Nyt 06-07-05/06
Analisi – Poche buone scelte in un vicolo cieco
DAVID E. SANGER
Tesi NYT:
– Fino
ad ora Bush non è riuscito ad imbrigliare i suoi partner perché esercito una
pressione coordinata contro il Nord Corea.
– Il
lancio dei missili rende difficile al Sud Corea continuare il programma di
aiuto e investimenti al Nord, che ha causato profonde fratture con Washington,
e gli oppositori alla linea di impegno con il Nord potrebbero accrescere il
proprio consenso nelle presidenziali del 2007;
– potrebbero
risultarne rafforzati anche i falchi americani contrari al dialogo a sei,
liberi di spingere per sanzioni crescenti contro il N-C;
– non
è per nulla certo però che la Cina, che fornisce il petrolio e gran parte del
cibo al N-C accetti una linea USA di sanzioni.
– Il
lancio dei missili nordcoreani rafforzerà probabilmente anche all’interno del
Giappone la pressione di coloro che chiedono vengano aumentati gli sforzi di
difesa missilistica assieme agli USA, e il consenso per i falchi candidati alla
successione del primo ministro Koizumi che dovrebbe ritirarsi in settembre. Il
capo-gabinetto Shinzo Abe, principale candidato alla successione ha parlato di “serio problema per la sicurezza nazionale giapponese”;
[Cronaca: Il 4 luglio
il Nord Corea ha lanciato in chiara sfida all’Amministrazione americana almeno
6 missili sul mar del Giappone compreso uno intercontinentale (Taepodong 2),
che sembra fallito dopo 42 secondi dal lancio, che sarebbe in grado di
raggiungere l’Alaska e forse la costa occidentale USA.]
Non hanno funzionato le tattiche seguite
dall’Amministrazione Bush verso il Nord Corea nei sei anni passati di
ignorarlo, e poi ci far pressione sui suoi banchieri.
La scelta attuale di Bush è più una questione di politica
interna, la sua Amministrazione ha discusso per sei anni sull’atteggiamento da
prendere verso il paese, se negoziare o cercare di far crollare il regime,
portando avanti entrambe le tattiche, ma anche di relazione con i partner
dell’America che hanno diversi interessi rispetto al futuro del NC.
La posizione assunta di recente da Russia e Cina contrarie
alle sanzioni contro il NC chieste dagli USA, e favorevoli ad azioni meno
pesanti, è l’ultimo insuccesso di una serie di tentativi americani di utilizzare
la Cina per moderare il NC.
Una linea dura USA rischia di portare all’escalation del
conflitto cinquantennale con il NC; la situazione è complicata dall’opinione
diffusa che ora il NC ha sufficiente combustibile nucleare che potrebbe vendere
a un gruppo terroristico o ad un altro paese.
Finora il NC ha solo voluto ricordare che potrebbe lanciare
missili contro seoul o il Giappone con le sue basi americane.
Il primo test di lancio di missili fu nel 1998 (fallito).
– Il
NC ricorrerebbe ai test missilistici come arma di pressione per ottenere
attenzione alle sue richieste: così nel 1994, quando fallì un accordo con
Clinton, nel 2003 con l’invio delle truppe americane in Irak, e il NC espulse
gli ispettori internazionali e ri-processarono 8000 barre spente di
combustibile.
Fu in questo frangente che ufficiali del Pentagono
suggerirono un attacco agli impianti nucleare nordcoreani, un rischio che
nessuno volle prendersi.
Nei primi mesi del suo incarico Bush rifiutò di appoggiare
la “politica del sole – sunshine policy” del Sud Corea di togliere il nord
Corea dal suo isolamento con incentivi economici. La strategia dell’isolamento
voluta da Bush non ha avuto successo, perché il NC ha continuato a produrre
plutonio.
Bush ha invertito la rotta accettando di impegnare il NC nel
dialogo a sei organizzato dalla Cina.
Bush ha scommesso che la Cina si sarebbe stancata dei tira-molla
nordcoreani; in realtà la Cina teme un Nord Corea collassato e caotico più di
quanto tema le sue armi nucleari; ma il rifiuto nordcoreano di ottemperare all’ammonimento
cinese di non lanciare missili, potrebbe irritare la Cina.
Nyt 06-07-06
News
Analysis – Few Good Choices in Standoff
By DAVID E. SANGER
–
The Bush administration has tried to ignore North Korea,
then, reluctantly, to engage it, and then to squeeze its bankers in a manner
intended to make the country’s leader, Kim Jong Il, personally feel the pinch.
