Russia, Ucraina, CSI Wsws 06-01-05
La battaglia del gas tra Russia
e Ucraina
Peter Schwarz
Negli anni seguenti alla dissoluzione dell’Urss,
ristrette cricche al potere negli ex Stati della confederazione si arricchirono
enormemente saccheggiando le proprietà statali.<
In seguito
all’accordo 15 anni fa’ tra i presidenti di Russia, Ucraina e Bielorussia di
dissolvere l’URSS e di costituire la CSI, decisione presa senza alcuna
consultazione democratica e alcun dibattito, nell’interesse di
Analogamente a quanto accaduto nei Balcani, dove la
dissoluzione della Jugoslavia fu accompagnata dall’incoraggiamento di conflitti
etnici, anche le nuove elite di Russia ed Ucraina hanno ricorso al nazionalismo
come diversione dalle crescenti tensioni sociali, portando
Accordo sul gas Russia-Ucraina:
- la Russia venderà d’ora in poi il gas all’Ucraina a
€230 per 1000m3, tramite Rosukrenegro, sussidiaria di Gazprom e di
una banca austriaca, che a sua volta assicurerà il rifornimento all’Ucraina per
$95, la differenza nel prezzo sarà realizzata con la vendita da parte di
Rosukrenegro di gas a buon mercato proveniente dal Centro Asia. - La quota di gas importato dalla Russia passerà dagli
attuali 23MD di a 17MD m3. - La UE riceve il 66% delle sue importazioni di gas dalla
Russia. - I vecchi paesi europei dispongono di riserve di gas
sufficienti per 2-3 mesi, - quelli dell’Est Europa, come la Polonia che riceve il
45% del gas e il 90% del petrolio dalla Russia, hanno riserve bastanti per
sole due settimane. - Nel compromesso raggiunto tra Russia e Ucraina ha avuto
un ruolo importante la pressione della UE, in particolare tramite una società legata
all’Austria, (Banca austriaca Raiffeisen, con quote in Gazprom?) che ha appena
assunto la presidenza UE. - In futuro i paesi europei pagheranno all’Ucraina $1,60
invece di $1,09 per il pedaggio del trasporto del gas sul suo territorio. - In un crescendo di tensione nei tre giorni di maggior
conflitto, la Russia ha accusato l’Ucraina di essersi appropriata di grandi
quantità di gas: 100mn. di m3, per un valore di $25mn. solo il 1°
gennaio; ha minacciato di bloccare il trasporto del gas dal Turkemnistan verso
l’Ucraina. Respingendo l’accusa di furto, l’Ucraina ha minacciato di prendersi
parte del gas come pedaggio. - I media Ucraini hanno a loro volta accusato la Russia
di perseguire obiettivi politici, cercando di - dare appoggio allo sconfitto delle elezioni
presidenziali scorse, Viktor Janukovich; - di portare alla bancarotta settori
dell’industria ucraina per poter acquisire a basso prezzo le industrie chiave e
l’oleodotto ucraino. - L’Ucraina ha anche ventilato la possibilità di
espellere la flotta russa nel Mar Nero dalla sua base di Sebastopoli in
Ucraina. L’acuirsi delle tensioni con la Russia riaprirebbe le ostilità tra
l’Est Ucraina, con forti legami economici con la Russia e un’alta quota di
immigrati russi, e l’Ovest Ucraina.
Solo nel 1997 venne risolta la lunga controversia sulla
flotta russa nel Mar Nero e lo status della Crimea; numerose sono state le
dispute sul rifornimento di gas russo, con la chiusura in diverse occasioni
negli anni 1990 del rubinetto del gas per bollette non pagate.
Al contempo diversi oligarchi ucraini hanno ammassato
fortune gigantesche attingendo illegalmente al gasdotto.
Julia Timoschenko è una di coloro che si arricchirono
con questo genere d’affari.
Con l’appoggio USA e UE è infine giunta al potere
un’ala della borghesia ucraina desiderosa di spezzare l’influenza russa e di
avvicinarsi a NATO e UE.
La maggior parte degli ex paesi del patto di Varsavia
sono entrati nella NATO o nella UE, mentre gli USA hanno utilizzato la guerra
contro l’Afghanistan per insediare le proprie basi in Asia Centrale.
La Russia ha perso il monopolio sull’export energetico
dall’area del Caspio in seguito all’apertura dell’oleodotto Baku-Ceyhan.
