Individual Stockholder, R.I.P.
Azionista individuale – riposi in pace
WSJ 3/10/05
Tesi John C. Bogle, fondatore del gruppo di fondi comuni d’investimento Vanguard Group (Pennsylvania), secondo al mondo con $850 MD di fondi amministrati:
il
grosso dei pacchetti azionari non è più detenuto da azionisti
individuali, ma da istituzioni finanziarie (fondi comuni, fondi
pensione, ecc.) controllate da grandi gruppi;
i loro
amministratori non fanno gli interessi dei risparmiatori di cui
gestiscono il denaro, ma dei gruppi controllanti – e i propri.
In questo modo i risparmiatori e i pensionati sono deprivati di buona parte del loro “equo guadagno” (e dell’equa pensione).
*****
- Proprietà diretta azioni da parte di famiglie USA: 1950=91%, oggi=32%
- Proprietà azioni da parte istituzioni finanziarie: 1950=9%, oggi =68%.
-
Individui hanno perso le prerogative della proprietà, quali la scelta
dei titoli azionari e la possibilità di intervenire sulla direzione
delle società partecipate. - Le isituzioni finanziarie a
loro volta sono “proprietarie di nome, agenti di fatto”, con dovere di
operare per conto dei loro mandanti (proprietari dei fondi comuni e
beneficiari dei piani pensionistici). - Fondi pensione: 1950 avevano 1% di tutto il capitale azionario; 1989-95 saliti al 27%, ora rifluiti al 21%
- Fondi comuni: 3% nel 1950, 8% nel 1990, 28% oggi.
- Al declino secolare dei piani pensionistici a beneficio definito ha
corrisposto incremento piani di risparmio a contribuzione definita
(fondi comuni). - Enorme concentrazione: al posto di milioni di risparmiatori i primi 100 gestori di denaro controllano il 58% di tutte le azioni.
- Con poche eccezioni questi investitori istituzionali non intervengono
nella gestione delle imprese di cui hanno quote azionarie. Spesso hanno
interessi in conflitto con quelli dei loro azionisti. - Ad es. fondi pensione aziendali
sono controllati dagli stessi vertici aziendali remunerati sulla base
degli utili che realizzano. Durante gli anni ’90 essi elevarono
arbitrariamente le proiezioni dei rendimenti dei piani pensionistici,
facendo risultare utili operativi in linea con gli obiettivi anche
quando i tassi cadevano e venivano erose le prospettive di rendimento. - I gestori dei fondi comuni
sono remunerati da società distinte che cercano di massimizzare il
rendimento del proprio capitale, in conflitto con il proprio compito di
massimizzare il rendimento dei capitali ad essi affidati. - Gli eccessivi onorari per consulenza, le spese, gli alti costi di sottoscrizione e le enormi commissioni sulle transazioni dei titoli in portafoglio pagate ai broker negli ultimi due decenni hanno consumato ben il 45% del rendimento reale conseguito dai loro portafogli titoli.
- Mentre anni ’50 e ’60 investivano a lungo termine, ora prevale la
speculazione a breve ==> elevata rotazione titoli: i fondi comuni
azionari 1950-65 ruotavano il 17% del portafoglio in un anno; nel
1990-2005 una media del 91%. - Le istituzioni finanziarie
giganti sono perlopiù assenti dalla gestione delle società partecipate;
molto raramente votano contro i loro manager. -
“Oggi
è difficile distinguere i possessori dai posseduti.Tramite i piani
pensionistici a beneficio definito i grandi gruppi possiedono il 12% di
tutte le azioni, e controllano un altro 11% con i piani risparmio a
contribuzione definita… la maggior parte dei maggiori gestori di
denaro sono a loro volta posseduti da grandi conglomerati finanziari.
Si può sostenere che questa circolarità del possesso permette
all’America delle corporations di controllare se stessa”. - Le
ecccessive previsioni di rendimento dei piani pensionistici hanno
giocato un ruolo importante nella creazione dell’ammanco di $600 MD nelle passività dei fondi pensione privati rispetto alle attività. L’ammanco dei fondi pensionistici pubblici è stato stimato a $1,2 MD,
per un totale di $1,8MD, che continua a crescere. Nel corso di un
quarto di secolo i risparmiatori pensionistici hanno accumulato attivi
medi individuali di soli 33,6 mila $ nei fondi privati e di 26,9 mila $
nei fondi pubblici (frazione irrisoria di quanto necessario per una
pensione decente). - Un neo-assunto ha un orizzonte
d’investimento di 60 anni. Al rendimento nominale dell’8% annuo, tra 60
anni avrebbe $101.000; ma se il sistema finanziario ne consuma il 2,5%
annuo per l’intermediazione (stima per difetto), il risultato sarà pari
a soli $25.000, ossia un quarto. - Secondo Bogle tutto ciò
èè dovuto al mancato sviluppo di un “ambiente etico, regolamentare e
legale” che richieda ai fiduciari quali gli agenti dei fondi di operare
nell’esclusivo interesse dei loro mandanti. - Si è inoltre
sviluppata una giungla di programmi pensionistici a imposizione
differita (Social Security, pensioni aziendali e pubbliche, piani di
retribuzione differita, 401(k)s, 403(b)s, IRAs individuali, e Roth
IRAs, cui ora Bush vuole aggiungere i Personal Savings Accounts (piani
di risparmio pensionistici individuali). Necessità di sviluppare un
sistema integrato, che permetta risparmi. - “La società del possesso è finita. La società degli agenti (o dell’intermediazione) non sta funzionando come dovrebbe).