–
Yet none of these steps in the
past six years has worked. So now, after a barrage of missile launchings by
North Korea, President Bush
and his national security advisers found themselves on Wednesday facing what
one close aide described as an array of "familiar bad choices."
The choices have less to do with North Korea’s newest missile — which, as Mr. Bush pointed out on Wednesday, "didn’t stay up
very long and tumbled into the sea" — than with the bigger question of whether the president is
prepared to leave office in 2009 without constraining an unpredictable dictator
who boasts about having a nuclear arsenal.
"We’re at the moment when the
president has to decide whether he wants an unconstrained, nuclear North Korea
to be part of his legacy," said Jonathan D. Pollack, a professor of Asian
and Pacific studies at the United States Naval War College who has spent much
of his career studying North Korea and its improbable strategies for survival.
"Until now, the attitude has been,
‘If the North Koreans want to stew in their own juices, let them,’ " Mr.
Pollack said. "But it’s becoming clear that Mr. Bush may leave office with
the North Korean problem much worse."
–
Dealing with North Korea has frustrated every president
since Truman. But it has proved particularly vexing for Mr. Bush because his
administration has engaged in a six-year internal argument about whether to
negotiate with the country or try to plot its collapse — it has sought
to do both, simultaneously — and because America’s partners in dealing with
North Korea each have differing interests in North Korea’s future.
–
On Wednesday, rejecting pressure from the Bush
administration, China and Russia said they would not get behind an American
drive to bring sanctions against North Korea, saying they favored less punitive
actions.
It was the latest disappointment in a string of attempts to enlist
China to help moderate the North. Still, answering questions on
Wednesday, Mr. Bush expressed no interest in dropping his objections to
one-on-one talks with the North, a government he once said he
"detests."
Another alternative for Mr. Bush would be take a hard line that
might risk an escalation of the half-century-old confrontation between
the United States and North Korea. But such a tack is now complicated by the
widespread assumption that even if the North does not have the ability to
launch a nuclear weapon, it
now probably possesses enough extra nuclear fuel that it may be tempted to sell
some to a terrorist group or another state.
That is Mr. Bush’s biggest concern, and
late last year the National Security Council ordered a study of the likelihood
that Mr. Kim, in his effort to seek attention or gain negotiating leverage,
would threaten to do it. The results, according to a senior administration
official who would not speak for attribution about intelligence matters, were
inconclusive.
But so far the North has only dared to offer reminders, like the test
firings while Americans were celebrating the Fourth of July, that it possesses
weapons that could destroy Seoul or threaten Japan, including American forces
based there. The launchings were only the second time that North Korea had
tested an intercontinental-range missile that, depending on whose
numbers one believes, could eventually hit the United States. (The last such
test launching was in 1998, and as Anthony H. Cordesman of the Center for
Strategic and International Studies put it Wednesday, "both failed
dismally.")
–
To many experts, the missile
tests fit into a pattern: whenever
Mr. Kim has concluded that he was not getting attention to his demands, he has
staged a crisis.
–
His father, Kim Il Sung, did so
in 1994, and won an agreement from the Clinton administration that later fell
apart.
–
Kim Jong Il did so in 2003, as
American troops were flowing toward Iraq, when North Korea threw out
international inspectors and reprocessed the 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods into
what the Central Intelligence Agency says is enough bomb-grade material for six
or more weapons.
At that time, top Pentagon officials
briefed Mr. Bush on his military options, including bombing the North’s nuclear
facilities. "It didn’t take very long," one official deeply involved
in that briefing said, "because it was pretty clear there wasn’t an
acceptable military option — or at least, a risk anyone was willing to
take."
But Mr. Bush came to office appearing to
have already determined that he would not negotiate, either. He often said that
he distrusted North Korea’s government and detested how Mr. Kim treated the
North Korea people. In the
first months of his presidency, he refused to endorse South Korea’s "sunshine
policy" of luring North Korea out of its shell with economic incentives.
Yet the isolation strategy ultimately failed: North Korea kept producing
plutonium.
Mr. Bush then reversed course,
reluctantly agreeing to engage with the North Koreans at a distance, through
six-nation talks convened by China and joined by Japan, South Korea and Russia.
An agreement in principle was reached in September, calling for disarmament for
security guarantees and eventual aid, but with no timetable. Even before the
ink was dry, the North Koreans were interpreting it differently than the other
signatories were.