Il gruppo al potere a Mosca attorno a Putin ha cercato
di contrastare l’accerchiamento della Russia utilizzando le risorse energetiche
come strumento politico: oltre all’Ucraina, anche i tre paesi baltici e le
repubbliche di Moldavia,Georgia, Azerbaidjan e Armenia da gennaio 2006 devono
pagare un maggior prezzo per il gas, anche se l’aumento è inferiore a quello
chiesto all’Ucraina. E stato tagliato il rifornimento di gas russo anche alla
Moldavia.
Solo per la Bielorussia, stretta alleata della Russia,
è stato mantenuto il prezzo di $48 a 1000m3, in cambio della
cessione di tutto il suo gasdotto a Gazprom.
Wsws 06-01-05
WSWS
: News & Analysis : Europe : Russia
& the former USSR
The gas
conflict between Russia and Ukraine
By Peter
Schwarz
The
halting of Russian gas supplies to Ukraine
for three days this week brought to a head a long-smoldering conflict between
the two successor states of the former Soviet Union.
On
January 1, the Russian state company Gazprom stopped gas supplies to Ukraine after
the latter refused to pay the price demanded by Gazprom of $230 per thousand
cubic metres (tcm) of gas. Up until now, Ukraine had received Russian gas at
the special price of $50 tcm—a little more than one fifth of the world price.
On
Wednesday morning, Gazprom agreed to a deal with the Ukrainian gas company
Naftogas. In future, Gazprom will sell gas to Ukraine at the world market
price of $230 via the third party Rosukrenegro (a subsidiary of Gazprom and an
Austrian bank), which will in turn ensure deliveries to Ukraine at $95 tcm. The
price difference is to be made up by sales of cheap gas from central Asia undertaken by Rosukenegro.
Last
year, Ukraine received a
quarter of its gas from Russian sources, with 50 percent coming from Turkmenistan
and the rest from its own production facilities. According to the latest deal,
however, the proportion of Russian imported oil is to drop from the current
level of 23 billion to 17 billion cubic metres.
At
the same time, the most important routes for the export of Russian natural
gas to central and eastern Europe cross through the Ukraine. The only alternative
pipeline runs through Belarus
and Poland.
A recently agreed pipeline running through the Baltic Sea and connecting Russia directly with Germany will not be completed until
2010.
The
Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict briefly affected gas supplies to the countries
of the European Union, which receive a total of 66 percent of their imports
from Russian gas fields. While western European countries such as Germany possess
reserves to cover demand for two to three months, eastern European countries
were more directly hit. Poland, for example, which receives 42 percent of its
natural gas and 90 percent of its oil from Russia, has only two weeks of
reserve supplies.
Behind
the scenes, the EU exerted powerful pressure on the Russian and Ukrainian
governments to come to an agreement. The intervention of a company with
Austrian connections (Austria
has just taken over the chair of the EU) indicates that the EU played a
substantial role in the latest deal. This is confirmed by new prices agreed
for Russian gas that is transported to Europe via the Ukraine. In
future, European countries will pay Ukraine $1.60 instead of $1.09 for
the gas transported over Ukrainian territory.
During
the three days of the dispute, tension escalated between Moscow
and Kiev. Gazprom
had accused Ukraine
of illegally siphoning off large quantities of gas. On January 1 alone, 100
million cubic metres of gas, valued at $25 million, were re-diverted without
permission. “We are dealing with an incontestable case of theft,” Alexander
Medwedev, the vice-president of Gazprom, told the press. The Ukrainian
government rejected this reproach equally vigorously, while threatening to “use
Russian gas as a transit charge” under conditions of falling temperatures.
Gazprom
announced it would move to obstruct the flow of Ukrainian gas supplies from Turkmenistan
pipelines that run across Russian territory. For its part, the Ukrainian media
accused the Kremlin of pursuing political motives in the dispute and seeking to
back the camp of the loser in last year’s presidential election, Viktor
Janukovich, who is due to stand in parliamentary elections set for March. At the same time, the media
declared that Russia
is intent on driving sectors of Ukrainian industry into bankruptcy in order to
be able to take over key industries and the Ukrainian pipeline at favorable
prices.
The
administration in Ukraine
has also raised the possibility of expelling the Russian Black Sea fleet from
its base in the Ukrainian port of Sebastopol, a move that would undoubtedly provoke
vigorous opposition from Moscow.