NOTA:
Vanguard Group si presenta come il gruppo di fondi con i più bassi
costi di intermediazione, e pubblica su internet tutti i voti per
delega dati dai gestori dei suoi fondi alle assemblee delle società
partecipate, onde darsi un’immagine di trasparenza.
Vanguard Group si presenta come il gruppo di fondi con i più bassi
costi di intermediazione, e pubblica su internet tutti i voti per
delega dati dai gestori dei suoi fondi alle assemblee delle società
partecipate, onde darsi un’immagine di trasparenza.
L’articolo
può quindi essere visto come una presa di posizione “pro domo sua”, ma
è proprio dai conflitti tra gruppi e frazioni che emergono con evidenza
le contraddizioni del sistema.
può quindi essere visto come una presa di posizione “pro domo sua”, ma
è proprio dai conflitti tra gruppi e frazioni che emergono con evidenza
le contraddizioni del sistema.
By JOHN C. BOGLE
October 3, 2005; Page A16
The amazing disappearance of the individual stockholder as the backbone of the U.S. stock market has been one of the least recognized but most profound trends of the last half-century. As shown in the chart nearby, direct ownership of stocks by American households has declined from 91% in 1950 to just 32% today. The 9% ownership stake held by financial institutions in 1950 crossed the 50% mark in 1983, and now totals 68% of all stocks. It is hard to imagine that our earlier society dominated by individual stock ownership will ever return.
Of
course, individual investors remain major participants in the stock
market, but now do so largely through mutual funds and public and
private pension plans. But such participation lacks the traditional
attributes of ownership such as selection of individual stocks and
engagement in the process of corporate governance.
course, individual investors remain major participants in the stock
market, but now do so largely through mutual funds and public and
private pension plans. But such participation lacks the traditional
attributes of ownership such as selection of individual stocks and
engagement in the process of corporate governance.
* * *
But aren’t our financial institutions owners of stocks? Not really. They are owners in name — agents, in fact,
with a duty to act on behalf of their principals, including our mutual
fund owners and beneficiaries of our retirement plans. Today’s
agency-dominated investment society is overwhelmingly composed of those
two groups of underlying owners.
with a duty to act on behalf of their principals, including our mutual
fund owners and beneficiaries of our retirement plans. Today’s
agency-dominated investment society is overwhelmingly composed of those
two groups of underlying owners.
At first, the march toward institutionalization was led by pension plans. Holding
less than 1% of all stocks in 1950, they shot up to 19% in 1980 and 27%
in 1989-95, only to ebb to today’s level of 21%. Growth in mutual-fund ownership, on the other hand, was stagnant in the early years, holding at 3% in 1950 and 1980 alike, rising to just 8% by 1990. Since then, fund ownership of stocks has risen relentlessly to a record high of 28% currently. Within the pension segment, public plans are holding steady while private pension plans are gradually receding. But the
secular decline in defined-benefit pension plans has been matched by an
offsetting rise in defined-contribution thrift and savings plans in
which mutual funds are the major component. So today’s dominant stock ownership by mutual funds seems destined for continued growth.
less than 1% of all stocks in 1950, they shot up to 19% in 1980 and 27%
in 1989-95, only to ebb to today’s level of 21%. Growth in mutual-fund ownership, on the other hand, was stagnant in the early years, holding at 3% in 1950 and 1980 alike, rising to just 8% by 1990. Since then, fund ownership of stocks has risen relentlessly to a record high of 28% currently. Within the pension segment, public plans are holding steady while private pension plans are gradually receding. But the
secular decline in defined-benefit pension plans has been matched by an
offsetting rise in defined-contribution thrift and savings plans in
which mutual funds are the major component. So today’s dominant stock ownership by mutual funds seems destined for continued growth.
Institutional investing is now largely the business of giants. America’s 100 largest money managers alone now hold 58% of all stocks.