Mr. Bush has most recently bet that
China would eventually tire of the North Korean antics and enforce some
discipline. Mr. Bush repeated that he and Jiang Zemin, China’s former leader,
had agreed that a nuclear North Korea was "unacceptable." But the reality, administration
officials acknowledge, is that China fears a collapsed and chaotic North Korea
more than it fears a nuclear-armed North Korea.
–
That could change now. The
Chinese warned the North Koreans not to fire the missiles; the fact that Mr.
Kim dismissed that warning is bound to anger China’s leaders.
–
But so far, Mr. Bush has not been able to harness his
partners into coordinated pressure on the North. If
that changes soon, at the United Nations Security Council and around the world,
it could be that the president will finally have a way forward.
New York Times
Nyt 06-07-05
Missiles
Fired by North Korea; Tests Protested
By NORIMITSU
ONISHI and DAVID E. SANGER
TOKYO, Wednesday, July 5 — North Korea test-fired at least six
missiles over the Sea of Japan on Wednesday morning, including an
intercontinental missile that apparently failed or was aborted 42 seconds after
it was launched, White House and Pentagon officials said.
The small barrage of launchings, which
took place over more than four hours, came in defiance of warnings from
President Bush and the governments of Japan, South Korea and China. Of the
launchings, which the United States and Japan condemned, intelligence officials
focused most of their attention on the intercontinental missile, called the
Taepodong 2, which American spy satellites have been watching on a remote
launching pad for more than a month.
It is designed to be capable of reaching
Alaska, and perhaps the West Coast of the United States, but American officials
who tracked its launching said it fell into the Sea of Japan before its first
stage burned out.
"The Taepodong obviously was a
failure — that tells you something about capabilities," Stephen Hadley,
President Bush’s national security adviser, told reporters in a phone call on
Tuesday evening in Washington. But other officials warned that even a failed
launching was of some use to the North Koreans, because it will help them
diagnose what went wrong with the liquid-fueled rocket.
In a statement issued late Tuesday
night, the White House said the United States "remains committed to a
peaceful diplomatic solution" and sought implementation of a joint
statement on denuclearization issued after a meeting with North Korea in
September. But it said "the North Korean regime’s actions and
unwillingness to return to the talks appears to indicate that the North has not
yet made the strategic decision to give up their nuclear programs."
"Accordingly, we will continue to
take all necessary measures to protect ourselves and our allies," the
White House said, offering no details.
The missiles have been the source of
considerable diplomatic tension in recent weeks, because of North Korea’s
declarations that it already possesses nuclear weapons. American intelligence
agencies have told President Bush they believe the North has produced enough
fuel for six or more weapons, but it is unclear whether they have actually used
it to make nuclear devices.
However, the country is not believed to
have developed a warhead small enough to fit atop one of its missiles, and it
has never conducted a nuclear test, to the knowledge of American officials.
The other missiles that the North fired
appeared to be a mix of short-range Scud-C missiles and intermediate-range
Rodong missiles, of the kind that the North has sold to Iran, Pakistan and
other nations. Those missiles also landed in the Sea of Japan.
None of the launchings were announced in
advance. But the first came just minutes after the space shuttle Discovery
lifted off in Florida — an event the North Koreans could monitor on television.
Administration officials said they could only speculate as to whether the
missile launching had been timed to coincide with the shuttle launching, or
with Independence Day, but outside analysts had little doubt.
"It’s very in your face to do it on
the Fourth of July," said Ashton B. Carter, a Harvard professor who, with
former defense secretary William J. Perry, had urged the Bush administration to
destroy the Taepodong missile on the launching pad, advice the administration
rejected.
"Hooray if it failed," Mr.
Carter said.
–
While the test itself was a
sign of North Korea’s defiance of the United States, for the administration,
the outcome was as favorable as officials could have hoped for: the North’s
capacity was called into question, and the North’s enigmatic leader, Kim Jong
Il, has now put himself at odds with the two countries that have provided him
aid, China and South Korea. "Our hope is that the Chinese are going to be
furious," said one senior American official, who declined to be
identified.
–
Another official noted that only days ago, the Chinese indicated
that they were trying to put together an "informal" meeting of the
long-dormant six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear program.
–
The North has boycotted the
talks since September, citing American efforts to close down the banks it uses
overseas.
But North Korea had apparently not
responded to the Chinese invitation, and American officials said last week that
the Chinese would not have made that gesture if they believed that they were
about to be embarrassed by the country that they once considered a close ally.
–
The launching also makes it
difficult for the South Koreans to continue their policy of providing aid and
investment to the North, a program that has caused deep rifts with Washington.