Any intensification of frictions due to the gas conflict would also have led
to a re-ignition of hostilities between the East of Ukraine,
which has strong economic links with Russia
and a high proportion of Russian immigrants, and the West of Ukraine.
The
roots of the conflict
The
current contract runs for five years, but it is highly questionable whether it
will last that long. The gas conflict is just one symptom of growing
economic and political tensions.
To
understand the roots of this conflict, it is necessary to go back 15 years. At
that time, the presidents of Russia,
Ukraine and Belarus decided in Minsk
to dissolve the Soviet Union and replace it
with a community of independent states. This step was taken by Boris Yeltsin,
Leonid Kravchuk and Stanislav Schuchewitsch without any democratic
authorisation and without any debate over the economic and political
consequences. They
acted in the interest of a small ruling layer, which originated largely from
the Stalinist bureaucracy, and which then began to enormously enrich itself
during the following years through the plundering of Soviet state property.
To
denationalise state property and reintegrate the economy into the structure of
world capitalism, everything in the way of progressive economic and social
achievements that had been established by the Soviet Union
was destroyed and smashed. Complex economic relations that—in the case of Russia and Ukraine—existed
long before the emergence of the Soviet Union
were broken up. The consequences for the population were devastating.
Like
the Balkans, where the smashing up of Yugoslavia
was accompanied by the deliberate encouragement of ethnic conflicts, the new
ruling elites of Russia and Ukraine have
resorted to nationalism in order to create a diversion from growing social
tensions. As a result, the relations between Russia
and Ukraine
have deteriorated significantly.
These
relations have been extremely tense since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. A controversy over the Russian Black Sea
fleet and the national status of the Crimea
was only settled in 1997. There have also been repeated disputes over the
Russian gas supplies. The gas tap was turned off on a number of occasions in
the 1990s because of unpaid bills. At the same time, several Ukrainian
oligarchs amassed their gigantic fortunes by illegally tapping the pipelines
and selling off large amounts of gas. One of these profiteers was Julia
Timoschenko, a leader of Ukraine’s
so-called “orange revolution,” who made millions in the gas and oil business.
With
substantial support from the US
and the European Union, the “orange revolution” finally brought to power a wing
of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie that saw its future bound up with a break from Russia’s
influence and a turn towards NATO and the European Union.
Russia,
meanwhile, has come under increasing pressure from encirclement by the US and the
European Union. In
similar fashion to Ukraine,
a pro-American government also came to power last year in Georgia. Most
of the former Warsaw Pact states had already joined
NATO or the European Union, while the US
used its war against Afghanistan
to establish bases in Central Asia. Following
the opening up of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, Russia lost its monopoly over
energy exports from the Caspian region.
The
ruling layer in Russia
led by President Putin has sought to counter this encirclement by using the
energy resources of the country as a political tool. Alongside Ukraine, three Baltic states and the republics
of Moldavia, Georgia, Azerbaijan
and Armenia are due to pay higher
gas prices from January—although their increase is less drastic than that
imposed on Ukraine.
Gas supplies were cut off for Moldavia
as well as Ukraine.
The
only exception is Belarus,
which is closely allied to Russia,
and which continues to receive supplies at the low price of $48. In return,
however, the republic has had to agree to turn over its entire pipeline network
to Gazprom.
The
Kremlin and Gazprom can demonstrate that the price increase they are demanding
is entirely in line with the free market economic policies of the governments
affected. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) has made an increase in gas
prices to the world market level a condition of membership in the WTO,
regarding any special prices as a violation of competitive principles. It
favors, however, a gradual increase. “These countries must pay for the going
energy market prices in the medium-term, so that their economies become
demonstrably more efficient,” remarked WTO director Pascal Lamy.
The
strategic significance of gas and oil
In
view of the limited sources of fossil fuels and the increasing energy
demands of rapidly growing industrialised countries such as China and India, the issue of oil and gas
reserves is increasingly developing into the strategic question in the twenty-first
century. Following the US
activities in the Gulf and the latest war against Iraq,
whose neighboring states, Saudi Arabia,
Iran,
and the Gulf sheikdoms, control the world’s largest oil reserves, securing
access to energy supplies for the coming decades has become a priority for the
governments of all industrial nations.
The
struggle for energy reserves contains enormous potential for future conflict.