When such a relative handful of professional managers substantially
displaces a diffuse group of millions of inchoate individual investors,
one might have expected the managers to more aggressively assert their
rights of stock ownership and demand more enlightened corporate
governance focused on shareholder interests. With few notable
exceptions, however (some state and local pension plans, unions, and
TIAA-CREF), our institutional investors have refrained from active participation in corporate affairs.
What explains the passivity of these institutions that in fact hold effective control over corporate America? First, too many
of our financial agents have their own interests to serve, often
conflicting with the interests of their investor-principals. It is a truism that principals
are likely to watch over their own money with far more care than they
take in watching over the assets entrusted to them as the agents of
others. When there are many masters to serve, it is the master who pays
the servant whose interests are most likely placed front and center. Corporate pension plans, for example, are controlled by the same executives whose compensation is based on the earnings they report to shareholders. During
the 1990s, they arbitrarily raised their projections of future pension
plan returns, enhancing operating earnings to meet "guidance" targets,
even as interest rates tumbled and prospective returns eroded.
of our financial agents have their own interests to serve, often
conflicting with the interests of their investor-principals. It is a truism that principals
are likely to watch over their own money with far more care than they
take in watching over the assets entrusted to them as the agents of
others. When there are many masters to serve, it is the master who pays
the servant whose interests are most likely placed front and center. Corporate pension plans, for example, are controlled by the same executives whose compensation is based on the earnings they report to shareholders. During
the 1990s, they arbitrarily raised their projections of future pension
plan returns, enhancing operating earnings to meet "guidance" targets,
even as interest rates tumbled and prospective returns eroded.
Similarly, mutual fund managers are compensated
by separate corporations seeking to maximize the return on their own
capital (i.e., to enhance their own wealth), in direct conflict with
their duty to maximize the returns on the capital entrusted to them by
their fund shareholders. The excessive advisory fees, expenses,
hefty sales loads, and huge commissions on portfolio transactions paid
to brokers in return for their sales support consumed something like 45% of the real returns earned on fund portfolios during the past two decades.
Second, unlike their predecessors in the ’50s and ’60s, financial institutions focus on investment strategies that emphasize short-term speculation in evanescent stock prices, rather than traditional long-term investing based on durable intrinsic corporate values. From 1950
to 1965, equity mutual funds turned over their portfolios at an average
rate of 17% per year; in 1990-2005, the turnover rate averaged 91% per
year. The old own-a-stock industry could hardly afford to take for
granted effective corporate governance in the interest of shareholders;
the new rent-a-stock industry has little reason to care.
to 1965, equity mutual funds turned over their portfolios at an average
rate of 17% per year; in 1990-2005, the turnover rate averaged 91% per
year. The old own-a-stock industry could hardly afford to take for
granted effective corporate governance in the interest of shareholders;
the new rent-a-stock industry has little reason to care.
To further complicate matters, today’s typical giant
private financial institution — managing both pension plans and mutual
funds — faces serious conflicts in its exercise of the rights and
responsibilities of ownership. When a proxy proposal is opposed by
the management of a corporate client, the money manager is unlikely to
vote in its favor. It is not surprising, then, that governance activists among large private money managers are conspicuous not merely by their scarcity but by their absence. And it gets worse. Today, it
is difficult to separate the owners from the owned. Through its
defined-benefit pension plans, corporations own 12% of all stocks, and
dominate another 11% through defined-contribution savings plans. What is more, most of our largest money managers are themselves now owned by giant financial conglomerates. Arguably, this circularity of ownership allows corporate America to control itself.
private financial institution — managing both pension plans and mutual
funds — faces serious conflicts in its exercise of the rights and
responsibilities of ownership. When a proxy proposal is opposed by
the management of a corporate client, the money manager is unlikely to
vote in its favor. It is not surprising, then, that governance activists among large private money managers are conspicuous not merely by their scarcity but by their absence. And it gets worse. Today, it
is difficult to separate the owners from the owned. Through its
defined-benefit pension plans, corporations own 12% of all stocks, and
dominate another 11% through defined-contribution savings plans. What is more, most of our largest money managers are themselves now owned by giant financial conglomerates. Arguably, this circularity of ownership allows corporate America to control itself.
The problems created by this new and conflicted world of financial intermediation are hardly trivial. Excessive
return projections for pension plans have played a major role in
creating the current shortfall of $600 billion in private pension plan
liabilities relative to plan assets. The shortfall in public plans has been estimated at $1.2 trillion, bringing the total deficit to $1.8 trillion, and rising.
Individual retirement savings are also at dangerously low levels. Only
22% of workers participate in 401(k) savings plans and only 10% in IRAs
(9% have both). Despite having had a quarter-century-plus to build
assets in these tax-sheltered plans, investors have accumulated
balances of but $33,600 and $26,900 per participant respectively, a
trivial fraction of what would be required for a decent retirement.
return projections for pension plans have played a major role in
creating the current shortfall of $600 billion in private pension plan
liabilities relative to plan assets. The shortfall in public plans has been estimated at $1.2 trillion, bringing the total deficit to $1.8 trillion, and rising.
