,
how to develop new energy sources and improve energy efficiency, and
how to maintain a sustainable energy development".
M K Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign
Service for more than 29 years, with postings including ambassador
to Uzbekistan (1995-98) and to Turkey (1998-2001).