Growing demand and the effects of wars such as that conducted in Iraq have sent
oil prices soaring, and experts agree that these price levels are unlikely to
fall. Future conflicts will not only force prices even higher but will cut off
entire national economies from their energy input and threaten their very
existence. On a world scale, securing energy supplies today assumes a
similar significance to the struggle for access to coal and raw materials in Europe a hundred years ago—a conflict that was
instrumental to the outbreak of the First World War.
Above
all, Europe—and in particular Germany—is in a vulnerable
position. The European states possess only limited domestic energy reserves
that, like North Sea oil, are rapidly
declining. In 2000, the European OECD countries received somewhat more
than a third of their gas supplies from foreign countries. According to the
International Energy Agency, this figure is set to rise to nearly two thirds
by the year 2030. The situation is even more dramatic with regard to oil. Over
the same period, domestic oil production by European OECD countries is
predicted to decline from 48 to 15 percent.
The
members of the European Union already import 70 percent of their oil and 40
percent of their natural gas. The difference between European OECD[1]
and European Union countries stems from the status of Norway, which
is one of the world’s largest oil and gas exporters but is not a member of the
European Union.
Russia plays an extremely important role
for Europe’s future power supply. It has more
than a quarter of the world’s natural gas reserves and approximately 6 percent
of its oil reserves. In addition, it possesses nearly a quarter of the world’s
coal supplies.
The
former German government led by Gerhard Schröder had based its energy policy
on very strong links with Russia,
and Schröder developed a close personal friendship with Putin. Schröder
refrained from any criticism of the Kremlin’s war against Chechnya, praised
Putin as an “unimpeachable democrat” and remained neutral towards the
“orange revolution.”
Shortly
before ceding his post as German chancellor, Schröder sealed the contract for
building the Baltic Sea pipeline, which was
aimed at securing the German gas supply for the next 30 years. Since then, and
following an invitation from Putin, Schröder is due to take over as executive
chairman of the consortium that will build and operate the pipeline.
Following
the increase in gas prices by Gazprom, Schröder’s course was heavily criticised
in the German media. It is feared that Russia (possibly under another
government) will use the price and the supply of gas to Europe and Germany as a
means of exerting pressure, or that Germany will become increasing entangled in
the destabilisation of the region.
Under
the heading “First the Ukraine,
then us?” the weekly Die Zeit warned: “Gazprom has not only turned its
attentions towards Eastern Europe. With an
intelligent, farsighted expansion strategy, the Russian state company is
establishing direct access to Western European markets. The long-term goal
here is also price control of the Ukrainian kind, when gas reserves are
exhausted in the North Sea.”
As a
preventative measure, the newspaper recommends increased diversification:
“The gas reserves in North Africa and in the Caspian region are within the reach
of Europe and—significantly in terms of
costs—are nearer than the Siberian gas fields. Liquid gas technology is
ripe for introduction into Germany, enabling the country to also import
natural gas with ships. It now rests with the new Federal Government to develop
for Germany new natural gas
sources outside of Russia.”
In
similar fashion, the Frankfurter Allgemeine argues: “The biggest danger for
the power supply of the West in the foreseeable future will not come from the
scarceness of resources, but with its concentration in the hands of a handful
of states that are often politically very unreliable.”
There
is only one way to fend off political pressure from energy suppliers: “Europe must begin to diversify its energy purchases….
The Caspian region, which can be reached overland, or the Gulf States, which have much experience with
liquid gas transportation, would be suitable as new suppliers.”
There
is, however, one big problem with such advice. The regions specified by Die
Zeit and FAZ—North Africa, the Caspian Sea and the Gulf States—are not only
politically unstable, but also highly sought after by numerous
competitors—France, England, China and above all the US.
Supply
deals for oil and gas are already the subject of violent international
conflicts. China,
whose energy consumption is rising continuously, recently signed a contract for
liquid gas supplies from Iran.
The deal extends over a period of 25 years and has a total value
of $70-$100 billion. In return, China wants to invest substantial
sums in Iranian gas fields. India
has also struck a deal with Iran
for energy supplies worth more than $40 billion. Both contracts have met
considerable opposition from the US,
which is endeavoring to isolate Iran
and is threatening to impose sanctions.
Increasingly,
the struggle for energy is becoming the arena for violent conflicts amongst the
older established imperialist powers and with the newer emerging industrial
nations.