Individual retirement savings are also at dangerously low levels. Only
22% of workers participate in 401(k) savings plans and only 10% in IRAs
(9% have both). Despite having had a quarter-century-plus to build
assets in these tax-sheltered plans, investors have accumulated
balances of but $33,600 and $26,900 per participant respectively, a
trivial fraction of what would be required for a decent retirement.
With
today’s agency society arrogating to itself far too large a share of
market returns, the outlook for future individual retirement savings is
dire. A citizen entering the work force today has an investment
horizon of at least 60 years. If the stock market were to earn an
average nominal return of 8% per year, $1,000 invested today would then
be worth $101,000 — the magic of compounding returns. But if our financial system consumes 2.5 percentage points annually of that total return — a conservative estimate of today’s reality — that $1,000, growing now at 5.5% net, would be worth just $25,000, a minuscule 25% of the accumulation
that could have been obtained simply by owning the stock market itself.
The magic of compounding returns, it turns out, is simply overwhelmed
by the tyranny of compounding costs at today’s exorbitant levels.
today’s agency society arrogating to itself far too large a share of
market returns, the outlook for future individual retirement savings is
dire. A citizen entering the work force today has an investment
horizon of at least 60 years. If the stock market were to earn an
average nominal return of 8% per year, $1,000 invested today would then
be worth $101,000 — the magic of compounding returns. But if our financial system consumes 2.5 percentage points annually of that total return — a conservative estimate of today’s reality — that $1,000, growing now at 5.5% net, would be worth just $25,000, a minuscule 25% of the accumulation
that could have been obtained simply by owning the stock market itself.
The magic of compounding returns, it turns out, is simply overwhelmed
by the tyranny of compounding costs at today’s exorbitant levels.
The
serious shortfalls in retirement reserves that represent the backbone
of the nation’s savings have arisen importantly because our manager-agents have placed their own interests ahead of the interests of the investor-principals
they are duty-bound to serve. Our financial institutions have failed to
exercise the rights and responsibilities of corporate citizenship; to
adequately fund pension reserves; and to deliver to fund shareholders
their fair share of the returns generated by the financial markets
themselves.
serious shortfalls in retirement reserves that represent the backbone
of the nation’s savings have arisen importantly because our manager-agents have placed their own interests ahead of the interests of the investor-principals
they are duty-bound to serve. Our financial institutions have failed to
exercise the rights and responsibilities of corporate citizenship; to
adequately fund pension reserves; and to deliver to fund shareholders
their fair share of the returns generated by the financial markets
themselves.
* * *
Why?
Largely because the radical change from an ownership society dominated
by individual investors to an intermediation society dominated by
professional money managers and corporations has not been accompanied by the development of an ethical, regulatory and legal environment that
requires trustees and fiduciaries, as agents, to act solely and
exclusively in the interests of their principals. In addition, we
have developed a patchwork of tax-deferred retirement programs —
Social Security, corporate and public pensions, deferred compensation
plans, 401(k)s, 403(b)s, individual IRAs, and Roth IRAs — and are now
considering the addition of Personal Savings Accounts to the list.
We need to undertake a careful appraisal of this often costly mix, and
develop an integrated retirement system that will enhance savings.
Largely because the radical change from an ownership society dominated
by individual investors to an intermediation society dominated by
professional money managers and corporations has not been accompanied by the development of an ethical, regulatory and legal environment that
requires trustees and fiduciaries, as agents, to act solely and
exclusively in the interests of their principals. In addition, we
have developed a patchwork of tax-deferred retirement programs —
Social Security, corporate and public pensions, deferred compensation
plans, 401(k)s, 403(b)s, individual IRAs, and Roth IRAs — and are now
considering the addition of Personal Savings Accounts to the list.
We need to undertake a careful appraisal of this often costly mix, and
develop an integrated retirement system that will enhance savings.
The
overarching need is for a clearly enforced public policy that honors
the interests of our citizen-investors and puts these beneficiaries in
the driver’s seat where they belong. The ownership society is over. The
agency (or intermediation) society is not working as it should.
overarching need is for a clearly enforced public policy that honors
the interests of our citizen-investors and puts these beneficiaries in
the driver’s seat where they belong. The ownership society is over. The
agency (or intermediation) society is not working as it should.
Mr.
Bogle, founder and former CEO of Vanguard, is author of "The Battle for
the Soul of Capitalism," published this week by Yale.
Bogle, founder and former CEO of Vanguard, is author of "The Battle for
the Soul of Capitalism," published this week by Yale.