Administration officials said that Christopher R. Hill, the assistant secretary
of state for East Asia and the main negotiator with North Korea, would leave
for Asia on Wednesday, and that they expected him to use the launchings to try
to bring South Korea and China into the fold on imposing some kind of
sanctions.
–
At the same time, the launching is likely to strengthen the
hand of hard-liners in the Bush administration who have long argued that the
six-party talks were bound to fail. They now have what
one American diplomat called "a clear runway" to press for a
gradually escalating series of sanctions, which some officials clearly hope
will bring down Mr. Kim’s government.
But it is far from clear that China —
which provides the North with its oil and much of its food — would go along
with any move for sanctions.
The firing ended weeks of speculation
about the intentions of Pyongyang, which had rolled out the Taepodong 2, its
new long-range missile, in full view of American spy satellites, and came
despite severe warnings from the United States and countries in this region
that a test would entail further isolation and sanctions. The first missile was
fired around 3:30 a.m. Wednesday, according to the Japanese government.
American officials said they believe the
Taepodong 2 was the third missile fired, with the U.S. Northern Command saying
that it was launched at 5 a.m. on Wednesday.
American and Japanese officials
immediately condemned the launchings. But American officials had never
considered it a serious threat to the United States, especially because there
was no evidence the missile was equipped with a warhead. Mr. Bush’s spokesman,
Tony Snow, only went so far as to call the launching "provocative
behavior."
The Japanese government said it would
take "severe actions" against the North, possibly including economic
sanctions. Those could include shutting down the ferry service to North Korea
and attempting to stem the flow of the transfer of cash to the North from
Koreans in Japan, though officials acknowledge that would be difficult.
At the United Nations, John R. Bolton,
the United States ambassador, was "urgently consulting" with other
members of the Security Council to try to schedule a meeting of the panel,
according to his spokesman, Richard A. Grenell. Later in the evening, it was
announced that the Council would meet to take up the matter at 10 a.m.
Wednesday at the request of Japan. Mr. Hadley acknowledged that "what we
really don’t have a fix on is, you know, what’s the intention of all this, what
is the purpose of all this? " He noted it was a violation of North Korea’s
previous pledges to hold to a moratorium on missile tests.
It was also unclear why North Korea
fired short- and mid-range missiles, which it has tested successfully in the
past and of which it is said to own several hundred.
"One theory is that they knew that
there was a probability that things with the Taepodong 2 wouldn’t work, so it
was good to fire off a few missiles that would actually work," said a
senior Bush administration official, who asked that his name not be used
because he was not authorized to speak about this issue.
In 1998, the last time the North tested
a missile outside its territory, Pyongyang fired the Taepodong 1, which flew
over Japan before falling into the sea. That test set off a negative reaction
in the region, especially in Japan, which responded by strengthening its
military and its alliance with the United States.
Wednesday’s tests are likely to increase calls inside Japan to strengthen
its missile defense efforts with the United States, and
could increase support for
hawkish candidates in the race to succeed Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi, who is scheduled to retire in September.
Shinzo Abe, Japan’s chief cabinet secretary, who
is the leading candidate to succeed Mr. Koizumi and who has gained popularity
in recent years by being tough on North Korea and China, said the tests were
"a serious problem from the standpoint of our national security, peace and
stability of the international community and proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction."
The tests are sure to anger China — which expended considerable
diplomatic prestige in pressing the North not to go ahead with the launching and to rejoin the six-nation talks — and raise doubts anew about
the real extent of Beijing’s influence on Pyongyang. The Chinese foreign
ministry said it had no comment to make yet on the launching.
In South Korea, whose government publicly urged
the North not to test-fire but privately played down the risk, opponents of the government’s
engagement policy toward the North might gain support in presidential elections
next year.
Intelligence from American satellite
photographs indicated in mid-June that the North was proceeding with the
test-firing of the Taepodong 2 at a launching pad on North Korea’s remote east
coast. Satellite photographs showed that the North Koreans had taken steps to
put fuel into the missile, but the missile sat there until Wednesday morning,
leading to speculation that the North was simply staging the event in order to
gain attention from the United States.
American officials had suggested that
they might use the missile defense shield to shoot down the Taepodong 2 in
midair. Bad weather in this region was said to have delayed the launching,
because poor visibility would prevent the North from tracking its missile.
But the North contradicted expert
opinion by launching its long-range missile in predawn darkness today.
Norimitsu Onishi reported from Tokyo for
this article, and David E. Sanger from Vermont. Reporting was contributed by
Warren Hoge from the United Nations, and by David S. Cloud, Helene Cooper and
Sheryl Gay Stolberg from Washington.
New York Times