—————————-
Russlands
Energiekonzern betreibt ein Machtspiel mit weltpolitischen Auswirkungen. Eine
Analyse
von Michael Thumann
Im
bitteren Streit zwischen Russland und der Ukraine um die Erdgasversorgung
spielen die Deutschen die Naiven am Rande. „Ein bilaterales Problem“, wiegelt das Auswärtige
Amt ab, und aus dem Kanzleramt ist gar nichts zu hören. Ist halt
Weihnachtsurlaub. Dabei nutzt Moskau gerade die westlichen Feiertage, die
Kräfteverhältnisse in Osteuropa neu zu justieren und verlorenes Terrain neu zu
erobern.
Vorweg die
nackten Fakten. Moskau will den Gaspreis für die Ukraine verfünffachen. Die Ukraine
protestiert und droht mit der Entnahme von Gas aus der Druschba-Pipeline von
Russland über die Ukraine nach Westeuropa. Außerdem droht Kiew an, den
Mietzins für die Nutzung der ukrainischen Marinefestung Sewastopol durch
die russische Schwarzmeerflotte anzuheben. Der russische
Verteidigungsminister stellt daraufhin die Integrität der ukrainischen Grenzen
infrage.
Für einen
Streit um den Gaspreis klingt das ziemlich kriegslüstern. Drei Fragen stellen
sich darob: 1. Warum eskaliert der Streit um die Gaspreise derart? 2. Kann er
zum Krieg führen? 3. Erwächst den Deutschen daraus eine Gefahr?
Erstens.
Moskaus Begründung für die Preiserhöhung klingt wirtschaftlich: weil die
Energiepreise eben in der ganzen Welt gestiegen seien. Das wahre Motiv aber ist
politisch. Unter den Staaten der ehemaligen Sowjetunion strebt der russische
Staatskonzern Gasprom nach einer Monopolposition. Konkurrenten wie Kasachstan
und Turkmenistan kauft Gasprom das Erdgas in langfristigen Verträgen ab, damit
diese Länder nicht als eigenständige Anbieter auftreten. Ein Monopolist in
Eurasien indes kann die Preise diktieren – auch nach politischen Erwägungen.
Der Moskau
zugewandte weißrussische Diktator Lukaschenko bekommt Sonderkonditionen von 50
Dollar pro 1000 Kubikmeter. Die Ukrainer, die sich vor einem Jahr mit der
orangenen Revolution dem russischen Zugriff entzogen und nun einen demokratisch
gewählten Präsidenten haben, sollen von jetzt auf sofort den Weltmarktpreis von
255 Dollar zahlen. Eine schrittweise Anpassung lehnt Moskau ab. In der
Ukraine dürfte die Verfünffachung des Preises zur Verarmung vieler Haushalte,
zu einer Wirtschaftskrise und am Ende gar zum Sturz der Regierung von Wiktor
Juschtschenko führen. Das aber wäre genau nach dem Geschmack des russischen
Präsidenten.
Juschtschenko
ärgert die Russen aus vielerlei Gründen. Die Betonung der Unabhängigkeit (die zu
akzeptieren vielen Russen schwer fällt), die einigermaßen demokratischen
Verhältnisse im Land, das Streben nach Westen, die Avancen Richtung EU –
das alles gehört nicht zu den Benimmregeln, die der Kreml noch heute für die
ehemaligen Satelliten ausgibt. Besonders empfindlich aber reagiert Moskau
auf die Gespräche zwischen Kiew und Washington über eine stärkere Anbindung an
die Nato, bis hin zur Mitgliedschaft. Und die Nato ist nun einmal – egal,
wie viele Verträge sie mit Russland zur Beruhigung schon abgeschlossen hat –
ein Feindbild.
Insofern
ergibt sich mit der Gasrechnung für Wladimir Putin ein perfektes Druckmittel,
mit dem die Ukrainer davon abgehalten werden sollen, zu enge Bindungen an den
Westen einzugehen.
Abstand zur Nato gegen langsame Erhöhung der Gaspreise – wäre das kein Deal?
Und falls die Regierung in Kiew nicht nachgeben will, stürzt sie irgendwann von
selbst über die Energietarife und deren Folgen. Gasproms Preistabelle ist
die Fortsetzung der Kremlpolitik mit anderen Mitteln.
Zweitens: Eine
militärische Zuspitzung des Konflikts bleibt dennoch unwahrscheinlich. Beide
Seiten können daran derzeit kein Interesse haben. Für die Ukraine ist die
Gefahr zu groß, dass die russische Flotte das überwiegend russisch besiedelte
Sewastopol mit einem Sylvesterblitz besetzt. Für Russland käme ein
Konflikt zu Beginn dieses Jahres ungelegen, denn Russland führt 2006 die
G-8-Nationen und will sie nach Moskau einladen. Eine Pleite wie 1980, als die
USA und viele westliche Nationen die Olympischen Spiele boykottierten, weil die
Sowjetunion Afghanistan überfallen hatte, wird Putin sich nicht erlauben.
Er wird
daher den Ukrainern ein Geschäft vorschlagen, auf das bereits die Weißrussen in
ihrer Not am vergangenen Mittwoch eingegangen sind. Minsk zahlt künftig
weiterhin knapp 50 Dollar für 1000 Kubikmeter russisches Gas und darf
Transitgebühren auf das nach Europa durchgeleitete Gas erheben. Dafür
übernimmt Gasprom die komplette Kontrolle der weißrussischen Gaspipeline nach
Europa, mit anderen Worten: Minsk tritt ein Teil seiner souveränen Rechte an
Moskau ab.
So in etwa
kann sich Putin die Gasverhältnisse auch mit der Ukraine vorstellen. Es werden
vielleicht noch viele Monate der gegenseitigen Drohungen und geheimen
Verhandlungen vergehen, doch dann könnten die Russen am Ziel sein.
Drittens: Eine
unmittelbare Gefahr für die Deutschen ergibt sich aus dem Zwist nicht. Die
deutschen Gasversorger haben genügend Reserven gelagert, um über die
kommenden Wochen, ja Monate zu kommen. Sollten ein harter Winter und eine
abgeschaltete ukrainische Pipeline zeitlich zusammentreffen, dann gibt es
immer noch die Pipeline über Weißrussland und Polen. Außerdem
profitieren die Deutschen heute von der klugen Diversifikationspolitik der
siebziger Jahre, sodass nur gut ein Drittel unseres Erdgases aus Russland
kommt, der Rest aus den Niederlanden, Norwegen und anderen Zulieferländern.
Für
Deutschland ist allerdings eine unabhängige starke Ukraine wichtig – als
Handelspartner und Transitland, als politischer Partner, als strategisches Land
zwischen Schwarzem Meer und dem Westen. An einer machtpolitischen Einverleibung der Ukraine
durch Russland, das sich ausdrücklich als Konkurrenzmacht zur EU versteht,
können Berlin und Brüssel kein Interesse haben.
Eine
weitere Gefahr droht in Zukunft. Gasprom hat sein Augenmerk nicht nur auf
Osteuropa gerichtet. Mit einer klugen, weitsichtigen Expansionsstrategie
verschafft sich der russische Staatskonzern direkten Zugang zu den
westeuropäischen Märkten. Das ferne Ziel heißt auch hier Preiskontrolle nach
ukrainischer Art, wenn einmal die Gasreserven in der Nordsee erschöpft sind.
Der ehemalige Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder ist in dieser Sache Gasproms
bester Lobbyist, denn er hat mit Putin eine direkte Pipeline von Russland nach
Deutschland auf dem Grund der Ostsee durchgesetzt und wird ihren Bau jetzt als
Manager begleiten. Zweitens, und das ist noch wichtiger, hat der deutsche
Gaspromi alle Versuche torpediert, die Gasversorgung Deutschlands aus vielen
Quellen auch in zwanzig Jahren sicherzustellen. Gas aus Algerien? Vom
Kaspischen Meer? Aus der Golfregion? Nein, bloß das nicht, Schröder hat sieben
Jahre lang die deutsche Energiestrategie auf Russland verengt und dabei
weitreichende Entscheidungen getroffen.
Es ist noch
nicht spät, diesen Kurs zu korrigieren. Die Gasreserven in Nordafrika und in
der kaspischen Region liegen in greifbarer Reichweite Europas und – nicht
unwichtig für die Kosten – näher als die sibirischen Gasfelder. Die
Flüssiggas-Technologie ist reif für die Einführung in Deutschland, damit das
Land auch auf Schiffen Erdgas einführen kann. Es liegt jetzt in der Hand der neuen
Bundesregierung, neue Erdgasquellen außerhalb Russlands für Deutschland zu
erschließen. Das Beispiel Ukraine sollte ganz Europa Vorsicht lehren.
(c) ZEIT
online, 29.12.2005
01/2006